KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between Plaintiffs JESSE I. SANTANA and DAVID VASQUEZ, and Defendants THE COUNTY OF YUBA, YUBA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY PATRICK McGRATH, YUBA COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY MELANIE BENDORF, FORMER YUBA COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY JOHN VACEK, YUBA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY INVESTIGATOR MARY BARR, YUBA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY INVESTIGATOR GENE STOBER, and Defendant TIM EVANS (collectively, the "Parties"), by and through their undersigned Counsel, pursuant to Local Rules 143 and 144 as follows:
1. On January 9, 2018, following the Mid-Litigation Status Conference, the Court issued an order vacating all dates. At that time, the Court ordered the parties to participate in the Court's VDRP process, and further ordered no summary judgment motions be filed until that process was completed. The Court issued an Order extending the dispositive motion deadline from March 9, 2018 to April 20, 2018 in order to allow for the VDRP process to be completed. See Doc. No. 86.
2. On January 17, 2018, the District Court appointed James R. James R. Kirby II, of Nageley Kirby & Winberry LLP, as the VDRP Neutral Attorney. See Doc. No. 87. On January 30, 2018, a Notice of Withdrawal was filed terminating James Kirby as the VDRP Neutral due to a conflict of interest. Doc. No. 88. On February 16, 2018, the Court appointed Van Longyear, of Longyear O'Dea & Lavra, as the VDRP Neutral Attorney. Doc. No. 90. At this time, Mr. Longyear has not contacted the parties about setting up a VDRP conference.
2. The Parties respectfully request the District Court modify the deadline for dispositive motions to be filed, moving the deadline for such motions to be filed to June 29, 2018, in order to give the parties time to complete the VDRP process. No other deadlines would be changed.
3. The reason for this request is three-fold. First, the Parties seek to move the dispositive motion deadline to allow the parties to complete the VDRP process that is currently underway with the recently appointed VRDP mediator, Van Longyear. Based on counsel's trial calendar in the coming months, the Parties require additional time to complete that process and meaningfully evaluate the potential for the case to resolve in advance of filing dispositive motions. The Parties will be coordinating to set the VDRP session with Mr. Longyear's office. As of the date of filing of this motion, a VDRP date has not yet been confirmed.
4. In addition, counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants continue to meet and confer regarding the Yuba County Defendants' proposed grounds for a motion for summary judgment. As part of that continued meet and confer effort, Plaintiffs have requested that Defendants stipulate to the filing of a Third Amended Complaint to augment the factual allegations in support of their "stigma-plus" claim for relief against the Yuba County Defendants. A true and correct copy of the proposed Third Amended Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. A true and correct copy of a "red-lined" version of the Third Amended Complaint, which details the exact allegations that Plaintiffs would like to add and the dismissal of the third claim is attached hereto as Exhibit B. For convenience of the court, the proposed amended language appears on page 19 at paragraph 69, line 11 (". . .,
5. It is further stipulated by the Parties that there is no need for additional responsive pleadings to be filed by the Defendants and the response(s) to paragraph 69 and 70 of the Third Amended Complaint as set forth in the respective answer of the party defendants shall apply to the additional allegations set forth above.
6. Continuance of the deadline for filing dispositive motions will serve the interests of justice and judicial resources as it will allow the parties to complete the VDRP process as well as fully complete their meet and confer efforts on all proposed dispositive motions, and allow Plaintiffs to file their proposed Third Amended Complaint.
7. Counsel has conferred about the timing issues that may affect the remainder of the case and have jointly agreed upon the above and now seek court approval.
Having reviewed the above stipulation and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference Order be modified as follows:
1. The deadline for filing dispositive motions will be moved from April 20, 2018 to June 29, 2018.
2. Plaintiffs may file their proposed Third Amended Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3. The prior answers filed by Defendants will be deemed the responsive pleadings filed in response to the Third Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Plaintiffs, JESSE SANTANA and DAVID VASQUEZ, hereby allege as follows:
1. This is a civil action seeking damages as a result of the illegal and unconstitutional conduct and malicious prosecution of Plaintiffs Jesse Santana ("SANTANA") and David Vasquez ("VASQUEZ") by defendants County of Yuba ("YUBA COUNTY"); Yuba County District Attorney Patrick McGrath ("McGRATH"), Deputy District Attorney Melanie Bendorf ("BENDORF"), Deputy District Attorney John Vacek ("VACEK"), Yuba County District Attorney Investigator Mary Barr ("BARR"), and Yuba County District Attorney Investigator Gene Stober ("STOBER") [Collectively, "YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS"]; and Timothy J. Evans ("ATTORNEY EVANS").
2. As a result of defendants' illegal conduct, and other acts and omissions, SANTANA and VASQUEZ were unlawfully and maliciously prosecuted without probable cause in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
3. Plaintiffs' prosecution was fueled by Defendants' unconstitutional custom, practice and policy of discriminating against the Plaintiffs based on their Hispanic ethnicity and in order to keep the local judicial bench racially homogenous and exclusive of non-whites. YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS abused their authority and acted outside the scope of their roles as prosecutors and ATTORNEY EVANS conspired, aided and abetted the co-defendants in their unlawful and unconstitutional conduct to prosecute SANTANA and VASQUEZ without probable cause and in violation of their constitutional rights.
4. On April 25, 2014, after almost seven years of defending themselves against the unconstitutional acts by Defendants, SANTANA and VASQUEZ were acquitted on all charges. Plaintiffs' personal and professional lives were, and have been, damaged irreparably. Plaintiffs' professional reputations were also irreparably damaged and they continue to suffer emotional anguish. SANTANA and VASQUEZ now pursue this action to expose the wrongdoing that led to their illegal prosecution, to vindicate their civil rights, to obtain awards of compensatory damages for their losses, and to obtain awards of punitive damages to deter Defendants and others from5605602017
5. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 for the deprivation of rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction of this court is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.
6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant named herein because Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each defendant is currently domiciled in the State of California.
7. The court has pendant and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367. The pendant state law claims contained in this Complaint arise from the same nucleus of operative facts, and involve identical issues of fact and law, as the federal claims, such that the entire action constitutes a single case appropriate for prosecution as a single proceeding.
8. On or about October 22, 2014, Plaintiffs presented a written claim for damages with the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS pursuant to California Government Code Section 910 et seq.
9. The County of Yuba issued a Notice of Rejection of Claim on October 30, 2014. This Complaint is thus timely and properly commenced on all state claims pursuant to applicable provisions of the Government Code.
10. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of California, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) because the defendants to this action reside in this District and because a substantial part, if not all, of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this judicial district.
11. Pursuant to Eastern District Civil Local Rule 120 (d), intradistrict assignment to the Sacramento Division of the Court is proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the County of Yuba.
12. The Plaintiffs in this case are Jesse Santana ("SANTANA"), who at all relevant times hereto, was a resident of the County of Sutter, State of California, and David Vasquez ("VASQUEZ"), who at all relevant times hereto, was a resident of the County of Yuba, State of California.
13. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant YUBA COUNTY is a political subdivision of the State of California duly organized and existing under the laws thereof, and has the capacity to sue and be sued. The Yuba County DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE is an official subdivision of YUBA COUNTY, and all attorneys and investigators employed by the DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE are employees of YUBA COUNTY.
14. Defendant McGRATH, sued herein in his personal capacity, was at all relevant times herein the District Attorney for the Yuba County DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE and he at all times possessed the power and authority, and was charged by law with the responsibility, to enact policies and to prescribe rules and practices concerning the operation of the Yuba County DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
15. Defendant BENDORF, sued herein in her personal capacity, was at all relevant times a Deputy District Attorney employed by YUBA COUNTY who, in committing the acts alleged herein, acted within the course and scope of her duties, under the color of law, and with authority and ratification of her principal, YUBA COUNTY.
16. Defendant VACEK, sued individually, was a former Deputy District Attorney and, at the time of committing the acts alleged herein, a duly authorized employee of YUBA COUNTY acting within the course and scope of his duty, under the color of law and with complete authority and ratification of his principal, YUBA COUNTY
17. Defendant BARR, sued individually, was an Investigator and, at the time of committing the acts alleged herein, a duly authorized employee of YUBA COUNTY acting within the course and scope of her duties, under the color of law and with complete authority and ratification of her principal, YUBA COUNTY.
