OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF ## 33, 35, 36, 37, 38)

MATTHEW F. LEITMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Rebecca West ("West") has lived a difficult life. She suffers from multiple mental illnesses, including bipolar disorder; has a history of abusing cocaine, heroin, and other drugs; was kicked out of high school; worked as a prostitute; and has been in and out of jail on a variety of charges. West says that she turned to a life of drugs and prostitution because officers and employees of the Garden City Police Department sexually assaulted her when she was a teenage volunteer for the department in 1990 and 1991. Nearly twenty-five years later, West filed this civil action against the men she says raped her and/or covered up the assaults and against the city that employed them. The Defendants vehemently deny West's accusations.

If West's allegations are true, she suffered unspeakable harm at the hands of the very people tasked with protecting and mentoring her. But the Court has not considered, and expresses no opinion concerning, the truth or falsity of West's allegations and the Defendants' denials.

Instead of addressing the merits of West's accusations, the Court has first considered Defendants' argument that the applicable statutes of limitations bar all of West's civil claims. West admits that her action is untimely on its face, but she argues that she may nonetheless proceed because the statutes of limitations were tolled by her insanity. The Court disagrees. West has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was continuously insane (or insane at all) and thus entitled to invoke the Michigan statute that provides for tolling due to insanity, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(1) (the "Insanity Tolling Statute"). West's other proffered bases for tolling the statutes of limitations on equitable grounds likewise fail as a matter of law. Because all of West's claims are time-barred, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of West's claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. West's Allegations of Sexual Assault

In 1989, when West was fifteen years old, she joined the "Police Explorer" program at the Garden City Police Department. (See West Deposition, ECF #36-2 at 67, 116, Pg. ID 489, 501.) The Police Explorer program "allow[ed] teenagers the opportunity to experience law enforcement as a potential career. The opportunities included police related training, patrol ride-alongs, and other such police related activities." (Complaint, ECF #1 at ¶7.)

West alleges that on several occasions during 1990 and 1991, Defendants Kevin Nowak ("Nowak"), Thomas Wallace ("Wallace"), Richard Sundstrom, and Mark D'onofrio sexually assaulted her. (Compl. at ¶¶ 9-15.) At that time, these Defendants were employed by the Garden City Police Department.

West further contends that Defendants Fred Sayger ("Sayger"), David Harvey, and Michael Bertha (each of whom were Garden City Police Officers during the relevant time period) "used their positions of authority to conspire with, and/or cover-up, the assaults and battery." (Id. at ¶24.) Finally, West says that many of the Defendants, including Wallace, Sayger, and Nowak, encouraged her to "keep quiet" and not report the alleged abuse. (West Dep. at 110-111, 115, 117, Pg. ID 500-502.)

B. Following the Alleged Assaults, West Begins Abusing Drugs, Struggles to Find Steady Employment, and Places Three Children for Adoption

West says that she began abusing alcohol and other drugs, including "marijuana, crack, [and] heroin" as a way to "self-medicate[]" following the assaults. (Id. at 17, 24-25, Pg. ID 477-479.) As a result of her drug use, West was "thrown out of high school." (Id. at 25-26, Pg. ID 479.) By the time West turned 18, she had become, in her own words, "a drug addict, and soon thereafter, a prostitute." (Compl. at ¶23.) West insists that she turned to drugs and prostitution as a "direct result[] [of] the emotional and physical abuse placed upon her by the Defendant's [sic] actions." (Id.)

West also struggled to find steady employment. West says that since the early 1990s, she has worked at 7-Eleven, Farmer Jack, Sumitomo Wiring Systems, Big Boy's, Athena Café, Wendy's, Taco Bell, Tim Horton's, Subway, Ram's Horn, and as a direct care worker for elderly individuals, among other jobs. (See West Dep. at 41-48 Pg. ID 483-484.) West says that she could not "hold a job" and that she stayed at each employer for only a few months at a time on average. (Id. at 41, Pg. ID 483.)

