Filed: Sep. 24, 2014
Latest Update: Sep. 24, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel, Assistant United States Attorney Justin Lee, and defendant Kenneth Dwayne Oliver, by and through his attorney of record, Hayes H. Gable III, agree and stipulate to vacate the existing status conference in the above-entitled case, September 25, 2014, and to continue the matter to O
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel, Assistant United States Attorney Justin Lee, and defendant Kenneth Dwayne Oliver, by and through his attorney of record, Hayes H. Gable III, agree and stipulate to vacate the existing status conference in the above-entitled case, September 25, 2014, and to continue the matter to Oc..
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STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel, Assistant United States Attorney Justin Lee, and defendant Kenneth Dwayne Oliver, by and through his attorney of record, Hayes H. Gable III, agree and stipulate to vacate the existing status conference in the above-entitled case, September 25, 2014, and to continue the matter to October 16, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., for status conference.
The reason for this continuance is to allow defense counsel to allow the parties additional time to negotiate a settlement in this matter.
The parties further agree and stipulate that the period from September 25, 2014 to October 16, 2014, should be excluded in computing time for commencement of trial under the Speedy Trial Act, based upon the interest of justice under 18 USC §§3161(h)(7)(A) and Local Code T4, to allow continuity of counsel and to allow reasonable time necessary for effective defense preparation.
It is further agreed and stipulated that the need for defense counsel to prepare exceeds the defendant's and the public's interest in commencing trial within the 70-day Speedy Trial time period.
Accordingly, the parties request the Court to adopt this stipulation.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