18. Defendant STOBER, sued individually, was an Investigator and, at the time of committing the acts alleged herein, a duly authorized employee of YUBA COUNTY acting within the course and scope of his duty, under the color of law and with complete authority and ratification of his principal, YUBA COUNTY.
19. All acts complained of herein by Plaintiffs against YUBA COUNTY were done and performed by its authorized agents, servants, and/or employees, including the above-named individual Defendants, each of whom was acting within the course, purpose and scope of said agency, service and/or employment capacity and under the color of law. Moreover, Defendant YUBA COUNTY and its agents ratified all of the acts complained of herein.
20. Defendant ATTORNEY EVANS, sued herein in his personal capacity, was at all relevant times a private attorney licensed by the State of California to practice law, and, in doing the things complained of herein, was acting in concert and in agreement with all other Defendants.
21. Each of the Defendants caused and is responsible for the unlawful conduct described herein and the resulting injuries by, among other things, (a) personally participating in the unlawful conduct or acting jointly or conspiring with others who did so; (b) authorizing, acquiescing in or setting in motion policies, plans or actions that led to the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct; (c) failing to take action to prevent the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct; (d) failing and refusing, with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights, to initiate and maintain adequate training and supervision; and (e) ratifying the unlawful conduct committed by others, and failing to take remedial or disciplinary action with reference to said unlawful conduct.
22. All individual defendants are guilty of fraud, oppression, and/or malice that would justify the imposition of punitive and exemplary damages.
23. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 22 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
24. On November 9, 2007, Socorro Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") and two of her daugthers. Socorro Acevedo ("Socorro") and Laura Acevedo ("Laura"), met with Marysville Police Detective Randall Elliott. Socorro, a minor less than eighteen years old who was employed as a dispatcher at a local towing business known as Mitchell's Towing, told Detective Elliott that she had been sexually assaulted and physically abused by her employer, Joseph Griesa ("Griesa"). Socorro said Griesa touched her breasts and buttocks and put his hands down her pants, with force and without consent.
25. At the meeting, Socorro provided Detective Elliott with her cell phone, which contained an array of sexually inappropriate text messages from Griesa to Socorro as well as a recording of a telephone conversation between Griesa and Socorro which substantiated Socorro's allegations. Socorro also showed Detective Elliott bruises on her forearm and shin, which she said Griesa had caused. Detective Elliott photographed the bruising and had a female officer photograph additional bruises on Socorro's torso.
26. Detective Elliott informed Socorro that it would be difficult to prosecute any criminal charges against Griesa because the case would come down to "he said/she said," and hence it was unlikely that criminal charges would be filed against Griesa. Detective Elliott recommended to Socorro that she pursue a civil claim against Griesa, citing as an example the unsuccessful homicide prosecution of O.J. Simpson, followed by successful civil litigation against him for wrongful death.
27. After her interview with Detective Elliott, Socorro, accompanied by her mother and sister, consulted with Plaintiff SANTANA to explore the possibility of pursuing a civil claim against Griesa as Detective Elliott had suggested. Socorro explained that she did not want to testify in open court against Griesa and thereby have the whole embarrassing story become public knowledge. She particularly feared what might happen if her father and brother found out what Griesa had done to her. She felt that her father, who was in poor health, could suffer a stroke if he found out, and that her brother, who was hot-tempered and overprotective, might try to physically attack Crriesa. In addition, she wanted to put the whole matter behind her as soon as possible, in that she planned to leave the area to attend college.
28. SANTANA confirmed what Detective Elliott had told them, namely that Socorro could file a civil lawsuit seeking money damages from Griesa. SANTANA explained that such lawsuits are often settled without a trial and sometimes even settled before the lawsuits are filed. He pointed out that while a judge would have to approve any settlement since Socorro was still a minor, she would not have to give detailed testimony about what Griesa had done to her as would happen at trial, and that seeking such judicial approval would typically give rise to little, if any, publicity. SANTANA also told them that Socorro, as a sexual assault victim, had a right not to testify in open court if she chose not to do so, but it was ultimately up to the judge to decide whether Socorro was in contempt for not testifying.
29. SANTANA offered to represent Socorro, together with her mother as guardian ad litem, on a pro bond basis, and Socorro and her mother agreed to the arrangement.
30. On November 16, 2007, Detective Elliott phoned Griesa to inform him of the abuse allegations that Socorro had made against Griesa and advised Griesa to contact a lawyer before providing any statement on the matter. Griesa agreed. Later that day, Griesa met with VASQUEZ, and VASQUEZ then phoned Detetcive Elliott, who explained Socorro's abuse allegations and the criminal charges he was considering. VASQUEZ advised Detective Elliott that he was about to leave on a ten day vacation and asked Detective Elliott to postpone sending any investigation report to the District Attorney until VASQUEZ had an opportunity following his return to discuss the matter further with Griesa. Detective Elliott agreed to the request
31. On or about November 19, 2007, a sister of Socorro phoned Detective Elliott to request that he obtain a search warrant for Griesa's office because she learned that Griesa was removing his computer, video camera equipment, and other items from his office at Mitchell's Towing, and she believed said items contained evidence that would corroborate Socorro's allegations. Detective Elliott declined to do so, explaining that a search warrant would not be worth the effort and that the case ultimately boiled down to a "he said-she said" matter.
32. In the latter part of November, 2007, Griesa met again with VASQUEZ to explore negotiating an early civil settlement with Socorro. VASQUEZ told Griesa that, while the District Attorney would decide whether to file criminal charges, the District Attorney might be less likely to do so if Griesa and Socorro promptly reached a civil settlement. Griesa deposited $50,000.00 into VASQUEZ' trust account so VASQUEZ could open settlement negotiations with a good faith settlement offer in that amount.
33. On or about November 28, Detective Elliott continued his investigation into the sex abuse allegations by speaking with two employees of Mitchell's Towing who reported having seen a bruise on Socorro's face which reportedly resulted from Griesa striking her during an incident in which he exposed himself to her.
34. During the latter part of November and early part of December, 2007, SANTANA and VASQUEZ engaged in numerous settlement negotiations which resulted in a tentative settlement of Socorro's civil claims against Griesa for $100,000.00, and began preparation of a written release to be approved and signed by their respective clients. They agreed that once the release was thus approved and signed, judicial approval would be required for the settlement to become final in that Socorro was a minor. As to the language of the release, they agreed to refer to Socorro's wishes regarding her wanting to settle her civil claims against Griesa, her wanting no criminal charges filed so that there would not be any publicity of her ordeal at the hands of Griesa, and her wanting to exercise any privilege she may have pursuant to law not to testify in any proceeding. In its final version, the release stated the following:
35. While preparation of the release was underway during December, VASQUEZ told Detective Elliott of the possible civil settlement, and Detective Elliott responded that this would be a good resolution of the matter. VASQUEZ also told BENDORF of the proposed settlement and asked if finalization of the settlement would have any effect on whether the District Attorney's office would file any criminal charges against his client. Also, SANTANA phoned Detetcive Elliott to inform him of his client's wishes that she wanted to settle her civil claims against Griesa, that she wanted to move to the Bay Area to attend college, that a possible civil settlement between Socorro and Griesa was being worked on, that she no longer desired a criminal prosecution of Griesa for his sexual abuse of her, she did not want to testify against Griesa and that SANTANA would have to be present if Detective Elliott wanted to interview her. In addition, Griesa told Detective Elliott of the proposed settlement for $100,000.00. Detective Elliott's response was that Griesa should see another attorney for a second opinion and recommended ATTORNEY EVANS as the attorney whom Griesa should see.
36. On December 14, Detective Elliott submitted to the District Attorney's office his report on his investigation into Socorro's sex abuse allegations. In the report, Detetcive Elliott made no recommendation on whether criminal charges should be filed against Griesa. He also noted his belief that VASQUEZ and SANTANA had reached a settlement for their clients in which Griesa would pay money to Socorro, and Detective Elliott recommended that consideration consequently be given to bribery charges against SANTANA and VASQUEZ. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Detective Elliott was encouraged or pressured by one or more of the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS to insert into his report (i) the false allegation that SANTANA had told him in the December 11 phone call that SANTANA had flatly instructed Socorro not to talk further with Detetcive Elliott; and (ii) the recommendation that the DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE investigate VASQUEZ and SANTANA for bribery (despite Detective Elliott's knowledge from his law enforcement experience that victims of sexual assaults are often afraid to coke forward and don't want to face their accusers or testify in court, and hence that Socorro's reported reluctance to testify against Griesa may well have been the consequence solely of Socorro's experience as a sexual assault victim, and not of any effort by SANTANA or VASQUEZ to bribe her into refusing to respond to any subpoena to appear in any court proceeding against Griesa). Upon receiving Detective Elliott's report, the District Attorney's office refrained from filing any criminal charges agtainst Griesa and immediately began investigating the possible bribery charges against SANTANA and VASQUEZ.
