Filed: Aug. 22, 2014
Latest Update: Aug. 22, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a preliminary hearing on Monday, August 25, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. 2. This matter will be presented to the grand jury for indictment on Thursday, August 21,
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a preliminary hearing on Monday, August 25, 2014, at 1:30 p.m. 2. This matter will be presented to the grand jury for indictment on Thursday, August 21, 2..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a preliminary hearing on Monday, August 25, 2014, at 1:30 p.m.
2. This matter will be presented to the grand jury for indictment on Thursday, August 21, 2014.
3. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the hearing date until September 22, 2014, at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between August 25, 2014, and September 22, 2014.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The defense needs additional time to consider a fast-track disposition and review discovery. The government has provided a fast-track disposition to the defendant.
b. Counsel for the government is unavailable on August 25, 2014, due to the death of a family member.
c. The parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendants the reasonable time necessary for effective resolution and/or case preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny continuity of counsel for the government.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 25, 2014, to September 22, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
