Filed: Jul. 24, 2013
Latest Update: Jul. 24, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MICHAEL J. SENG, Magistrate Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 29, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 16, 2013 and to exclude ti
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MICHAEL J. SENG, Magistrate Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 29, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 16, 2013 and to exclude tim..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. SENG, Magistrate Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 29, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 16, 2013 and to exclude time between July 29, 2013 and September 16, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)(A), (b)(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with client, conduct investigation, and further discuss a resolution of the case.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 29, 2013 to September 16, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
Good cause appearing, the foregoing stipulation is accepted and approved and adopted as the Order of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