37. On or about December 13, Socorro and her mother both signed the release. However, Griesa did not promptly sign the release because there was no guarantee he would not be criminally prosecuted. On December 21, Socorro notified SANTANA that her father had learned about the sex abuse by Griesa and wanted him criminally prosecuted, and that she therefore changed her mind about the settlement and wanted to proceed instead with the criminal prosecution. SANTANA recommended that she retain another attorney, Michael Trezza, to represent her. Socorro did so. SANTANA then immediately informed both VASQUEZ and Detetcive Elliott of this turn of events. SANTANA also offered Detective Elliott the name and number of Socorro's new attorney so he could interview her. Detective Elliott declined the information and said he was not interested. VASQUEZ returned to Griesa the $50,000.00 that the latter had deposited into VASQUEZ' trust account for settlement purposes.
38. During 2007, before undertaking representation of Socorro, SANTANA had submitted his application to the Governor's Office for a judicial appointment to the vacant seat on the Sutter County Superior Court. SANTANA was a prominent Hispanic attorney whose law practice primarily entailed representation of criminal defendants. His application for judicial appointment was strongly supported by the local Hispanic community, including another prominent Hispanic attorney, VASQUEZ. The other application for the judicial appointment was by former Sutter County Deputy District Attorney Susan Green ("Green"), who is Caucasian. Green is a friend of the Defendants and member of the Defendants' inner circle.
39. Sutter County and YUBA COUNTY are neighboring, and their respective Superior Courts are less than two miles apart. Although Hispanics make up approximately twenty-five percent of the population in each of said Counties, no Hispanic has ever been a judge in either of said Superior Courts. As Hispanics, both VASQUEZ and SANTANA are members of a5475475739
40. Defendants have adhered to a custom and practice of favoring and encouraging the judicial appointments of Caucasians, and resisting or preventing any judicial appointments of Hispanics or other persons from ethnic minorities, in the Superior Courts of said two counties. This custom and practice by the Defendants would keep the local judiciary racially homogenous all Caucasian.
41. Pursuant to said custom and practice, Defendants actively supported Green's application for appointment to fill the above-referenced judicial vacancy, and opposed SANTANA's application for said judicial appointment. Defendants feared the Governor's office was making strong efforts to diversify the local judiciary.
42. On or around early December 2007, Green and Defendants McGRATH, BENDORF, and ATTORNEY EVANS attended a secret lunch meeting in which McGRATH proposed to further said custom and practice by implementing a plan to derail SANTANA's application for said judicial appointment ("Derailment Plan"), and the other meeting participants agreed to the Derailment Plan. Soon after said meeting, McGRATH and the other meeting participants enlisted the remaining Defendants to join in the Derailment Plan.
43. The core of the Derailment Plan was to institute an aggressive criminal investigation of SANTANA for bribery and related criminal charges purportedly arising from SANTANA's above-described representation of Socorro in connection with her allegations of sexual misconduct by Griesa. Defendants knew that once SANTANA became aware that he was the object of a criminal investigation, he would be obligated immediately to disclose same to the state commission ("State Commission") responsible for screening judicial applicants, and that the State Commission would automatically disqualify SANTANA upon learning that he was the object of a criminal investigation. Defendants were also aware that the Governor could select a candidate to fill said judicial vacancy as early as.June 2008.
44. For the criminal investigation of SANTANA to appear bona fide, the Derailment Plan included also making VASQUEZ an object of the criminal investigation, as well as eventually proceeding with criminal prosecutions of both SANTANA and VASQUEZ. Pivotal to Defendants' decision to also include VASQUEZ was that, like SANTANA, VASQUEZ is Hispanic, in that Defendants believed that their contention that SANTANA illegally interacted with another attorney would appear plausible only if both attorneys were Hispanic. As to how the criminal investigation and prosecutions would be conducted, the Derailment Plan was to disregard established and lawful procedural constraints on the gathering of evidence in criminal investigations, as well as to disregard any evidence or applicable law that would demonstrate or tend to demonstrate that neither SANTANA nor VASQUEZ had committed the crimes with which Defendants planned to charge them. Defendants agreed to pursue the Derailment Plan by falsely characterizing the settlement efforts of SANTANA and VASQUEZ as seeking to conclude a "secret" settlement between Socorro, whereunder Socorro was induced by the payment of money from Griesa to refuse to communicate further with Detetcive Elliott concerning his criminal investigation of Griesa, and, if subpoenaed, to refuse to appear at any hearing concerning Griesa. Defendants so agreed despite their knowledge that (i) the proposed settlement provided for Griesa to pay money to Socorro in settlement of her civil claim against him for her damages from his sexual misconduct, and added only that Socorro would request that the criminal investigation against Griesa not proceed further (not to refuse to cooperate in any ongoing investigation), and would exercise any available privilege under the law not to testify in court against Griesa (not to refuse to appear in court if subpoenaed); (ii) SANTANA informed Detective Elliott not that SANTANA had instructed Socorro not to talk further with Detective Elliott, but rather that SANTANA would have to be present if Detetcive Elliott wished to talk further with Socorro; and (iii) the proposed settlement was not "secret," but rather disclosed by VASQUEZ as a possible alternative to criminal prosecution of Griesa (with Defendants then responding positively to that possibility) and disclosed by SANTANA in support of his client Socorro's wishes; and (iv) the handling of the proposed settlement by SANTANA and VASQUEZ was consistent with accepted practice among police, prosecutors, and private attorneys dealing with conduct by a perpetrator that may be the subject of civil claims and criminal prosecution, when in accord with the victim's wishes.
45. In their ensuing criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ pursuant to their Derailment Plan, Defendants gave legal advice to the police and investigators, engaged in their unconstitutional and illegal investigatory and administrative functions, fabricated evidence during the investigation, held defamatory press conferences, and acted illegally and improperly, including but not limited to the following respects:
(a) ATTORNEY EVANS agreed to represent Griesa, and thereby received from Griesa a copy of the client file that VASQUEZ turned over to Griesa when replaced by ATTORNEY EVANS. ATTORNEY EVANS then violated the attorney-client privilege that protected the client file by presenting the file and its entire contents to the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS for examination without informing Griesa that he was doing so, much less seeking a waiver by Griesa of said attorney-client privilege.
(b) On May 5, 2008, assisted by other Defendants, BARR prepared and filed an application for a search warrant authorizing the search of the Law Offices of SANTANA, VASQUEZ, and Trezza. In the application, BARR falsely represented that the proposed settlement between Socorro and Griesa amounted to bribery in violation of Penal Code §138, subdivision (a), namely the proposed payment of money to Socorro in exchange for her refusal to attend a criminal trial of Griesa if subpoenaed thereto as a witness. Instead the proposed settlement contemplated Socorro exercising any privilege available under the law to decline to testify if she were thus subpoenaed, and it was already Socorro's intention, independent of any settlement agreement with Griesa, to avail herself of any such privilege if subpoenaed to attend Griesa's trial. In addition, BARR's application withheld the fact that Socorro believed Griesa had sodomized her while she was not fully conscious, in addition to subjecting her to lesser forms of sex abuse. Inclusion of that fact would have materially impaired the probable cause showing that BARR sought to make in her application, in that the sodomy allegation entitled Socorro to decline to testify in court about Griesa's sex abuse, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1219, subdivision (b), whereas BARR contended in her application that Socorro was not so entitled, and hence that the discussion in the proposed settlement about Socorro not testifying was an egregious departure from the law. Pursuant to their Derailment Plan, the Defendants had Barr certify "under the penalty of perjury" that the facts, assertions and innuendos underlying the application for the search warrant were true.
