MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND
CHARLES F. EICK, Magistrate Judge.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied, and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 22, 2015, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on July 29, 2016. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2016. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 15, 2016. The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed August 19, 2015.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts disability since April 1, 2006, based on alleged low back pain, anxiety, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, hypertension, migraine headaches, and frequent urinary tract infections (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 53-55, 284). Plaintiff testified that she suffers from back pain and other symptoms of allegedly disabling severity (A.R. 55-74).
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found Plaintiff has severe degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and migraines (A.R. 23).1 However, the ALJ also found Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work, including Plaintiff's past relevant work as a reception clerk, phlebotomist, file clerk, and medical assistant (A.R. 26-29 (adopting vocational expert testimony at A.R. 80-82)). The ALJ deemed Plaintiff's contrary testimony "not entirely credible" (A.R. 27). The ALJ therefore found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 29). The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-6).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.
Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Stated Reasons for Rejecting Plaintiff's Credibility are Legally Insufficient.
Plaintiff testified, inter alia, she has back pain every day, all day, in her lower back and on the right side above her waist which radiates down to her calf when she sleeps (A.R. 56-57). Plaintiff also testified she has intermittent back spasms (A.R. 71-72). Plaintiff claimed that on an average day she must lie down to relieve her pain and spasms four or five times for 30 to 60 minutes each time (A.R. 73-74).
Where, as here, an ALJ finds that a claimant's medically determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to cause the symptoms alleged (A.R. 27), the ALJ may not discount the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of the symptoms without making "specific, cogent" findings, supported in the record, to justify discounting such testimony. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that ALJ must state "specific, clear and convincing" reasons to reject a claimant's testimony where there is no evidence of malingering).2 Generalized, conclusory findings do not suffice. See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (the ALJ's credibility findings "must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (the ALJ must "specifically identify the testimony [the ALJ] finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony"); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1284 ("The ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion."); see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p.3
Here, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff's credibility "for the reasons explained in this decision," stating:
In terms of the claimant's alleged impairments, her testimony concerning her symptoms was grossly exaggerated. She was able to drive herself to the hearing, although she said her son or a friend usually drives her [A.R. 43]. She testified she can take care of her own personal hygiene but it takes longer [A.R. 63]. She uses no assistive device [A.R. 63]. She can prepare food in a microwave but does not clean [A.R. 65-66]. She does not do laundry other than to fold clothes [A.R. 65]. She can wash dishes for fifteen minutes then has to lie down or sit for 30 minutes [A.R. 66]. She does not grocery shop [A.R. 67].
The claimant is able to take the train to Ventura to visit her daughter riding 12 hours but said she was able to do it because the seats recline and she can walk around [A.R. 67-68]. She makes this trip every 1-2 months [A.R. 68].4 She visits her daughter[,] son in law and grandchildren for a week at a time [A.R. 68]. She also stays with and socializes with her daughter's mother in law while there [A.R. 68, 75-76]. She alleges she has 2-3 anxiety attack[s] a week even when she does not go anywhere [A.R. 69-70]. She has been able to pass the courses of study for phlebotomy and her CNA courses but contends she does not comprehend when reading a magazine [A.R. 76-77]. She alleges that she has back spasms, applies ice and has to lie down for an hour [A.R. 71-72]. She can walk 15-20 minutes, stand for 15-20 minutes and sit for 30-60 minutes [A.R. 72].5 She uses a TENS unit for pain [A.R. 72].6 She alleges that she has disturbed sleep 3-4 times a month and wakes up with panic attacks and her heart racing [A.R. 74].7 She alleges that she has migraines for which she takes over the counter generic medication which make the headaches go away after 30-45 minutes [A.R. 60] (Testimony). On December 11, 2008, her treatment record indicated she needed a supply of medication because she was traveling to Hawaii for three months [citing A.R. 421].
(A.R. 27). The ALJ did not mention specifically Plaintiff's testimony that she has to lie down four or five times a day for 30 to 60 minutes each time (A.R. 73-74).
It thus appears that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility based on her reported daily activities and on asserted inconsistencies in the record.8 The ALJ's stated reasoning is legally insufficient.
