STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; PROPOSED FINDINGS AND ORDER [18 U.S.C. § 3161]

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Ruth Willis, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. This matter was originally assigned to the Honorable John A. Mendez and by previous order set for a status hearing on August 6, 2013. On July 22, 2013, the matter was re-assigned to the Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr. and was set for a status on August 1, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 12, 2013 and to exclude time between July 22, 2013 and September 12, 2013 under Local Codes T4 and T2. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, loan records, and related documents in electronic form that constitute approximately 6,700 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel.

b) Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to conduct her investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with her client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The United States does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 22, 2013 to September 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and good cause appearing, IT IS SO FOUND AND SO ORDERED. The status conference currently scheduled for August 1, 2013, is hereby vacated and continued to September 12, 2013, at 9 a.m. in Courtroom 7. The time period between July 22, 2013 and September 12, 2013 is excluded under Local Codes T4 and T2. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.