(c) During June 2008, ATTORNEY EVANS had Griesa continue to cooperate with Defendants in their investigation of VASQUEZ and SANTANA by (1) formally waiving, in open court, his attorney-client privilege in connection with documents generated by VASQUEZ during his representation of Griesa, and (ii) agreeing to undergo a lengthy interrogation by Defendants that dealt only with the attempt by VASQUEZ and SANTANA to negotiate a civil settlement between Griesa and Socorro, to the exclusion of any inquiry into Griesa's sexual misconduct with Socorro. Pursuant to the Derailment Plan, Defendants then and thereafter encouraged and accepted Griesa's cooperation and assistance in prosecuting SANTANA and VASQUEZ, and at least tacitly agreed not to investigate or prosecute Griesa on any serious felony charges despite Defendants' knowledge of an incident in which Griesa had induced Socorro to drink a chemical-laced beverage that impaired her consciousness and then digitally penetrated and/or sodomized her, and hence that, if fully investigated and prosecuted, Griesa could face lengthy incarceration and potentially life imprisonment. In thus encouraging and accepting Griesa's said cooperation, Defendants in bad faith abused and exceeded the bounds of their prosecutorial discretion.
(d) On July 15 and 17, 2008, Defendants BENDORF, VACEK and STOBER interrogated Socorro, who was a minor, for a total of six hours. In that the focus of the interrogation was bribery, Socorro faced the risk of prosecution for offering to receive a bribe. Nonetheless, said Defendants refused her request for her attorney, Michael Trezza, to be present during the interrogation. During her interrogation, Socorro stated that, when the proposed settlement with Griesa was being discussed, it was already her intention, independent of any such settlement, not to testify against him, and neither SANTANA nor VASQUEZ made any attempt to influence her not to testify. From her perspective, the only purpose of the proposed settlement with Griesa was for him to compensate her for the personal injuries he had inflicted on her, in lieu of Socorro civilly pursuing her personal injury claim against him in court. Although Socorro's said statements to the interrogating Defendants constituted material exonerating evidence for SANTANA and VASQUEZ, said Defendants suppressed or ignored the exonerating evidence. During the interrogation Socorro disclosed in detail that GRIESA had given her a grape drink with a chemical that caused her to lose consciousness and he raped and sodomized her. The incident occurred in late 2007, near Township Road, in Sutter County. BENDORF, VACEK and STOBER were personally present when this disclosure was made and covered that case up in order for GRIESA to cooperate with them. As an investigator, STOBER had a mandatory duty to report the incident to law enforcement, which he failed to do. Griesa was never charged with the rape and sodomy of Socorro.
(e) Defendants suppressed the material exonerating evidence that (i) when Socorro first reported to Detective Elliott that Griesa had sexually abused her, Detective Elliott discouraged her from seeking criminal prosecution of Griesa and encouraged her instead to pursue a civil claim against Griesa; (ii) Detective Elliott thereafter expressed approval to VASQUEZ of the proposed settlement then being negotiated between Socorro and Griesa; and (iii) that VASQUEZ indicated to Deputy District Attorney BENDORF that Griesa would not conclude the proposed civil settlement with Socorro if criminal charges were filed against Griesa.
46. On or about May 14, 2008, one week after his judicial interview with the Governor's office, SANTANA became aware of the foregoing criminal investigation when his law office was searched pursuant to the search warrant issued upon BARR's above-referenced application. As he was required to do, SANTANA immediately notified the State Commission that he had become the subject of a criminal investigation, and the State Commission consequently disqualified him as a judicial candidate. Governor Schwarzenegger subsequently appointed Susan Green, the only remaining candidate, to the judgeship for which she and SANTANA had been vying.
47. In October 2008, the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS conducted a grand jury against SANTANA and VASQUEZ. In November, 2008, the grand jury returned an indictment against SANTANA and VASQUEZ on the felonies of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice. SANTANA and VASQUEZ were booked, arraigned, ordered to make all future court appearances. During this process, as well as their ensuing court appearances, they missed work. They feared that, if convicted, they would face incarceration as well as become disbarred as attorneys, and lose their reputation and their livelihood.
48. On May 16, 2012, the Court of Appeal voided the indictment against SANTANA in its entirety because the presiding judge was biased against SANTANA and therefore the court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to convene the grand jury for SANTANA. The indictment against VASQUEZ was dismissed after SANTANA'S indictment was voided.
49. The California State Attorney General's Office ("Attorney General") then replaced Defendants in the further prosecution of SANTANA and VASQUEZ. The Attorney General filed a criminal complaint against SANTANA and VASQUEZ for obstructing justice and dissuading a witness, while refraining from again charging them with bribery. In a jury trial conducted in March and April 2014, a jury acquitted SANTANA and VASQUEZ of all charges after deliberating for less than an hour. Following the jury verdict, McGRATH was quoted in the local newspaper stating, "Our investigation was solid and we stand by our prosecution of Mr. Santana and Mr. Vasquez."
50. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 49 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
51. By conducting an illegal and improper criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ in bad faith, Defendants caused and induced them to be prosecuted without probable cause on felony charges of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice.
52. In thus prosecuting SANTANA and VASQUEZ, Defendants expressly discriminated against them on the basis of their Hispanic ancestry, thereby violating their rights to equal protection as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
53. Said prosecution terminated in the favor of SANTANA and VASQUEZ in that a jury subsequently returned verdicts of not guilty on the remaining charges of dissuading a witness and obstruction of justice.
54. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, and consternitgon, worry, anxiety, and other emotional distress.
55. Defendants acted as hereinabove alleged intentionally, maliciously, oppressively and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against each Defendant.
56. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
57. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 56, hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
58. Defendant YUBA COUNTY is liable for the above alleged conduct of the individual Defendants because District Attorney McGRATH, acting as a final policymaker of YUBA COUNTY, intentionally and in bad faith formulated and carried out the above-alleged Derailment Plan whereby SANTANA's judicial candidacy would be derailed by subjecting SANTANA and VASQUEZ to malicious prosecution in violation of their rights to equal protection.
59. Defendant McGRATH and Does 1-20, inclusive, furthermore facilitated and advanced his Derailment Plan, both before and after putting it into place, by establishing and carrying out a policy of failing and refusing to adequately or properly train, supervise, discipline, or control all of the other individually named YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS, in the exercise of their duties as prosecutors and investigators, including by failing and refusing to take reasonable and necessary steps to assure that their conduct was constrained by the strictures of the U.S. Constitution.
60. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by and on behalf of YUBA COUNTY, Plaintiffs have been substantially damaged in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and emotional distress.
61. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
68. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 67 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
69. Following the acquittal of Plaintiffs on or about April 25, 2014, at the conclusion of the above-alleged criminal investigation and prosecution of Plaintiffs in violation of their constitutional rights to equals protection, McGRATH, aided and abetted by the other individual Defendants, conducted a press conference and/or issued a press release on or about May 4, 2014, in connection with said unconstitutional investigation and prosecution, in which he defamed Plaintiffs by stating that "at every stage of this proceeding, evidence was found that wrongdoing had occurred by Santana and Vasquez," that McGRATH was "as comfortable with [his] job in investigating this case as any [he has] investigated in 30 years," that the actions of Santana and Vasquez that McGRATH had investigated were "absolutely irregular," and that the acquittal of Santana and Vasquez was merely the result of many adverse rulings by the trial judge that "prevented [the prosecutor] from presenting" a full and effective case.
70. Said statements by McGRATH expressly and by innuendo portrayed Santana and Vasquez as dishonorable and unethical attorneys, and thereby substantially further injured their reputations, both personal and professional, and caused significant damage to their law practices.
71. Defendants acted as hereinabove alleged intentionally, maliciously, oppressively and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against each Defendant.
72. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
73. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 72 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
74. All individual Defendants entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of derailing SANTANA's candidacy for judicial appointment, and their overt acts pursuant to the conspiracy included formulating and implementing the Derailment Plan, including by conducting in bad faith an illegal and improper criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ, and formulating and conducting the above-alleged press conference or press release challenging the jury acquittals of SANTANA and VASQUEZ. Plaintiffs are informed, believe and allege that in doing the things alleged, Defendants, and each of them, assisted, cooperated, coordinated and acted in concert with each of the other Defendants.
75. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs were substantially damaged in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and emotional distress.
76. Defendants acted as hereinabove alleged intentionally, maliciously, oppressively and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against each Defendant.
77. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
78. Plaintiffs herein reallege Paragraphs 1 through 77 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
79. Acting in bad faith, and despite the absence of probable cause to support his doing so, ATTORNEY EVANS aided, abetted, and caused the above-alleged illegal and improper criminal investigation and prosecution of SANTANA and VASQUEZ on felony charges of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice.
80. Said prosecution terminated in the favor of SANTANA and VASQUEZ in certain of said charges were set aside by court order as legally unfounded, and, on April 25, 2014, a jury returned verdicts of not guilty on the remaining charges of dissuading a witness and obstruction of justice.
81. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs were substantially damaged, in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and they have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, and consternation, worry, anxiety, and other emotional distress.
82. In acting as hereinabove alleged, ATTORNEY EVANS acted intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, and despicably, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against him.
83. Plaintiffs herein reallege Paragraphs 1 through 82 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
84. Defendant Attorney Evans entered into a conspiracy with the other individual Defendants for the purpose of derailing SANTANA's candidacy for judicial appointment, and their overt acts pursuant to the conspiracy included conducting in bad faith an illegal and improper criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ, thereby causing the prosecution without probable cause of SANTANA and VASQUEZ on felony charges of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice, and formulating and conducting the above-alleged press conference or press release challenging the jury acquittals of SANTANA and VASQUEZ.
84. As the proximate result of the above alleged conduct of ATTORNEY EVANS, Plaintiffs were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and other emotional distress, all to their damage in sums to be established according to proof.
85. In acting as hereinabove alleged, ATTORNEY EVANS acted intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, and despicably, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against him.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:
A. For compensatory damages against all defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial;
B. For special damages against all defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial:
C. For punitive and exemplary damages against the individual defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial;
D. For attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
E. For costs of suit; and
F. For any further relief, including injunctive relief, as may be just and proper.
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on any and all issues triable by a jury.
Plaintiffs, JESSE SANTANA and DAVID VASQUEZ, hereby allege as follows:
1. This is a civil action seeking damages as a result of the illegal and unconstitutional conduct and malicious prosecution of Plaintiffs Jesse Santana ("SANTANA") and David Vasquez ("VASQUEZ") by defendants County of Yuba ("YUBA COUNTY"); Yuba County District Attorney Patrick McGrath ("McGRATH"), Deputy District Attorney Melanie Bendorf ("BENDORF"), Deputy District Attorney John Vacek ("VACEK"), Yuba County District Attorney Investigator Mary Barr ("BARR"), and Yuba County District Attorney Investigator Gene Stober ("STOBER") [Collectively, "YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS"]; and Timothy J. Evans ("ATTORNEY EVANS").
2. As a result of defendants' illegal conduct, and other acts and omissions, SANTANA and VASQUEZ were unlawfully and maliciously prosecuted without probable cause in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
3. Plaintiffs' prosecution was fueled by Defendants' unconstitutional custom, practice and policy of discriminating against the Plaintiffs based on their Hispanic ethnicity and in order to keep the local judicial bench racially homogenous and exclusive of non-whites. YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS abused their authority and acted outside the scope of their roles as prosecutors and ATTORNEY EVANS conspired, aided and abetted the co-defendants in their unlawful and unconstitutional conduct to prosecute SANTANA and VASQUEZ without probable cause and in violation of their constitutional rights.
4. On April 25, 2014, after almost seven years of defending themselves against the unconstitutional acts by Defendants, SANTANA and VASQUEZ were acquitted on all charges. Plaintiffs' personal and professional lives were, and have been, damaged irreparably. Plaintiffs' professional reputations were also irreparably damaged and they continue to suffer emotional anguish. SANTANA and VASQUEZ now pursue this action to expose the wrongdoing that led to their illegal prosecution, to vindicate their civil rights, to obtain awards of compensatory damages for their losses, and to obtain awards of punitive damages to deter Defendants and others from engaging in unconstitutional conduct such as occurred herein.
5. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 for the deprivation of rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction of this court is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.
6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant named herein because Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each defendant is currently domiciled in the State of California.
7. The court has pendant and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367. The pendant state law claims contained in this Complaint arise from the same nucleus of operative facts, and involve identical issues of fact and law, as the federal claims, such that the entire action constitutes a single case appropriate for prosecution as a single proceeding.
8. On or about October 22, 2014, Plaintiffs presented a written claim for damages with the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS pursuant to California Government Code Section 910 et seq.
9. The County of Yuba issued a Notice of Rejection of Claim on October 30, 2014. This Complaint is thus timely and properly commenced on all state claims pursuant to applicable provisions of the Government Code.
10. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of California, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) because the defendants to this action reside in this District and because a substantial part, if not all, of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this judicial district.
11. Pursuant to Eastern District Civil Local Rule 120 (d), intradistrict assignment to the Sacramento Division of the Court is proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the County of Yuba.
12. The Plaintiffs in this case are Jesse Santana ("SANTANA"), who at all relevant times hereto, was a resident of the County of Sutter, State of California, and David Vasquez ("VASQUEZ"), who at all relevant times hereto, was a resident of the County of Yuba, State of California.
13. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant YUBA COUNTY is a political subdivision of the State of California duly organized and existing under the laws thereof, and has the capacity to sue and be sued. The Yuba County DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE is an official subdivision of YUBA COUNTY, and all attorneys and investigators employed by the DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE are employees of YUBA COUNTY.
14. Defendant McGRATH, sued herein in his personal capacity, was at all relevant times herein the District Attorney for the Yuba County DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE and he at all times possessed the power and authority, and was charged by law with the responsibility, to enact policies and to prescribe rules and practices concerning the operation of the Yuba County DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
15. Defendant BENDORF, sued herein in her personal capacity, was at all relevant times a Deputy District Attorney employed by YUBA COUNTY who, in committing the acts alleged herein, acted within the course and scope of her duties, under the color of law, and with authority and ratification of her principal, YUBA COUNTY.
16. Defendant VACEK, sued individually, was a former Deputy District Attorney and, at the time of committing the acts alleged herein, a duly authorized employee of YUBA COUNTY acting within the course and scope of his duty, under the color of law and with complete authority and ratification of his principal, YUBA COUNTY
17. Defendant BARR, sued individually, was an Investigator and, at the time of committing the acts alleged herein, a duly authorized employee of YUBA COUNTY acting within the course and scope of her duties, under the color of law and with complete authority and ratification of her principal, YUBA COUNTY.
18. Defendant STOBER, sued individually, was an Investigator and, at the time of committing the acts alleged herein, a duly authorized employee of YUBA COUNTY acting within the course and scope of his duty, under the color of law and with complete authority and ratification of his principal, YUBA COUNTY.
19. All acts complained of herein by Plaintiffs against YUBA COUNTY were done and performed by its authorized agents, servants, and/or employees, including the above-named individual Defendants, each of whom was acting within the course, purpose and scope of said agency, service and/or employment capacity and under the color of law. Moreover, Defendant YUBA COUNTY and its agents ratified all of the acts complained of herein.
20. Defendant ATTORNEY EVANS, sued herein in his personal capacity, was at all relevant times a private attorney licensed by the State of California to practice law, and, in doing the things complained of herein, was acting in concert and in agreement with all other Defendants.
21. Each of the Defendants caused and is responsible for the unlawful conduct described herein and the resulting injuries by, among other things, (a) personally participating in the unlawful conduct or acting jointly or conspiring with others who did so; (b) authorizing, acquiescing in or setting in motion policies, plans or actions that led to the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct; (c) failing to take action to prevent the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct; (d) failing and refusing, with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights, to initiate and maintain adequate training and supervision; and (e) ratifying the unlawful conduct committed by others, and failing to take remedial or disciplinary action with reference to said unlawful conduct.
22. All individual defendants are guilty of fraud, oppression, and/or malice that would justify the imposition of punitive and exemplary damages.
23. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 22 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
24. On November 9, 2007, Socorro Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") and two of her daughters, Socorro Acevedo ("Socorro") and Laura Acevedo ("Laura"), met with Marysville Police Detective Randall Elliott, Socorro, a minor less than eighteen years old who was employed as a dispatcher at a local towing business known as Mitchell's Towing, told Detective Elliott that she had been sexually assaulted and physically abused by her employer, Joseph Griesa ("Griesa"). Socorro said Griesa touched her breasts and buttocks and put his hands down her pants, with force and without consent.
25. At the meeting, Socorro provided Detective Elliott with her cell phone, which contained an array of sexually inappropriate text messages from Griesa to Socorro as well as a recording of a telephone conversation between Griesa and Socorro which substantiated Socorro's allegations. Socorro also showed Detective Elliott bruises on her forearm and shin, which she said Griesa had caused. Detective Elliott photographed the bruising and had a female officer photograph additional bruises on Socorro's torso.
26. Detective Elliott informed Socorro that it would be difficult to prosecute any criminal charges against Griesa because the case would come down to "he saicUshe said," and hence it was unlikely that criminal charges would be filed against Griesa, Detective Elliott recommended to Socorro that she pursue a civil claim against Griesa, citing as an example the unsuccessful homicide prosecution of O.J. Simpson, followed by successful civil litigation against him for wrongful death.
