JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff Jesus Betanzo Basilio ("Plaintiff") sued the City of Fairfield ("the City"), the Fairfield Police Department ("FPD"), and FPD Chief of Police Walt Tibbet ("Tibbet") (collectively "Defendants") for civil rights and state law violations arising out of an interaction between Plaintiff and FPD officers (Doc. #1). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. #9). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. #14).
The Court takes the facts alleged by Plaintiff as true for purposes of this motion. In February 2014, FPD officers arrested Plaintiff at his residence. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff is a Mexican-American male and was a minor at the time of the arrest.
One officer searched Plaintiff and forcefully pulled on Plaintiff's testicles.
When Plaintiff arrived at the police station, officers took him into an interrogation room.
At some point, the officers came back into the room asked Plaintiff about a suspect in a shooting.
Plaintiff sued Defendants in February 2016, alleging seven causes of action: (1) excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), (2) denial of medical care pursuant to § 1983, (3) violation of the Bane Act, (4) battery, (5) negligence, (6) false imprisonment, and (7) false arrest.
Plaintiff brings his first cause of action for excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. at 8. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed to the extent that it is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment because an excessive force claim is limited to being brought under the Fourth Amendment. MTD at 4. Defendants are correct. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that:
Defendants argue that the City cannot be liable under § 1983 because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a "longstanding practice or custom" because "Plaintiff's factual allegations relate only to his particular incident, and there are no facts showing a practice or custom beyond the subject incident." MTD at 6. Defendants are correct. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the City "maintained or permitted one or more of the following official policies, customs, or practices," and then lists several different practices in generic terms. Compl. ¶ 10. But Plaintiff does not provide facts to support these generic allegations. The facts in Plaintiff's complaint relate only to one encounter with FPD. There are no facts supporting the existence of any "longstanding practice" which constitutes the "standard operating procedure" of the FPD.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a ratification claim. MTD at 6. "To prove
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim based on inadequate training. MTD at 7. "[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact."
Plaintiff alleges that the City "[f]ail[ed] to provide adequate training and supervision to FPD Officers with respect to constitutional limits on force, detention, and provision of medical care." Compl. ¶ 10(A). Plaintiff provides only conclusory allegations and no facts to support his claim that the City improperly trained its officers. Plaintiff's claim against the City based on a failure to train theory is dismissed with leave to amend.
Defendant Tibbet argues that any claims against him in his official capacity should be dismissed. MTD at 8. When a plaintiff files suit against both a local government entity and an officer in his official capacity, "the court may dismiss the officer as a redundant defendant."
"[A] supervisory official can be found liable in his individual capacity if there is a sufficient nexus between his own conduct and the constitutional violations committed by subordinates."
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of people in police custody "to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs."
Like his first cause of action, Plaintiff's second cause of action is brought pursuant to § 1983. Compl. at 10. Thus, to hold the City liable for failure to provide medical treatment, Plaintiff must allege that a policy or practice of City caused the constitutional violation.
Plaintiff fails to allege a policy or practice of deliberate indifference. The only facts Plaintiff provides to support the allegation of a policy or practice is his own experience with the FPD. This is insufficient to show that the City had a policy or practice of acting deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of those in custody.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim against Tibbet. MTD at 11-12. There are no facts alleged in this complaint sufficient to support a deliberate indifference claim against Tibbet. Additionally, Plaintiff does not address in his opposition Defendants' arguments regarding the second cause of action. Plaintiff merely summarizes the law, but does not provide any analysis to show that he has properly stated a deliberate indifference claim against the City or Tibbet. Plaintiff's second cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend.
The Bane Act creates an individual cause of action where "a person . . . whether or not acting under the color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion" with a right secured by federal or state law. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). "In order to state a claim under this statute, Plaintiff must plead facts showing violence or intimidation by threat of violence by the accused defendant."
Plaintiff does not allege a constitutional violation or use of threats or coercion by Tibbet. Plaintiff's Bane Act claim against Tibbet in his official capacity is dismissed with prejudice (because such a claim is duplicative of a claim against the City) and the Bane Act claim against Tibbet in his individual capacity is dismissed with leave to amend.
As to the liability of the City under the Bane Act, "public entities may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by their employees within the scope of employment if the act or omission would have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative."
Plaintiff alleges wrongful acts by various police officers, but all such acts are in the context of the alleged false arrest and false imprisonment. In Plaintiff's opposition, he fails to specifically identify any facts in his complaint which indicate threats, intimidation, and coercion which are independent from intimidation and coercion inherent in the alleged false arrest and imprisonment itself. Plaintiff's Bane Act claim against the City is, therefore, dismissed with leave to amend.
Plaintiff brings his negligence claim against both the City and Tibbet. Compl. at 14. "Public entities in California are not liable for state-law tort claims for any injuries caused by their conduct except where such liability is expressly authorized by statute."
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants are liable for negligence per se because they violated California Government Code § 845.6. Compl. ¶ 55. Section 845.6 states that "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but . . . a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care." Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6. "Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care."
Plaintiff's common law negligence claim against the City is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's common law negligence claim against Tibbet is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff's § 845.6 claims against the City and Tibbet are dismissed with leave to amend.
"False arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts. False arrest is but one way of committing a false imprisonment."
Defendants argue that "no statutory basis is alleged for a false imprisonment claim against the City, thus the claim against it is not cognizable." MTD at 15. As discussed above, a state entity in California is immune from tort liability unless some statute abrogates that immunity. Plaintiff fails to identify a statute under which Plaintiff can base the City's liability. Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim against the City is dismissed with leave to amend.
Plaintiff's seventh cause of action for false arrest is dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim.
Plaintiff's first cause of action for excessive force, to the extent it is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, is dismissed with prejudice but remains to the extent it is brought under the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiff's claims against Chief Tibbet in his official capacity are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's common law negligence claim against the City (sixth cause of action) is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's false arrest claim (seventh cause of action) is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's remaining claims against Tibbet in his individual capacity and against the City that were challenged in this motion to dismiss are dismissed with leave to amend.
Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint within twenty days from the date of this Order. Defendants' responsive pleadings are due within twenty days thereafter. The Court advises that failure to cure the defects identified in this Order may be grounds for dismissal of those claims without further leave to amend.
Finally, Defendants' reply brief is five pages longer than the page limit allowed by the Court in its Order re Filing Requirements (Doc. #7-2). As indicated by the Order, the Court did not consider any arguments made past the fifth page of the reply. Counsel for Defendants must pay a $250.00 sanction ($50.00 per page for the five pages over the limit) within ten days of the date of this order.