MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KAREN E. SCOTT, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Maria G. Romo appeals the final decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denying her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. The ALJ's decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

I.

BACKGROUND

In August 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI and DIB, initially alleging disability beginning in October 2010, but then changing the onset date to August 1, 2011, when she was 32 years old. Administrative Record ("AR") 21, 164, 171. She alleges she is unable to work due to severe low back pain that radiates down her left leg. AR 42.

On August 5, 2013, an ALJ conducted a hearing, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a vocational expert ("VE") and medical expert ("ME"). AR 37-62.

On August 13, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff's request for benefits. AR 14-27. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of piriformis syndrome,1 sciatica, low back strain and obesity. AR 20. Notwithstanding her impairments, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform "light work" with the following additional exertional limitations:

AR 20.

Based on the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an accounting clerk and security dispatcher. AR 23, 93. The ALJ thus found Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The parties dispute whether the ALJ erred in:

(1) discounting Plaintiff's testimony concerning the severity and limiting effects of her pain;

(2) failing to account in the RFC for Plaintiff's claimed inability to sustain work activities due to her pain; and

(3) finding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Gave Clear and Convincing Reasons for Discounting Plaintiff's Credibility.

Plaintiff contends that because of her pain, she "cannot work at all for at least a day a week." Dkt. 19 at 4.2 Even on the other four days, she cannot work "for the entire day." Id. Rather, she would need to take frequent breaks, because she "cannot get around . . . for several hours" every other day. Id. at 3; AR 42-43.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility concerning the limiting effects of her pain. Dkt. 19 at 5-7.

1. Applicable Law

An ALJ's assessment of symptom severity and claimant credibility is entitled to "great weight." See Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986). "[T]he ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating a claimant's subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment [that] could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. If so, the ALJ may not reject a claimant's testimony "simply because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).

Second, if the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may discredit the claimant's subjective symptom testimony only if he makes specific findings that support the conclusion. Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). Absent a finding or affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ must consider a claimant's work record, observations of medical providers and third parties with knowledge of claimant's limitations, aggravating factors, functional restrictions caused by symptoms, effects of medication, and the claimant's daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84 & n.8. "Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).

The ALJ may also use ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering the claimant's reputation for lying and inconsistencies in her statements or between her statements and her conduct. Id. at 1284; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). An ALJ may consider the fact that a claimant stopped working for reasons other than disability in assessing credibility. Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001).

2. Analysis

Following the two-step process outlined above, the ALJ found as follows:

AR 21.

The ALJ gave two clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility: (1) Plaintiff lied in her application about why she stopped working in August 2011, and (2) the lack of objective evidence (such as records of doctor visits or treatment for pain management) to support Plaintiff's testimony concerning the severity of her pain. AR 22-23.

a. Plaintiff provided inconsistent explanations for why she stopped working in August 2011.

Plaintiff's application for benefits says, "I became unable to work because of my disabling condition on August 1, 2011." AR 171. Plaintiff's "Adult Function Report" says that she stopped working "Because of my condition(s)." AR 201. Plaintiff confirmed at the hearing that she stopped working on August 1, 2011. AR 40. She told one of her doctors, however, that "she no longer worked [for HD Supply Repair and Remodel] because she tested dirty for marijuana." AR 312. The doctor concluded, "Ms. Romo has been out of work now since August 2011 but not due to her low back. She states that this was due to marijuana use." AR 319.

When asked at the hearing, "If you were not fired from your job in August of 2011 for smoking marijuana, would you still be working?" Plaintiff answered, "I was going to get a medical leave. I was already getting ready to . . . stop working." AR 48-49. In her briefing, Plaintiff repeats that she was planning to take a medical leave when she was fired because she "could not do the work." Dkt. 19 at 7. She also points out that marijuana is "most often used to relax muscles and help relieve pain." Id. Thus, Plaintiff argues that her representation that she left her former employment due to disability "does not detract from her condition or credibility." Id.

As discussed above, an ALJ is entitled to rely on ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering inconsistencies in a claimant's statements. An "ALJ's finding that a claimant generally lacked credibility is a permissible basis to reject excess pain testimony." Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) ("If a claimant . . . is found to have been less than candid in other aspects of his testimony, that may properly be taken into account in determining whether his claim of disabling pain should be believed."); Holland v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63601 at *30 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) (ALJ did not err in discounting the credibility of a claimant who testified he was laid off because pain caused excessive absenteeism but who told others he was laid off due to the slow economy).

Here, the record supports a finding of inconsistency between the reason Plaintiff claimed to have stopped working in her application and Adult Function Report and the reason why Plaintiff actually stopped working. This inconsistency provides a clear and convincing reason for the ALJ to discount the credibility of Plaintiff's testimony concerning the severity and limiting effects of her pain.

b. Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of treatment in 2012-2013 consistent with her claims of disabling pain.