27. After her interview with Detective Elliott, Socorro, accompanied by her mother and sister, consulted with Plaintiff SANTANA to explore the possibility of pursuing a civil claim against Griesa as Detective Elliott had suggested. Socorro explained that she did not want to testify in open court against Griesa and thereby have the whole embarrassing story become public knowledge. She particularly feared what might happen if her father and brother found out what Griesa had done to her. She felt that her father, who was in poor health, could suffer a stroke if he found out, and that her brother, who was hot-tempered and overprotective, might try to physically attack Griesa. In addition, she wanted to put the whole matter behind her as soon as possible, in that she planned to leave the area to attend college.
28. SANTANA confirmed what Detective Elliott had told them, namely that Socorro could file a civil lawsuit seeking money damages from Griesa. SANTANA explained that such lawsuits are often settled without a trial and sometimes even settled before the lawsuits are filed. He pointed out that while a judge would have to approve any settlement since Socorro was still a minor, she would not have to give detailed testimony about what Griesa had done to her as would happen at trial, and that seeking such judicial approval would typically give rise to little, if any, publicity. SANTANA also told them that Socorro, as a sexual assault victim, had a right not to testify in open court if she chose not to do so, but it was ultimately up to the judge to decide whether Socorro was in contempt for not testifying.
29. SANTANA offered to represent Socorro, together with her mother as guardian ad litem, on a pro bono basis, and Socorro and her mother agreed to the arrangement.
30. On November 16, 2007, Detective Elliott phoned Griesa to inform him of the abuse allegations that Socorro had made against Griesa and advised Griesa to contact a lawyer before providing any statement on the matter. Griesa agreed. Later that day, Griesa met with VASQUEZ, and VASQUEZ then phoned Detetcive Elliott, who explained Socorro's abuse allegations and the criminal charges he was considering. VASQUEZ advised Detective Elliott that he was about to leave on a ten day vacation and asked Detective Elliott to postpone sending any investigation report to the District Attorney until VASQUEZ had an opportunity following his return to discuss the matter further with Griesa. Detective Elliott agreed to the request
31. On or about November 19, 2007, a sister of Socorro phoned Detective Elliott to request that he obtain a search warrant for Griesa's office because she learned that Griesa was removing his computer, video camera equipment, and other items from his office at Mitchell's Towing, and she believed said items contained evidence that would corroborate Socorro's allegations. Detective Elliott declined to do so, explaining that a search warrant would not be worth the effort and that the case ultimately boiled down to a "he said-she said" matter.
32. In the latter part of November, 2007, Griesa met again with VASQUEZ to explore negotiating an early civil settlement with Socorro. VASQUEZ told Griesa that, while the District Attorney would decide whether to file criminal charges, the District Attorney might be less likely to do so if Griesa and Socorro promptly reached a civil settlement. Griesa deposited $50,000.00 into VASQUEZ' trust account so VASQUEZ could open settlement negotiations with a good faith settlement offer in that amount.
33. On or about November 28, Detective Elliott continued his investigation into the sex abuse allegations by speaking with two employees of Mitchell's Towing who reported having seen a bruise on Socorro's face which reportedly resulted from Griesa striking her during an incident in which he exposed himself to her.
34. During the latter part of November and early part of December, 2007, SANTANA and VASQUEZ engaged in numerous settlement negotiations which resulted in a tentative settlement of Socorro's civil claims against Griesa for $100,000.00, and began preparation of a written release to be approved and signed by their respective clients. They agreed that once the release was thus approved and signed, judicial approval would be required for the settlement to become final in that Socorro was a minor. As to the language of the release, they agreed to refer to Socorro's wishes regarding her wanting to settle her civil claims against Griesa, her wanting no criminal charges filed so that there would not be any publicity of her ordeal at the hands of Griesa, and her wanting to exercise any privilege she may have pursuant to law not to testify in any proceeding. In its final version, the release stated the following:
35. While preparation of the release was underway during December, VASQUEZ told Detective Elliott of the possible civil settlement, and Detective Elliott responded that this would be a good resolution of the matter. VASQUEZ also told BENDORF of the proposed settlement and asked if finalization of the settlement would have any effect on whether the District Attorney's office would file any criminal charges against his client. Also, SANTANA phoned Detetcive Elliott to inform him of his client's wishes that she wanted to settle her civil claims against Griesa, that she wanted to move to the Bay Area to attend college, that a possible civil settlement between Socorro and Griesa was being worked on, that she no longer desired a criminal prosecution of Griesa for his sexual abuse of her, she did not want to testify against Griesa and that SANTANA would have to be present if Detective Elliott wanted to interview her. In addition, Griesa told Detective Elliott of the proposed settlement for $100,000.00. Detective Elliott's response was that Griesa should see another attorney for a second opinion and recommended ATTORNEY EVANS as the attorney whom Griesa should see.
36. On December 14, Detective Elliott submitted to the District Attorney's office his report on his investigation into Socorro's sex abuse allegations. In the report, Detetcive Elliott made no recommendation on whether criminal charges should be filed against Griesa. He also noted his belief that VASQUEZ and SANTANA had reached a settlement for their clients in which Griesa would pay money to Socorro, and Detective Elliott recommended that consideration consequently be given to bribery charges against SANTANA and VASQUEZ. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Detective Elliott was encouraged or pressured by one or more of the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS to insert into his report (i) the false allegation that SANTANA had told him in the December Il phone call that SANTANA had flatly instructed Socorro not to talk further with Detetcive Elliott; and (ii) the recommendation that the DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE investigate VASQUEZ and SANTANA for bribery (despite Detective Elliott's knowledge from his law enforcement experience that victims of sexual assaults are often afraid to come forward and don't want to face their accusers or testify in court, and hence that Socorro's reported reluctance to testify against Griesa may well have been the consequence solely of Socorro's experience as a sexual assault victim, and not of any effort by SANTANA or VASQUEZ to bribe her into refusing to respond to any subpoena to appear in any court proceeding against Griesa). Upon receiving Detective Elliott's report, the District Attorney's office refrained from filing any criminal charges agtainst Griesa and immediately began investigating the possible bribery charges against SANTANA and VASQUEZ.
37. On or about December 13, Socorro and her mother both signed the release. However, Griesa did not promptly sign the release because there was no guarantee he would not be criminally prosecuted. On December 21, Socorro notified SANTANA that her father had learned about the sex abuse by Griesa and wanted him criminally prosecuted, and that she therefore changed her mind about the settlement and wanted to proceed instead with the criminal prosecution. SANTANA recommended that she retain another attorney, Michael Trezza, to represent her. Socorro did so. SANTANA then immediately informed both VASQUEZ and Detetcive Elliott of this turn of events. SANTANA also offered Detective Elliott the name and number of Socorro's new attorney so he could interview her. Detective Elliott declined the information and said he was not interested. VASQUEZ returned to Griesa the $50,000.00 that the latter had deposited into VASQUEZ' trust account for settlement purposes.
38. During 2007, before undertaking representation of Socorro, SANTANA had submitted his application to the Governor's Office for a judicial appointment to the vacant seat on the Sutter County Superior Court. SANTANA was a prominent Hispanic attorney whose law practice primarily entailed representation of criminal defendants. His application for judicial appointment was strongly supported by the local Hispanic community, including another prominent Hispanic attorney, VASQUEZ. The other application for the judicial appointment was by former Sutter County Deputy District Attorney Susan Green ("Green"), who is Caucasian. Green is a friend of the Defendants and member of the Defendants' inner circle.
39. Sutter County and YUBA COUNTY are neighboring, and their respective Superior Courts are less than two miles apart. Although Hispanics make up approximately twenty-five percent of the population in each of said Counties, no Hispanic has ever been a judge in either of said Superior Courts. As Hispanics, both VASQUEZ and SANTANA are members of a
40. Defendants have adhered to a custom and practice of favoring and encouraging the judicial appointments of Caucasians, and resisting or preventing any judicial appointments of Hispanics or other persons from ethnic minorities, in the Superior Courts of said two counties. This custom and practice by the Defendants would keep the local judiciary racially homogenous all Caucasian.
41. Pursuant to said custom and practice, Defendants actively supported Green's application for appointment to fill the above-referenced judicial vacancy, and opposed SANTANA's application for said judicial appointment. Defendants feared the Governor's office was making strong efforts to diversify the local judiciary.