First, Plaintiff's limited daily activities do not support the ALJ's adverse credibility determination. See, e,g., Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Vertigan") ("the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability"); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453-55 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Gallant") (fact that claimant could cook for himself and family members as well as wash dishes did not preclude a finding that claimant was disabled due to constant back and leg pain); see also Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d at 1138 (reversing adverse credibility determination where "the ALJ did not elaborate on which daily activities conflicted with which part of Claimant's testimony"). "The Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits, and many home activities may not be easily transferable to a work environment where it might be impossible to rest periodically or take medication." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1283 n.7. The record does not reflect that Plaintiff performed activities which would translate to sustained activity in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis for eight hours a day, five days a week.9
Second, to the extent the ALJ considered as a significant part of Plaintiff's daily activities the fact that Plaintiff travels by train once every two months to visit family, or the fact that she once spent three months in Hawaii, substantial evidence does not suggest that these activities would translate to regular sustained work activity. Plaintiff testified that when she takes the train she can lie down fully and get up and move around at will (A.R. 67-68). While with her family, she reportedly socializes for only approximately an hour a day before going to a spare bedroom in her in-law's house to lie down (A.R. 76). There is no information in the record concerning Plaintiff's activities during her trip to Hawaii.
Third, the only arguable inconsistencies the Court can glean from the ALJ's discussion of the record are: (1) Plaintiff's purported testimony that she "does not comprehend when reading a magazine," yet was able to pass phlebotomy and CNA courses; and (2) Plaintiff's testimony that she has anxiety attacks two to three times a week, yet can travel to Hawaii and can visit with her family once every two months (A.R. 27). The record does not support the significance of these alleged inconsistencies. Plaintiff did not testify that she is incapable of comprehending when reading; Plaintiff testified that she "always had a hard time comprehending reading and having it stay in [her] mind," and that she had read "probably" three books for pleasure in her whole life (A.R. 76-77). Plaintiff admitted that she had to read and understand to get through her training, and explained that she had a "very hard" time passing the courses (A.R. 76-78). Plaintiff's admitted difficulty with reading comprehension is not necessarily inconsistent with her ability to pass the referenced courses. Similarly, Plaintiff did not claim any functional limitations from her anxiety attacks which would prevent her from traveling as she sometimes did. Plaintiff testified that when she gets anxiety attacks her chest hurts, her heart starts beating fast, and she gets light headed (A.R. 62). She takes Valium and Ziprasidone regularly to manage her anxiety (A.R. 62-63). As described, Plaintiff's twice weekly anxiety attacks are not inconsistent with an ability to travel once every two months to visit family or an ability to spend time in Hawaii.
The ALJ did not specify the objective medical record as a stated reason for discounting Plaintiff's credibility (A.R. 27). To the extent the ALJ may have relied on the medical record to discount Plaintiff's credibility, a lack of objective medical evidence "can be a factor" in discounting a claimant's credibility, but cannot "form the sole basis." See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d at 681. Additionally, the ALJ would have had to make a specific finding identifying the testimony the ALJ found not credible and linking the rejected testimony to parts of the medical record supporting the ALJ's non-credibility determination. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding it was legal error for ALJ to fail to make such a link) (citations omitted). The ALJ made no such link in the present case.
Defendant cites to other potential reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility (e.g., Plaintiff's allegation that she was unable to work as of April 1, 2006, despite an indication that Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity for three months in 2010, Plaintiff's alleged failure to see a specialist for her back pain (she did see a pain management specialist (A.R. 356-60)), and Plaintiff's alleged failure to seek mental health treatment) (see Defendant's Motion, pp. 7-8). Because the ALJ did not state such reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility, the Court cannot uphold the credibility determination on the basis of such reasons. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001) (the court "cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a ground that the agency did not invoke in making its decision").
The Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ's failure to state legally insufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility was harmless. "[A]n ALJ's error is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted). Here, the vocational expert testified that if someone needed to sit or lie down two times a work day for 15-minute breaks — which is a need less extreme than Plaintiff claimed — that person would not be able to do any of Plaintiff's past relevant work (A.R. 82). The vocational expert did not identify any other work such a person could perform (A.R. 79-83).
II. Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings is Appropriate.
Because the circumstances of the case suggest that further administrative review could remedy the ALJ's error, remand is appropriate. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2010); see Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Connett") (remand is an option where the ALJ fails to state sufficient reasons for rejecting a claimant's excess symptom testimony); but see Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007) (appearing, confusingly, to cite Connett for the proposition that "[w]hen an ALJ's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony are legally insufficient and it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to determine the claimant disabled if he had credited the claimant's testimony, we remand for a calculation of benefits") (quotations omitted); see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Unless the district court concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide benefits"); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d at 495-96 (discussing the evidently narrow circumstances in which a court will order a benefits calculation rather than further proceedings); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (remanding for further proceedings where the ALJ failed to state sufficient reasons for deeming a claimant's testimony not credible); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (court may "remand for further proceedings, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, [when] an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled"); Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2009) (agreeing that a court need not "credit as true" improperly rejected claimant testimony where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made); see generally INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an administrative determination, the proper course is remand for additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare circumstances); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for further administrative proceedings is the proper remedy "in all but the rarest cases").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,10 Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