In assessing the claimant's credibility, the ALJ may also consider "unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment. . . ." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the ALJ pointed out that "the objective evidence does not support the claimant's allegations of severity of pain and physical impairments and limitations." AR 22. The ALJ cited the fact that the record "only shows one visit to the doctor relating to her back pain in November 2012." AR 22.

The ALJ correctly determined that the only records from 2012 unrelated to Plaintiff's workers' compensation claim3 are from an emergency room visit dated November 29, 2012. According to those records, "Patient reports left low back pain radiating to left ankle, intermittent over 2 weeks." AR 249-50, 259. She was diagnosed with "sciatica," prescribed Vicodin, and discharged with instructions to follow up with her primary care doctor, Dr. Diop. Id. There are no records of a follow up visit to Dr. Diop.

Dr. Yashruti, the doctor who examined Plaintiff in connection with her workers' compensation claim in March 2012, stated that Plaintiff had received physical therapy and pain medication from July to October 2011, but "no additional treatment since then." AR 319. At the hearing in August 2013, Plaintiff confirmed that she was not presently receiving treatment for her pain, despite having MediCal insurance coverage, because she was waiting for a determination from the Social Security Administration. AR 44. She initially testified that she took Vicodin four times a week, but when asked how she obtains prescription pain medication without seeing a doctor, she stated that she uses ibuprofen. AR 44-45. She testified that her last physical therapy was two years before the hearing, in approximately 2011. AR 49.

Given this testimony, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's failure to seek treatment was inconsistent with the claimed severity of her pain is supported by substantial evidence, and it provides another clear and convincing reason for discounting Plaintiff's testimony.

B. The ALJ Did Not Err In Formulating Plaintiff's RFC.

Plaintiff contends that the RFC fails to account for Plaintiff's inability to sustain work activities (i.e., she must miss at least four days of work each month and take breaks whenever "the muscle spasms and the pain hit"). Dkt. 19 at 4-5.

A district court must uphold an RFC assessment when the ALJ has applied the proper legal standard and substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the decision. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ must consider all the medical evidence in the record and "explain in [her] decision the weight given to . . . [the] opinions from treating sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii); see also § 404.1545(a)(1); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). In determining a claimant's RFC, the ALJ should consider those limitations for which there is support in the record, but the ALJ need not consider properly rejected evidence or subjective complaints. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217; Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court must consider the ALJ's decision in the context of "the entire record as a whole," and if the "evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld." Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Here, the only evidence that Plaintiff would be frequently absent or off-task was Plaintiff's own testimony concerning the severity of her pain, which the ALJ properly discounted, as discussed above. Having discounted Plaintiff's testimony, it was not error to formulate an RFC which failed to take into account Plaintiff's asserted need to miss at least four days of work each month and take frequent, unscheduled breaks. Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that RFC excluding subjective pain limitations was supported by substantial evidence when ALJ specifically discredited claimant's pain testimony).

C. The ALJ's Finding that Plaintiff Could Perform Her Past Relevant Work was Supported by Substantial Evidence.

At this fourth step of the analysis, the burden falls upon the Plaintiff to prove that she cannot perform her prior work either as she actually performed it or as generally performed in the national economy. Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008).

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an accounting clerk or security dispatcher, because those jobs do not require work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff's RFC. AR 23. The ALJ relied on the testimony of a VE who testified that accounting clerk was Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") code 216.487-0104 and security dispatcher was DOT code 372.167-010. AR 53, 55. When the ALJ asked the VE if a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's RFC could perform these jobs, the VE answered yes. AR 58-59.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was required to "line up all of the requirements of the past relevant work on one side, and counterpoise those requirements against [Plaintiff's] limitations." Dkt. 19 at 8-9, citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ not only failed to do this, but also failed to develop the record adequately concerning the demands of Plaintiff's past relevant work, such that the required analysis could not be performed with the current record. Id. at 10.

The Commissioner points out that the ALJ is entitled to rely on the claimant's testimony to define the claimant's past relevant work as performed, or the DOT as the source for how a job is generally performed, citing Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). Dkt. 20 at 7. Here, the DOT documents the demands of both of Plaintiff's prior positions as an accounting clerk and security dispatcher as those jobs are generally performed. See DOT No. 216.482-010 at WL 1991 6719335; DOT No. 372.167-010 at WL 1991 673083.6 Comparing the listed exertional demands with Plaintiff's RFC, one can determine that nothing in these job descriptions is inconsistent with Plaintiff's RFC.

Plaintiff again asserts that she cannot do her past jobs because her pain would cause excessive absenteeism. Dkt. 19 at 10. But the ALJ was not required to perform a function-by-function analysis for impairments that the ALJ already determined were not credible. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (ALJ properly relied on VE testimony in response to hypothetical that contained all of the limitations the ALJ found credible); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956 (finding VE testimony reliable when hypothetical posed included all claimant's functional limitations as determined by ALJ).

Thus, the ALJ was entitled to rely on the VE's testimony in finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work. Plaintiff did not carry her burden to show otherwise. Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting claimant's "burden of proving an inability to return to [her] former type of work and not just to [her] former job").

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice.