MEMORANDUM OPINION

JACQUELINE CHOOLJIAN, Magistrate Judge.

I. SUMMARY

On January 27, 2015, Sandra Chavez Alvarez ("plaintiff") filed a Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of plaintiff's application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, respectively ("Plaintiff's Motion") and ("Defendant's Motion"). The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; January 29, 2015 Case Management Order ¶ 5.

Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.

II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

On November 8, 2010, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits. (Administrative Record ("AR") 141, 308). Plaintiff asserted that she became disabled on December 28, 2009, due to left hand injury, and carpal tunnel (AR 338). On remand from the Appeals Council, the ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who was represented by counsel), and a vocational expert on March 3, 2014. (AR 60-100). At a supplemental hearing on August 7, 2014, the ALJ heard additional testimony from plaintiff, and obtained testimony from a new vocational expert.1 (AR 30-59).

On October 9, 2014, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled through the date of the decision. (AR 16-25). Specifically, the ALJ found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: left carpal tunnel syndrome, mild right to carpal tunnel syndrome, impingement of the right elbow and right shoulder, epicondylitis of the right elbow, arthritis, and obesity (AR 18); (2) plaintiff's impairments, considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment (AR 19); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)) with additional limitations2 (AR 19); (4) plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work (AR 23); (5) there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, specifically cafeteria attendant, assembler (plastic hospital products), and small products assembler I (AR 23-24); and (6) plaintiff's allegations regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her subjective symptoms were only partially credible (AR 20, 22).

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review. (AR 1).

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Sequential Evaluation Process

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is to follow a five-step sequential evaluation process:

Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110 (same).

The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (claimant carries initial burden of proving disability).

B. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). Courts review only the reasons provided in the ALJ's decision, and the decision may not be affirmed on a ground upon which the ALJ did not rely. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must "`consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). A denial of benefits must be upheld if the evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's decision. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ) (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 ("Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.") (citation omitted).

Even when an ALJ's decision contains error, it must still be affirmed if the error was harmless. Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014).

C. Evaluation of Credibility

When a claimant provides "objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms alleged," and there has not been an affirmative finding that the claimant was malingering, the ALJ may discount the credibility of the claimant's statements regarding subjective symptoms only by "offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so" supported by substantial evidence. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4620123, *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the ALJ's interpretation of the claimant's testimony is reasonable and is supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court's role to "second-guess" it. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (Evaluation of a claimant's credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are solely functions of the Commissioner.) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ inadequately evaluated the credibility of her subjective complaints regarding limitations in her left-upper extremity. (Plaintiff's Motion at 6). Plaintiff essentially contends that, contrary to the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment, plaintiff should actually be restricted to only "occasional" use of her left upper extremity, and "it is impossible for [plaintiff] to use her left upper extremity for frequent fine and gross manipulation." (Plaintiff's Motion at 6) (citing AR 79-81). A reversal or remand is not warranted.

Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's assessment that plaintiff essentially retained the residual functional capacity to, among other things, perform light work and frequent fine and gross manipulation with her left upper extremity. For example, it appears that the ALJ reasonably interpreted plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony as supporting a finding that plaintiff could perform light work and frequent fine and gross manipulation with her left upper extremity. The ALJ noted plaintiff's testimony that she could hold a pen or pencil for only 5 to 10 minutes at a time and that plaintiff had "difficulty using her left upper extremity for lifting activities as well as flexion and turning activities." (Plaintiff's Motion at 6; AR 22, 79-81). As the ALJ noted, however, plaintiff also testified that she could pick up a gallon of milk "[f]or a while" if she used both hands, even though she had "difficulty" holding a kitchen pot and could not pick up a gallon of milk "continuously" or with her left hand alone. (AR 22, 79). Plaintiff also testified that she is "right hand dominant" and did not wear a brace on her right hand. (AR 22, 76). Thus it was reasonable for the ALJ to infer from plaintiff's own testimony that although plaintiff "[could not] support much weight with her left hand alone," plaintiff still "should be able to support more weight when using her right hand as well." (AR 22).

In addition, the ALJ gave "some weight" to Dr. Luigi F. Galloni (an examining orthopedic surgeon) who opined that plaintiff should be restricted from repetitive activity with the left upper extremity (i.e., "repetitive grasping, gripping, and torquing, as well as repetitive use of the left hand, and repetitive flexion extension, and pronation and supination of the left elbow"), and the ALJ reasonably found such preclusion from repetitive activity as being "generally consistent with the ability to perform a light range of work" with the left upper extremity. (AR 22, 500).

While plaintiff argues that the evidence reflects more significant limitations in her left-upper extremity (Plaintiff's Motion at 6-7), this Court will not second-guess the ALJ's reasonable determination otherwise, even if such evidence could give rise to inferences more favorable to plaintiff. See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, a remand or reversal on this basis is not warranted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.