42. On or around early December 2007, Green and Defendants McGRATH, BENDORF, and ATTORNEY EVANS attended a secret lunch meeting in which McGRATH proposed to further said custom and practice by implementing a plan to derail SANTANA's application for said judicial appointment ("Derailment Plan"), and the other meeting participants agreed to the Derailment Plan. Soon after said meeting, McGRATH and the other meeting participants enlisted the remaining Defendants to join in the Derailment Plan.
43. The core of the Derailment Plan was to institute an aggressive criminal investigation of SANTANA for bribery and related criminal charges purportedly arising from SANTANA's above-described representation of Socorro in connection with her allegations of sexual misconduct by Griesa. Defendants knew that once SANTANA became aware that he was the object of a criminal investigation, he would be obligated immediately to disclose same to the state commission ("State Commission") responsible for screening judicial applicants, and that the State Commission would automatically disqualify SANTANA upon learning that he was the object of a criminal investigation. Defendants were also aware that the Governor could select a candidate to fill said judicial vacancy as early as June 2008.
44. For the criminal investigation of SANTANA to appear bona fide, the Derailment Plan included also making VASQUEZ an object of the criminal investigation, as well as eventually proceeding with criminal prosecutions of both SANTANA and VASQUEZ. Pivotal to Defendant's decision to also include VASQUEZ was that, like SANTANA, VASQUEZ is Hispanic, in that Defendants believed that their contention that SANTANA illegally interacted with another attorney would appear plausible only if both attorneys were Hispanic. As to how the criminal investigation and prosecutions would be conducted, the Derailment Plan was to disregard established and lawful procedural constraints on the gathering of evidence in criminal investigations, as well as to disregard any evidence or applicable law that would demonstrate or tend to demonstrate that neither SANTANA nor VASQUEZ had committed the crimes with which Defendants planned to charge them. Defendants agreed to pursue the Derailment Plan by falsely characterizing the settlement efforts of SANTANA and VASQUEZ as seeking to conclude a "secret" settlement between Socorro, whereunder Socorro was induced by the payment of money from Griesa to refuse to communicate further with Detetcive Elliott concerning his criminal investigation of Griesa, and, if subpoenaed, to refuse to appear at any hearing concerning Griesa. Defendants so agreed despite their knowledge that (i) the proposed settlement provided for Griesa to pay money to Socorro in settlement of her civil claim against him for her damages from his sexual misconduct, and added only that Socorro would request that the criminal investigation against Griesa not proceed further (not to refuse to cooperate in any ongoing investigation), and would exercise any available privilege under the law not to testify in court against Griesa (not to refuse to appear in court if subpoenaed); (ii) SANTANA informed Detective Elliott not that SANTANA had instructed Socorro not to talk further with Detective Elliott, but rather that SANTANA would have to be present if Detetcive Elliott wished to talk further with Socorro; and (iii) the proposed settlement was nbt "secret," but rather disclosed by VASQUEZ as a possible alternative to criminal prosecution of Griesa (with Defendants then responding positively to that possibility) and disclosed by SANTANA in support of his client Socorro's wishes; and (iv) the handling of the proposed settlement by SANTANA and VASQUEZ was consistent with accepted practice among police, prosecutors, and private attorneys dealing with conduct by a perpetrator that may be the subject of civil claims and criminal prosecution, when in accord with the victim's wishes.
45. In their ensuing criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ pursuant to their Derailtment Plan, Defendants gave legal advice to the police and investigators, engaged in their unconstitutional and illegal investigatory and administrative functions, fabricated evidence during the investigation, held defamatory press conferences, and acted illegally and improperly, including but not limited to the following respects:
(a) ATTORNEY EVANS agreed to represent Griesa, and thereby received from Griesa a copy of the client file that VASQUEZ turned over to Griesa when replaced by ATTORNEY EVANS. ATTORNEY EVANS then violated the attorney-client privilege that protected the client file by presenting the file and its entire contents to the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS for examination without informing Griesa that he was doing so, much less seeking a waiver by Griesa of said attorney-client privilege.
(b) On May 5, 2008, assisted by other Defendants, BARR prepared and filed an application for a search warrant authorizing the search of the Law Offices of SANTANA, VASQUEZ, and Trezza. In the application, BARR falsely represented that the proposed settlement between Socorro and Griesa amounted to bribery in violation of Penal Code §138, subdivision (a), namely the proposed payment of money to Socorro in exchange for her refusal to attend a criminal trial of Griesa if subpoenaed thereto as a witness. Instead the proposed settlement contemplated Socorro exercising any privilege available under the law to decline to testify if she were thus subpoenaed, and it was already Socorro's intention, independent of any settlement agreement with Griesa, to avail herself of any such privilege if subpoenaed to attend Griesa's trial. In addition, BARR's application withheld the fact that Socorro believed Griesa had sodomized her while she was not fully conscious, in addition to subjecting her to lesser forms of sex abuse. Inclusion of that fact would have materially impaired the probable cause showing that BARR sought to make in her application, in that the sodomy allegation entitled Socorro to decline to testify in court about Griesa's sex abuse, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1219, subdivision (b), whereas BARR contended in her application that Socorro was not so entitled, and hence that the discussion in the proposed settlement about Socorro not testifying was an egregious departure from the law. Pursuant to their Derailment Plan, the Defendants had Barr certify "under the penalty of perjury" that the facts, assertions and innuendos underlying the5545544366 application for the search warrant were true.
(c) During June 2008, ATTORNEY EVANS had Griesa continue to cooperate with Defendants in their investigation of VASQUEZ and SANTANA by (i) formally waiving, in open court, his attorney-client privilege in connection with documents generated by VASQUEZ during his representation of Griesa, and (ii) agreeing to undergo a lengthy interrogation by.Defendants that dealt only with the attempt by VASQUEZ and SANTANA to negotiate a civil settlement between Griesa and Socorro, to the exclusion of any inquiry into Griesa's sexual misconduct with Socorro. Pursuant to the Derailment Plan, Defendants then and thereafter encouraged and accepted Griesa's cooperation and assistance in prosecuting SANTANA and VASQUEZ, and at least tacitly agreed not to investigate or prosecute Griesa on any serious felony charges despite Defendants' knowledge of an incident in which Griesa had induced Socorro to drink a chemicallaced beverage that impaired her consciousness and then digitally penetrated and/or sodomized her, and hence that, if fully investigated and prosecuted, Griesa could face lengthy incarceration and potentially life imprisonment. In thus encouraging and accepting Griesa's said cooperation, Defendants in bad faith abused and exceeded the bounds of their prosecutorial discretion.
(d) On July 15 and 17, 2008, Defendants BENDORF, VACEK and STOBER interrogated Socorro, who was a minor, for a total of six hours. In that the focus of the interrogation was bribery, Socorro faced the risk of prosecution for offering to receive a bribe. Nonetheless, said Defendants refused her request for her attorney, Michael Trezza, to be present during the interrogation. During her interrogation, Socorro stated that, when the proposed settlement with Griesa was being discussed, it was already her intention, independent of any such settlement, not to testify against him, and neither SANTANA nor VASQUEZ made any attempt to influence her not to testify. From her perspective, the only purpose of the proposed settlement with Griesa was for him to compensate her for the personal injuries he had inflicted on her, in lieu of Socorro civilly pursuing her personal injury claim against him in court. Although Socorro's said statements to the interrogating Defendants constituted material exonerating evidence for SANTANA and VASQUEZ, said Defendants suppressed or ignored the exonerating evidence. During the interrogation Socorro disclosed in detail that GRIESA had given her a grape drink with a chemical that caused her to lose consciousness and he raped and sodomized her. The incident occurred in late 2007, near Township Road, in Sutter County. BENDORF, VACEK and STOBER were personally present when this disclosure was made and covered that case up in order for GRIESA to cooperate with them. As an investigator, STOBER had a mandatory duty to report the incident to law enforcement, which he failed to do. Griesa was never charged with the rape and sodomy of Socorro.
(e) Defendants suppressed the material exonerating evidence that (i) when Socorro first reported to Detective Elliott that Griesa had sexually abused her, Detective Elliott discouraged her from seeking criminal prosecution of Griesa and encouraged her instead to pursue a civil claim against Griesa; (ii) Detective Elliott thereafter expressed approval to VASQUEZ of the proposed settlement then being negotiated between Socorro and Griesa; and (iii) that VASQUEZ indicated to Deputy District Attorney BENDORF that Griesa would not conclude the proposed civil settlement with Socorro if criminal charges were filed against Griesa.