In addition, during her period of drug use, West placed three children for adoption — in 1998, 2000, and 2006. (See id. at 29-30, Pg. ID 480.) West believes she had to sign legal paperwork to complete the adoptions. (See id.) The record does not contain any evidence that any party connected to the adoption process raised any concerns about West's competency to execute those documents or to place her children for adoption.

C. West Pleads Guilty to Various Criminal Charges, and State Courts Find Her Competent to Enter Those Pleas

In 2000 and 2001, West pleaded guilty to several criminal charges. For example, in June 2000, West pleaded guilty to driving with her license suspended and with expired plates (see ECF #36-6 at 2-8, 14-16, Pg. ID 534-540, 546-548); in March 2001, West pleaded guilty to possession of a syringe (see ECF #36-7 at 11-15, Pg. ID 559-562); and in July 2001, West was again charged with driving with a suspended license, and she pleaded guilty to driving with expired plates. (See ECF #36-6 at 9-10, 13, Pg. ID 541-542, 545.).1 Under the Michigan Court Rules, the state trial courts could not have accepted West's guilty pleas if they had any reason to question West's competency, see MCR 6.125; Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.2020, and, at least one state-court judge affirmatively found that West had "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived her right to counsel when she pleaded guilty. (ECF #36-7 at 8, 12, 16, Pg. ID 556, 560, 564.) The record contains no evidence that West or any other party or court raised any concerns about her competency during any of the criminal proceedings against her.

D. West Unsuccessfully Attempts Treat Her Drug Addiction

In 2005 and 2006, West received treatment for her drug addictions. West first entered a drug treatment program at the Oakdale Recovery Center ("Oakdale") after she became pregnant in 2005. (See West Dep. at 30, 59-60; Pg. ID 480, 487.) West says she did not complete the treatment, and upon leaving Oakdale, she immediately "got back on [drugs]." (Id. at 30, Pg. ID 480.)

West was also hospitalized at the Psychiatric Intervention Center ("PIC") for at least two weeks in 2006. (See id. at 23-24, Pg. ID 478.) West says that the doctors at PIC "concentrate[ed] on [her] drug use" and she "didn't stay long enough to get to [her] mental issues because they just thought it was the drugs." (Id. at 24, Pg. ID 478.) West's drug use continued after her discharge from PIC.

E. West Reports the Alleged Abuse to Former Garden City Police Officer Lyle Dickson, and She Engages Dickson as Her Attorney

In 2013, West contacted Lyle Dickson ("Dickson"), a former Garden City police officer whom she remembered from her time as a Police Explorer. (See id. at 33, 76, Pg. ID 481, 491.) Dickson is now a practicing attorney. West says she contacted Dickson as part of "trying to get [her] life together" and "tak[ing] [her] life back so [she] can be normal." (Id. at 81, Pg. ID 83.) In July 2013, West told Dickson about the alleged sexual assaults (see ECF #36-3 at 7, Pg. ID 509), and she thereafter retained him as her attorney.

F. Dickson Reports the Alleged Assaults to the Michigan State Police, and West Files This Civil Action Against the Defendants

In August 2013, Dickson contacted the Michigan State Police to report that he had a client (West) who claimed to have been sexually assaulted by employees of the Garden City Police Department. (See id. at 10, Pg. ID 512.) Dickson told the State Police that his client was "scared to come forward" because some of the employees were still working for the police department. (Id.) West later agreed to be interviewed by the Michigan State Police. The State Police determined that criminal charges could not be pursued because the criminal statute of limitations had expired. (See id. at 4-5, Pg. ID 506-507.)

West thereafter filed this civil action on January 13, 2014. (See ECF #1.) She brings state-law claims for "assault and battery" and "negligence — fail to train, fail to properly hire," and she also asserts claims for violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See id.)

G. Nearly 11 Months After Filing This Action, West Again Enters Treatment for Her Drug Addictions and Mental Illnesses

In November 2014 — almost 11 months after filing this action — West began treatment with Lincoln Behavioral Services ("LBS") for her drug addictions and mental illnesses. (See id. at 32-33, Pg. ID 480-481; ECF #36-5 at 5, Pg. ID 530.) One of West's counselors at LBS is Suhasini Mistry, Ph.D. In a letter about West, Dr. Mistry opines that West "demonstrates symptoms which are congruent with a diagnosis of Bipolar I disorder. . . ." (ECF #36-5 at 5, Pg. ID 530.) Dr. Mistry also concludes that West likely suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. (See id.) Finally, Dr. Mistry says that West's delay in reporting the alleged sexual abuse is not uncommon:

(Id.)

