CALLIE V. S. GRANADE, District Judge.
This matter is back before the Court following the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' order vacating the certificate of appealability ("COA") and remanding this case for further consideration. (Doc. 101). The Eleventh Circuit specifically directed this Court to "consider whether Charest has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, in conformity with
Patrick Joseph Charest is an Alabama prisoner in the custody of respondent, Billy Mitchem. On March 14, 1995, a jury found Charest guilty of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama. (Appendix A, p. 15-19).
After being convicted of these crimes, Charest filed his first Rule 32 petition in state court in February 1998.
Charest next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Alabama on May 8, 2003. (Case 03-cv-283-CB-D). While that petition was pending, Charest filed a second Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County in February 2004. During circuit court hearings in 2005 related to that petition, Charest reached an agreement with the prosecutor and the judge where his delinquency conviction was set aside and his life sentences were ordered to run concurrently instead of consecutively as originally imposed. (Doc. 59-1; Doc. 62-1, pp. 84-91; pp. 95-105). In exchange for the sentence modification, Charest agreed to waive all pending claims in his second Rule 32 petition, with the "exception of his issue of whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the actions complained of," because he alleged the crimes occurred in Florida, not Alabama.
Also in 2005, the Southern District of Alabama denied Charest's first petition for writ of habeas corpus (Case 03-cv-283-CB-D; Doc. 16), which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed (Case 03-cv-283-CB-D; Doc. 25), because it was time-barred. (Case 03-cv-283-CB-D; Doc. 16, p. 1).
Charest filed a third Rule 32 petition in September 2006 (Doc. 62-6, p. 1), but he did not argue in that petition that the crimes occurred in Florida. (Doc. 62-6, pp. 2-3). The circuit court denied his petition, which the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in 2008. (Doc. 62-6, p. 5-6). Charest filed a fourth Rule 32 petition in 2009, which the circuit court also denied and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. (Doc. 9-7).
Charest then filed his second habeas petition to initiate this case in February 2010. After careful consideration, this Court dismissed the petition with prejudice for failing to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). (Docs. 10, 14). Charest filed a motion for a COA, which the Eleventh Circuit granted, as to the following question:
(Doc. 26, p. 4). The Eleventh Circuit eventually concluded that this Court failed to address Charest's argument that his 2005 re-sentencing constituted a new and final judgment. The Eleventh Circuit thus vacated and remanded the case to this Court for further consideration. (Doc. 29, p. 3).
Upon remand, this Court appointed legal counsel for Charest, and established a briefing schedule to address the issues identified by the Eleventh Circuit. (Doc. 32). After the parties briefed the issues presented on remand, the magistrate judge issued a report that recommended denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that Charest abused the writ and because the second petition was time-barred. (Doc. 63, pp. 55-56). The magistrate judge also concluded that Charest's 2005 sentence modifications were a "new judgment" in accordance with
Charest appealed this Court's order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on jurisdictional grounds and, in the alternative, denying it as an abuse of the writ and untimely. (Doc. 101, pp. 1-2). Without considering Charest's underlying claim that the crimes occurred in Florida, this Court granted a COA on the following question:
(Doc. 96; Doc. 101, p. 2).
In a brief order, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the COA, and remanded the case for this court to consider whether Charest has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, in conformity with
"When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, (1) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
To make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), Charest must demonstrate "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."
A review of the testimony and evidence offered at trial, along with twenty years of post-conviction motions, briefs, and court orders, help confirm that Charest's argument is without merit. During Charest's trial in 1995, multiple witnesses testified that the crimes at issue took place in Alabama. Specifically, Tina Charest (Charest's daughter), "A.C." (victim), Lawrence Griffith (Baldwin County Sheriff's Department), and Crystal O'Donovan (witness) each testified about the events occurring in Alabama. (Appendix A, pp. 20-101). No objections were raised at trial regarding the testimony that the crimes occurred in Alabama, and the jury found the evidence sufficient to convict Charest of rape and sodomy.
Nevertheless, after his conviction Charest has argued that the "State's Indictment assumes Alabama had Jurisdiction, but no proof at trial." (Appendix A, p. 113). Charest has also argued that the Florida line is miles away from the Perdido River and where the crimes occurred because of natural changes over time. (Doc. 63, pp. 7-10; Appendix A, p. 114). These arguments fail. The Perdido River forms the boundary between Alabama and Florida. Ala. Const. I, § 37; Ala. Code § 41-2-4; Fla. Const. art. II, § 1; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 6.081. There is no dispute between Alabama and Florida regarding the location of the state line. The bridge Charest traversed with A.C. crosses the Perdido River, and at trial four witnesses testified Charest and A.C. were located on the Alabama side of the bridge when the crimes occurred. (Appendix A, pp. 20-101).
However, assuming for the sake of argument that the crimes took place on the Florida side of the bridge, the Circuit Court of Baldwin County would still have jurisdiction to hear Charest's case. Charest does not deny that he and the victim crossed back and forth between Alabama and Florida on the night in question. (Doc. 63, p. 3, n. 5). As the United States Supreme Court explained in
In
The Court of Criminal Appeals has further noted that jurisdiction over a defendant "requires both personal and subject matter jurisdiction" and matters of "personal jurisdiction are waivable." (Doc. 62-14, pp. 7-8);
Apart from Charest arguing that his crimes occurred in Florida, there is no indication that jurisdiction in this case is otherwise defective. The indictment pertained to felony and misdemeanor charges, giving the circuit court jurisdiction to hear the case. Charest's argument that the boundary between Florida and Alabama does not rest in the Perdido River is without merit. As a result, the Circuit Court of Baldwin County had jurisdiction to preside over Charest's trial in 1995.
After reviewing the extensive record in this case, and carefully considering Charest's argument concerning the trial court's alleged lack of jurisdiction, the Court concludes Charest does not raise a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. The record shows Alabama had jurisdiction to try this case. The Circuit Court of Baldwin County, the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Alabama Supreme Court have likewise concluded that Alabama had jurisdiction to try this case. Although jurists may debate whether the 2005 modification of Charest's sentence amounts to a new judgment (Doc. 86, pp. 3-5), jurists of reason would agree Charest has not stated a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right based on his assertion that the border between Alabama and Florida is unclear.
Because the two components of