Filed: Jul. 28, 2015
Latest Update: Jul. 28, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Christiaan Highsmith, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Roberto Gomez. Jr., Christopher R. Cosca, Esq., counsel for defendant Leonel Ayon, David A. Torres, Esq., counsel for defendant Leobardo Martinez-Carranza, Jesse Ortiz III, Esq., counsel for defendant Jason Rogers, Mic
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Christiaan Highsmith, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Roberto Gomez. Jr., Christopher R. Cosca, Esq., counsel for defendant Leonel Ayon, David A. Torres, Esq., counsel for defendant Leobardo Martinez-Carranza, Jesse Ortiz III, Esq., counsel for defendant Jason Rogers, Mich..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Christiaan Highsmith, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Roberto Gomez. Jr., Christopher R. Cosca, Esq., counsel for defendant Leonel Ayon, David A. Torres, Esq., counsel for defendant Leobardo Martinez-Carranza, Jesse Ortiz III, Esq., counsel for defendant Jason Rogers, Michael Petrik, Jr., Esq., counsel for defendant Shannon Armstrong, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Bradley Ward, Toni L. White, Esq., counsel for defendant David Uhrig, Clemente Jimenez, Esq., counsel for defendant William Welch, David A. Grow, Esq., counsel for defendant Michael McGibbon, Dwight M. Samuel, Esq., and counsel for defendant Jesus Sicairos, Jeffrey L. Staniels, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 30, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 1, 2015 at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between July 30, 2015 and October 1, 2015 under the Local Codes T-2 (unusual and complex) and T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Currently, the government has not yet provided discovery. As the court is aware, this is a "wire-tap" case wherein the government was "up on" multiple phone lines (four phone lines). Numerous federal and local law enforcement agencies had been investigating the individuals named in the indictment for several months prior to their respective arrests. On July 24, 2015, counsel for Mr. Armstrong had a lengthy discussion with the government's counsel regarding the anticipated discovery. First, the government indicated the discovery will be provided shortly. Second, government counsel indicated the discovery will be voluminous. The government indicated the defense should expect to receive several discs containing hundreds of recorded phone calls (many are in Spanish and will require translation). Additionally, as noted herein, multiple law enforcement agencies were involved in the investigation of this matter. As such, the government expects to produce hundreds of pages of written reports. Finally, the government expects to produce hundreds of photos and videos.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of July 30, 2015, to October 1, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and(iv), corresponding to Local Codes T-2 and T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that provision of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Benjamin B. Wagner
United States Attorney
by: /s/ Christiaan Highsmith
Christiaan Highsmith
Assistant United States Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