West has also received treatment from LBS social worker and therapist Heather Pebbles ("Pebbles"). Pebbles believes that "the catalyst to Ms. West's mental illness was sexual abuse that occurred during [West's] teens." (ECF #36-5 at 7, Pg. ID 532.)

H. Dr. Viken Matossian Evaluates, But Does Not Treat, West and Offers Opinions Concerning West's Delay in Reporting the Alleged Sexual Abuse

In December 2014, West met once with Dr. Viken Matossian, a psychiatrist. Dr. Matossian evaluated West, but he did not treat her. Dr. Matossian and West discussed the alleged incidents of sexual assault, West's history of drug use, and her mental illnesses. (See ECF #36-4.) Dr. Matossian observed that West "became angry about [the alleged assaults] much later in life, as she got into prostitution herself, and even moreso as she tried to get away from drugs and prostitution in 2005-6." (Id. at 6, Pg. ID 523.) Dr. Matossian further noted that West denied "being afraid to speak about what happened with the officers, but [told him that] it was upsetting enough that she used drugs to keep it out of her mind most of the time." (Id.) Dr. Matossian concluded that if the sexual assaults occurred, they "likely have contributed substantially to [West's] choices to use drugs, engage in illegal behavior, and get involved in prostitution." (Id.) Dr. Matossian then opined that it may have been "difficult or impossible" for West to "recognize or report" the abuse:

(Id.)

In May 2015, after Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment, Dr. Matossian reviewed additional information provided by West's mother. In a follow-up letter, he opined that "for most of the intervening years" it has been "impossible" for West to "advocate for herself" with respect to the alleged sexual assaults:

(ECF #40-7, Pg. ID 819.)

I. The Court Bifurcates the Proceedings in this Action

On January 12, 2015, the Court entered an order limiting the initial discovery in this action to matters related to Defendants' limitations defense and allowing all Defendants to file an early summary judgment motion limited to that defense. (See ECF #32.) Defendants each filed such a motion, and West has responded. The Court held a hearing on Defendants' motions on July 1, 2015.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. . . ." U.S. SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, "the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." Id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [that party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment is not appropriate when "the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury." Id. at 251-252. Indeed, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . ." Id. at 255.

ANALYSIS

A. The Applicable Statutes of Limitations

There is a two-year limitations period applicable to West's state-law assault and battery claim, see M.C.L. § 600.5805(2), and a three-year limitations period applicable to her state-law negligence claim. See M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). With respect to West's federal claim under § 1983, this Court "must look to state law to determine the appropriate limitations period." Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). Where, as in Michigan, "state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions." Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989). In Michigan, this limitations period is three years. See M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). Thus, "the appropriate statute of limitations to be borrowed for § 1983 actions arising in Michigan is the state's three-year limitations period for personal injury claims." Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Fleece v. Rhines, 3 Fed. App'x 300, 302 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan's three-year limitations period in § 1983 action alleging, among other things, assault and battery).

B. The Insanity Tolling Statute and its Application at the Summary Judgment Stage

West acknowledges that absent tolling, all of her claims would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. (See, e.g., ECF #44 at 9, Pg. ID 933.) West insists the Insanity Tolling Statute provides the necessary tolling.2 In relevant part, that statute provides that:

M.C.L. § 600.5851(1). Under the Insanity Tolling Statute, "where [a] plaintiff is deemed insane at the time the claim accrues, the plaintiff is permitted a year of grace from the time when the disability is removed in which to file his or her claim." English v. Bousamra, 9 F.Supp.2d 803, 808 (W.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd 188 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1999) (Table) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Insanity Tolling Statute defines the term "insane" to mean "a condition of mental derangement such as to prevent the sufferer from comprehending rights he or she is otherwise bound to know and is not dependent on whether or not the person has been judicially declared to be insane." M.C.L. § 600.5851(3) (emphasis added). While "one need not be a blithering idiot in order to raise the defense of mental derangement under this statutory provision," Davidson v. Baker-Vander Veen Construction Co., 192 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Mich. App. 1971), courts in recent years have concluded that "only a severe mental impairment will justify excusing plaintiff from bringing suit." English, 9 F.Supp.2d at 809. The Sixth Circuit has explained that a plaintiff may establish insanity under the Insanity Tolling Statute by showing, among other things, that he or she:

Britt v. Smith, 9 Fed. App'x 409, 410-411 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting English, 9 F.Supp.2d at 809).

The plaintiff "bear[s] the burden of demonstrating that [she is] entitled to the benefit of [the Insanity Tolling Statute]." English, 9 F.Supp.2d at 808 (citing Warren Consolidated Schools v. W.R. Grace & Company, 205 Mich.App. 580, 583, 518 N.W.2d 508 (1994) ("[W]here it appears that the cause of action is prima facie barred, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking to enforce the cause of action to show facts taking the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations[.]")). To carry that burden, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she suffered from a condition rising to the level of insanity under the Insanity Tolling Statute, (2) her insanity "existed when the claim accrued" and was "continuous," and (3) she filed her lawsuit within one year of regaining her sanity. Curran v. City of Dearborn, 957 F.Supp.2d at 884 (internal citations omitted).

While a plaintiff seeking to invoke the Insanity Tolling Statute has the ultimate burden of proof, a defendant seeking summary judgment on a limitations defense has the initial burden of production with respect to the insanity issue:

Id. (quoting English, 9 F.Supp.2d at 808).

C. The Insanity Tolling Statute Does Not Save West's Time-Barred Claims

1. Defendants Have Carried Their Initial Burden of Demonstrating the Absence of a Material Factual Dispute on the Issue of West's Claimed Insanity

The Defendants have presented persuasive evidence that West cannot satisfy the requirements for invoking the Insanity Tolling Statute. Most importantly, Defendants have shown that West's own deposition testimony is inconsistent with her current argument that she did not comprehend her legal rights during the entire time she seeks to toll and that this lack of comprehension caused her delay in filing her civil action against the Defendants. West admitted that she remembered the assaults throughout her life and that she always knew the assaultive behavior was wrong. (See, e.g., West Dep. at 27, 70-71, Pg. ID 479, 490.) And when West was asked to identify anything that "prevented" her from reporting the alleged assaults, she did not say that she was unable to make a report because she did not comprehend her rights. (See id. at 90, 93, Pg. ID 495-496.) Instead, West offered two explanations for her delay in reporting the assaults: she feared that people would not believe her and that the police would "stick up for [her assaulters who were fellow police officers and police department employees]." (Id. at 24, 35, 90, 93, Pg. ID 478, 481, 495-496.) Neither of these explanations has anything to do with West's currently-claimed inability to understand her legal rights. On the contrary, these explanations suggest that West engaged in a two-step thought process that shows that West did understand that she had been wronged: in step one, she recognized that the Defendants violated her rights, and in step two, she concluded that reporting the wrong would be fruitless because nobody would believe her or act to remedy the wrong. Finally, West admitted that she was able to report the alleged assaults to another member of the Police Explorers and to a former boyfriend. (See id. at 9-10, Pg. ID 475; see also ECF #36-3 at 7, Pg. ID 509.) All of this evidence suggests that West did comprehend that the Defendants violated her right to be free from sexual assaults and did comprehend that she could complain about their violations.

