Filed: Sep. 10, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Sept. 10, 2009 No. 08-17209 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 08-00084-CR-3-LAC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RAMANA RAO SURANENI, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida _ (September 10, 2009) Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Sept. 10, 2009 No. 08-17209 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 08-00084-CR-3-LAC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RAMANA RAO SURANENI, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida _ (September 10, 2009) Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges. P..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Sept. 10, 2009
No. 08-17209 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00084-CR-3-LAC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAMANA RAO SURANENI,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 10, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Ramana Rao Suraneni appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed
following his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit visa fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1546(a) and 371; conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) and (h); and visa fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1546(a) and 2. On appeal, Suraneni raises three challenges to his
sentence.
Suraneni first argues that the district court committed reversible error by
improperly relying on U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1 in calculating his base offense level under
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1), the guidelines provision applicable to money-laundering
offenses. Suraneni contends that the money-laundering charge was based on the
earnings that he derived from working in violation of his own immigration status
and, thus, the district court should not have relied on § 2L2.1, which relates to
offenses involving trafficking or assisting others in the fraudulent acquisition of
immigration credentials.
With respect to guidelines issues, we review “purely legal questions de novo,
a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and, in most cases, a district
court’s application of the guidelines to the facts with ‘due deference.’” United
States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2004). When
reviewing a district court’s application of a guidelines provision to the facts, we
have held that “due deference” is tantamount to clear-error review. See United
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States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2003). For a finding to be
clearly erroneous, we “must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.”
Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d at 1137 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court determining the appropriate
offense level must employ a two-step process. United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d
1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1998). The court must first determine the applicable
guidelines section based on “the offense of conviction.” Id.; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a).
The offense of conviction denotes “the offense conduct charged in the count of the
indictment . . . of which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). Once
the correct guidelines provision has been identified, the sentencing court must then
select the appropriate base offense level from among those specified within that
guideline.
Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314-15 ; U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.2(b), 1B1.3. Only
then may a court consider relevant conduct which did not comprise an element of
the offense of conviction.
Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314, 1316-17.
Where multiple counts of conviction have been adjudged, the district court
must group together all counts involving substantially the same harm. U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.2(b). The applicable offense level for groups of closely related counts is the
“highest offense level of the counts in the Group.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a).
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Ordinarily, the court must calculate the offense level for each constituent count to
ensure that the appropriate offense level has been identified. United States v.
Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435, 1438 (11th Cir. 1997); U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3, comment. (n.2).
Suraneni first alleges that the district court committed reversible error by
using U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1 to establish Suraneni’s base offense level at 11. Suraneni
argues that the district court should have used U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2 for a base offense
level of 8. We conclude from the record that the district court properly utilized
U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1 because the evidence established that Suraneni not only
laundered the proceeds of his own visa fraud through Data Group’s bank accounts,
but also laundered the proceeds of Maduhsudhan Koduru’s visa fraud through
Suraneni’s company Sumach Business Solutions.
The guidelines contain a provision for “Money Laundering and Monetary
Transaction Reporting.” This provision states:
(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) The offense level for the underlying offense from which the
laundered funds were derived, if (A) the defendant committed the
underlying offense . . .; and (B) the offense level for that offense can
be determined; or
(2) 8 plus the number of offense levels from the table in § 2B1.1
(Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value of
the laundered funds, otherwise.
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a) (emphasis added).
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Suraneni argues that the district court should have used U.S.S.G. § 2L2.2 because
the $132,500 laundered by Suraneni with Data Group represented proceeds of his
personal visa fraud. However, the uncontroverted evidence established that
Suraneni not only laundered the proceeds of his personal visa fraud, but also
laundered the funds of visa fraud committed by another person by running payrolls
for Madhusudhan Koduru, pursuant to § 2L2.1. (R160-38-39).
Application note 2 of the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 provides
guidance for the application of subsection (a)(1). Relevant for the purposes of this
case is application note 2(A) which states,
Multiple Underlying Offenses.- In cases in which subsection (a)(1)
applies and there is more than one underlying offense, the offense
level for the underlying offense is to be determined under the
procedures set forth in Application Note 3 of the Commentary to §
1B1.5 (Interpretation of References to Other Offense Guidelines).
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, comment. (n.2(A)).
Application note 3 of the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5 provides in relevant part,
A reference may direct that, if the conduct involved another offense,
the offense guideline for such other offense is to be applied . . . .
Where there is more than one such other offense, the most serious
such offense (. . .) is to be used.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5, comment. (n.3).
The evidence in this case demonstrates that Suraneni engaged in a conspiracy to
launder funds for his own visa fraud and the visa fraud of another, that is,
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Madhusudhan Koduru; therefore, we conclude that the district court properly used
the higher offense level of 11 found in U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1, which was the offense
level for the “most serious such offense.”
Suraneni next argues on appeal that the district court erred in applying a
two-level sentencing increase under § 2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated laundering
because the evidence did not support the district court’s finding that his money-
laundering scheme was committed in a sophisticated manner.
Section 2S1.1(b)(3) of the Guidelines provides a two-level increase if an
offense involved “sophisticated laundering.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). The
guidelines commentary explains that sophisticated laundering “means complex or
intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of the 18
U.S.C. § 1956 offense,” and it typically involves the use of “fictitious entities,”
“shell corporations,” “two or more levels (i.e. layering) of transactions,” or
“offshore financial accounts.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, comment. (n.5(A)).
Since Suraneni’s money-laundering scheme involved two or more layers of
transactions and the use of a shell corporation to conceal the source of his illicitly
derived funds, we conclude Suraneni’s conduct was committed in a sophisticated
manner and, therefore, the district court properly applied the enhancement.
Finally, Suraneni argues on appeal that the district court erred in applying a
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two-level role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for being an organizer of
criminal activity.
The district court initially imposed a four-level § 3B1.1(a) enhancement for
being an organizer of criminal activity involving five or more participants. At
Suraneni’s resentencing hearing, the role enhancement was subsequently reduced
to two levels because the district court feared that the application of
§ 2L2.1(b)(2)(A), under the auspices of § 2S1.1(a)(1), would result in
impermissible double counting. As such, the district court applied the two-level §
3B1.1(c) enhancement, though it did not explicitly determine whether Suraneni’s
role in the offense was more akin to an organizer or a mere supervisor of criminal
conduct.
Suraneni claims the district court’s finding that he was an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), was improper. In support
of his argument, Suraneni describes his conduct as merely referring others and
assisting some with clerical tasks. The record demonstrates that Suraneni’s
conduct was much more. The evidence demonstrated that Suraneni exercised
decision making authority, recruited accomplices, and claimed a right to a larger
share of the fruits of the crime. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
properly applied U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) .
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For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Suraneni’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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