46. On or about May 14, 2008, one week after his judicial interview with the Governor's office, SANTANA became aware of the foregoing criminal investigation when his law office was searched pursuant to the search warrant issued upon BARR's above-referenced application. As he was required to do, SANTANA immediately notified the State Commission that he had become the subject of a criminal investigation, and the State Commission consequently disqualified him as a judicial candidate. Governor Schwarzenegger subsequently appointed Susan Green, the only remaining candidate, to the judgeship for which she and SANTANA had been vying.
47. In October 2008, the YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS conducted a grand jury against SANTANA and VASQUEZ. In November, 2008, the grand jury returned an indictment against SANTANA and VASQUEZ on the felonies of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice. SANTANA and VASQUEZ were booked, arraigned, ordered to make all future court appearances. During this process, as well as their ensuing court appearances, they missed work. They feared that, if convicted, they would face incarceration as well as become disbarred as attorneys, and lose their reputation and their livelihood.
48. On May 16, 2012, the Court of Appeal voided the indictment against SANTANA in its entirety because the presiding judge was biased against SANTANA and therefore the court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to convene the grand jury for SANTANA. The indictment against VASQUEZ was dismissed after SANTANA'S indictment was voided.
49. The California State Attorney General's Office ("Attorney General") then replaced Defendants in the further prosecution of SANTANA and VASQUEZ. The Attorney General filed a criminal complaint against SANTANA and VASQUEZ for obstructing justice and dissuading a witness, while refraining from again charging them with bribery. In a jury trial conducted in March and April 2014, a jury acquitted SANTANA and VASQUEZ of all charges after deliberating for less than an hour. Following the jury verdict, McGRATH was quoted in the local newspaper stating, "Our investigation was solid and we stand by our prosecution of Mr. Santana and Mr. Vasquez."
50. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 49 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
51. By conducting an illegal and improper criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ in bad faith, Defendants caused and induced them to be prosecuted without probable cause on felony charges of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice.
52. In thus prosecuting SANTANA and VASQUEZ, Defendants expressly discriminated against them on the basis of their Hispanic ancestry, thereby violating their rights to equal protection as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
53. Said prosecution terminated in the favor of SANTANA and VASQUEZ in that a jury subsequently returned verdicts of not guilty on the remaining charges of dissuading a witness and obstruction of justice.
54. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, arid consternation, worry, anxiety, and other emotional distress.
55. Defendants acted as hereinabove alleged intentionally, maliciously, oppressively and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against each Defendant.
56. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
57. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 56, hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
58. Defendant YUBA COUNTY is liable for the above alleged conduct of the individual Defendants because District Attorney McGRATH, acting as a final policymaker of YUBA COUNTY, intentionally and in bad faith formulated and carried out the above-alleged Derailment Plan whereby SANTANA's judicial candidacy would be derailed by subjecting SANTANA and VASQUEZ to malicious prosecution in violation of their rights to equal protection.
59. Defendant McGRATH and Does 1-20, inclusive, furthermore facilitated and advanced his Derailment Plan, both before and after putting it into place, by establishing and carrying out a policy of failing and refusing to adequately or properly train, supervise, discipline, or control all of the other individually named YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS, in the exercise of their duties as prosecutors and investigators, including by failing and refusing to take reasonable and necessary steps to assure that their conduct was constrained by the strictures of the U.S. Constitution.
60. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by and on behalf of YUBA COUNTY, Plaintiffs have been substantially damaged in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and emotional distress.
61. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
62. Plaintiffs herein re allege Paragraphs 1 through 61 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
63. Defendant YUBA COUNTY is liable for the above alleged conduct of the individual YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS because said Defendants acted pursuant to a coustom and practice prevailing among YUBA COUNTY officials of favoring and encouraging the appointments of Caucasians as judges of the Superior Courts of Yuba County and neighboring Sutter County, and resisting or preventing any judicial appointments of Hispanies or other persons from ethnic minorities, in the Superior Courts of said two counties.
64. Defendant YUBA COUNTY caused and faeilitated said discriminatory custom and practice through its custom and practice of failing to adequately train, supervise, discipline, or in any other way proprly control all of the individually named YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS, in the exercise of their duties as employees of the Yuba County District Attorney's Office, including by failing and refusing to take reasonable and necessary steps to assure that their conduct is constrained by the strictures of the U.S. Constitution.
65. Defendant YUBA COUNTY, through their custom and practice of encouraging, condoning, tolerating and ratifying constitutional violations by their employees, including YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS McGRATH, BENDORF, VACEK, STOBER and BARR and Does 120, were deliberately indifferent to the constitutional violations being committed against the Plaintiffs.
66. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendant YUBA COUNTY, Plaintiffs wore substantially damaged in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and cfytional distress.
67. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
68. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 67 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
69. Following the acquittal of Plaintiffs on or about April 25, 2014, at the conclusion of the above-alleged criminal investigation and prosecution of Plaintiffs in violation of their constitutional rights to equals protection, McGRATH, aided and abetted by the other individual Defendants, conducted a press conference and/or issued a press release on or about May 4, 2014
70. Said statements by McGRATH expressly and by innuendo portrayed Santana and Vasquez as dishonorable and unethical attorneys, and thereby substantially further injured their reputations, both personal and professional:
71. Defendants acted as hereinabove alleged intentionally, maliciously, oppressively and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against each Defendant.
72. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
73. Plaintiffs herein re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 72 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
74. All individual Defendants entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of derailing SANTANA's candidacy for judicial appointment, and their overt acts pursuant to the conspiracy included formulating and implementing the Derailment Plan, including by conducting in bad faith an illegal and improper criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ, and formulating and conducting the above-alleged press conference or press release challenging the jury acquittals of SANTANA and VASQUEZ. Plaintiffs are informed, believe and allege that in doing the things alleged, Defendants, and each of them, assisted, cooperated, coordinated and acted in concert with each of the other Defendants.
75. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs were substantially damaged in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and emotional distress.
76. Defendants acted as hereinabove alleged intentionally, maliciously, oppressively and in reckless disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against each Defendant.
77. Upon prevailing herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
78. Plaintiffs herein reallege Paragraphs I through 77 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
79. Acting in bad faith, and despite the absence of probable cause to support his doing so, ATTORNEY EVANS aided, abetted, and caused the above-alleged illegal and improper criminal investigation and prosecution of SANTANA and VASQUEZ on felony charges of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice.
80. Said prosecution terminated in the favor of SANTANA and VASQUEZ in certain of said charges were set aside by court order as legally unfounded, and, on April 25, 2014, a jury returned verdicts of not guilty on the remaining charges of dissuading a witness and obstruction of justice.
81. As the proximate result of said unconstitutional conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs were substantially damaged, in that they were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and they have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, and consternation, worry, anxiety, and other emotional distress.
82. In acting as hereinabove alleged, ATTORNEY EVANS acted intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, and despicably, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against him.
83. Plaintiffs herein reallege Paragraphs 1 through 82 hereinabove, and each and every allegation thereof, as though fully set forth herein.
84. Defendant Attorney Evans entered into a conspiracy with the other individual Defendants for the purpose of derailing SANTANA's candidacy for judicial appointment, and their overt acts pursuant to the conspiracy included conducting in bad faith an illegal and improper criminal investigation of SANTANA and VASQUEZ, thereby causing the prosecution without probable cause of SANTANA and VASQUEZ on felony charges of bribery, dissuading a witness, and obstruction of justice, and formulating and conducting the above-alleged press conference or press release challenging the jury acquittals of SANTANA and VASQUEZ.
84. As the proximate result of the above alleged conduct of ATTORNEY EVANS, Plaintiffs were forced to undergo lengthy criminal prosecution, and have suffered loss of liberty, costs of defense, loss of reputation, loss of earnings, consternation, worry, humiliation, anxiety, and other emotional distress, all to their damage in sums to be established according to proof.
85. In acting as hereinabove alleged, ATTORNEY EVANS acted intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, and despicably, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to awards of punitive damages against him.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:
A. For compensatory damages against all defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial;
B. For special damages against all defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial:
C. For punitive and exemplary damages against the individual defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be proven at trial;
D. For attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988;
E. For costs of suit; and
F. For any further relief, including injunctive relief, as may be just and proper.
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury on any and all issues triable by a jury.