Defendants also have shown that West's legal history suggests that she was not continuously insane during the period she seeks to toll, as the Insanity Tolling Statute requires. As noted above, West pleaded guilty to criminal offenses several times times during the period during which she claims to have been insane. (See, e.g., ECF ## 36-6-36-8.) During each of these criminal proceedings, "if the state judge even suspected that [West] was incompetent, [the judge] was obliged to stop the proceedings and refer her for a mental examination." Curran, 957 F.Supp.2d at 886 (citing Michigan Court Rule 6.125(C)(1)). But the record contains no evidence that any judge or court ever declared West insane or incompetent, and there is no evidence that any court ever raised any concerns about her competency. Indeed, as discussed above, at least one judge affirmatively found West had knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel when she pleaded guilty. (See ECF #36-7 at 8, 12, 16, Pg. ID 556, 560, 564.) That the state courts viewed West as competent further supports Defendants' argument that West's alleged insanity did not exist for the entire time that she seeks to toll. See Curran, 957 F.Supp.2d at 886 (treating evidence that state court accepted guilty plea by plaintiff in a criminal case as evidence that plaintiff was not insane).

Finally, Defendants point out that West placed three children for adoption and completed legal documents as part of that process — with no evidence in the record that any party connected to the adoption proceedings ever questioned her competency. West's participation in the adoptions is at least some evidence that she was able to comprehend her legal rights during the period that she seeks to toll.

In sum, the Defendants have identified sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of a material factual dispute on two of the essential elements that West must satisfy in order to prevail under the Insanity Tolling Statute: namely, whether West was ever insane and whether her insanity was continuous. Thus, the burden shifts to West to present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor on those two issues.

2. West Has Not Identified Evidence Sufficient to Create a Material Factual Dispute With Respect to Whether She Satisfies the Insanity Tolling Statute

West insists that she was insane within the meaning of the Insanity Tolling Statute, but she has not presented the type of evidence — identified by the Sixth Circuit in Britt, supra — that has persuaded courts to find a plaintiff insane. For instance, she has not shown that she has been "unable to work with [her] retained attorneys" or "unable to comprehend or assist [her attorney] in asserting the cause of action against the defendant[s]." Britt, 9 Fed. App'x at 410 (quoting English, 9 F.Supp.2d at 809). On the contrary, it appears that West was able to contact Dickson, was able to provide him with sufficient information to draft and file her Complaint, and was able to work with him to prepare for her deposition.3 Likewise, West has not presented any evidence that she was "unable to comprehend simple legal procedures" or that it "was necessary to explain [to her] matters the ordinary person would understand." Id. In fact, the available evidence — her entry of the guilty pleas and participation in several adoptions — suggests that she was able to comprehend simple legal procedures. And, while West has submitted evidence that she suffered through bouts of debilitating drug abuse, she has not presented evidence that throughout the entire time she seeks to toll, she was "unable to attend to personal and business affairs." Id.4

West argues that the three letters (and one report) she has submitted from mental health professionals — Dr. Mistry, Ms. Pebbles, and Dr. Matossian — create a factual dispute with respect to whether she was insane during the relevant period. The Court disagrees. First, while the letters from Dr. Mistry and Ms. Pebbles do speak to West's mental illnesses and their potential root cause, those letters do not address whether West was insane as defined by the Insanity Tolling Statute. More specifically, these letters say nothing about whether West was able to comprehend her legal rights nor do they even attempt to establish that West has been continuously insane since the assaults first began. The letters from Dr. Mistry and Ms. Peebles thus do not create a material factual dispute with respect to West's claimed insanity.

Second, while Dr. Matossian's report and follow-up letter arguably do suggest that for some period of time West may have been unable to comprehend her legal rights, Dr. Matossian's submissions do not create a material factual dispute as to whether West was continuously unable to comprehend her rights throughout the entire period that she seeks to toll (i.e., the date of the assaults to at least one year prior to the filing of the Complaint). See, e.g. English, 9 F.Supp.2d at 808 ("To prevent the one-year period from beginning to run [under the Insanity Tolling Statute], [a] condition of incapacity must be continuous"). Indeed, Dr. Matossian never identifies a clear time at which West's claimed insanity began. For example, he suggests that West's psychological defense mechanisms may have prevented her from seeing herself as a victim at some undefined "point" after she began using drugs and engaging in prostitution. (ECF #36-4 at 6, Pg. ID 523.) And the first specific time frame during which Dr. Matossian identifies West as having been mentally ill is 1993, approximately two years after the assaults ended and two years into the period she wishes to toll due to her claimed insanity. (See ECF #40-7, Pg. ID 819.)

