Filed: May 13, 2014
Latest Update: May 13, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING REVISED BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a motion hearing on May 22, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the motion hear
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING REVISED BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a motion hearing on May 22, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the motion heari..
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STIPULATION REGARDING REVISED BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a motion hearing on May 22, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the motion hearing until July 3, 2014, and to exclude time between May 22, 2014, and July 3, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. By this stipulation, the parties further move to extend the government's time to respond to the defendant's motion to disclose confidential informant to June 19, 2014, and the defendant's time to reply to the government's response to June 26, 2014.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for both parties desire additional time to explore the posture of the defendant's criminal history in state court proceedings and to investigate the accuracy of state criminal records.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 22, 2014 to July 3, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