Moreover, Dr. Matossian appears to identify periods during which West could comprehend her legal rights. He says that West would have had the ability to see herself as a victim when she "quit[] prostitution in favor of a less unhealthy relationship," and he indicates that West "tried to get away from drugs and prostitution in 2005-6." (ECF #36-4 at 6, Pg. ID 523.) He also believes that West became more "angry" about the alleged assaults during this same "2005-6" time frame (id.), and West's anger suggests that she understood that what happened to her was wrong. Moreover, Dr. Matossian opines that West's condition "made it impossible for most of the intervening years to advocate for herself on this issue." (Id.; emphasis added.) In sum, Dr. Matossian's submissions, even when viewed in the light most favorable to West, do not create a material factual dispute as to whether West was continuously insane during the entire time that she seeks to toll.

For all of the reasons stated above, West may not defeat the Defendants' motion for summary judgment by invoking the Insanity Tolling Statute.

D. West is Not Entitled to an Tolling of the Limitations Period on Equitable Grounds

West argues in the alternative that the statutes of limitations should be tolled on equitable grounds. (See, e.g., ECF #44 at 17-20, Pg. ID 941-945.) West appears to rely on two separate equitable theories: "Equitable Tolling" and "Equitable Estoppel." (See id.)

West first argues that the Defendants "should be equitably estopped from invoking the statutes of limitations as a defense" because they wrongfully "induced [her] to refrain from bringing a cause of action" against them. (See id. at 17-19, Pg. ID 941-943.) The Court disagrees. Under Michigan law, "[f]or equitable estoppel to apply, plaintiff must establish that (1) defendant's acts or representations induced plaintiff to believe that the limitations period clause would not be enforced, (2) plaintiff justifiably relied on this belief, and (3) she was prejudiced as a result of her reliance on her belief that the clause would not be enforced." Fuller v. Geico Indem. Co., ___ N.W.2d ___, 2015 WL 966044 (Mich. App. Mar. 5, 2015) (quoting McDonald v. State Farm Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 811, 819 (Mich. 2008)).

West does not allege that any Defendant told her (or suggested in any way) that the statutes of limitations would not be enforced. Instead, West claims that certain Defendants made comments to her "under the table" about keeping the alleged abuse a secret and told her something to the effect of "don't say nothing, keep quiet, you know." (Id. at 77, Pg. ID 492.) But West acknowledges that the Defendants did not make "a direct threat," were not "specific," and never told her "don't go the police." (West Dep. at 78, 92, 117, Pg. ID 492, 495, 502.) Even if the statements identified by West may have induced West not to report the alleged assaults, the statements cannot support application of equitable estoppel under Michigan law because they did not communicate to West that Defendants would not enforce the applicable statutes of limitations. See Fuller, supra (essential element of equitable estoppel is conduct by defendant that leads plaintiff to believe statute of limitations will not be enforced). West has not cited any authority suggesting that a Michigan court would apply equitable estoppel on the facts and circumstances she alleges here.

West next argues that she is entitled to "equitable tolling" of the statutes of limitations. Her entire argument on this point is as follows:

(Id.)

The cases cited by West do not support her argument. While the Michigan Supreme Court may have recognized a type of equitable tolling in Lewis, the first case West cites, that court expressly overruled Lewis in Devillers, the second case she cites. See Devillers, 702 N.W.2d at 542. Moreover, in two more recent decisions, the Michigan Supreme Court has severely limited, if not completely eliminated, the equitable tolling doctrine West attempts to invoke. See Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 738 N.W.2d 664, 680 (Mich. 2007); Chabad-Lubavitch of Michigan v. Schuchman, 862 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. 2015) (peremptorily reversing Court of Appeals decision applying equitable tolling). If and to the extent equitable tolling exists under Michigan law,5 West has not provided any authority or basis for applying the doctrine in this case.6 Accordingly, the Court will not do so.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons explained above, the Court concludes that the statutes of limitations applicable to Wests' claims were not tolled and that all of West's claims are time-barred. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF ## 33, 35, 36, 37, 38) are GRANTED.