LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, Chief District Judge.
On November 17, 2016, the Court granted Defendant-Petitioners Fernando Espana Rubio and Justo Mata Bustos (collectively, "Defendants") motions to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on the basis that Defendants' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) convictions are no longer valid under the Supreme Court's decision Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). ECF Nos. 73 & 74. Before the Court granted their § 2255 motions, Defendants were both serving 171-month terms of imprisonment after pleading guilty to two counts of a three-count indictment: 87 months for Count 2, kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), served consecutively with 84 months for Count 3, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). ECF Nos. 50 & 51.
Pursuant to the Court's order, Defendants now jointly move to dismiss Count 3 of their respective indictments on the basis that Defendants' § 924(c)(1)(A) convictions cannot stand in light of the Court's legal determinations and application of Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. ECF No. 78. The Government has not filed a formal opposition to Defendants' pending motion. See ECF No. 82. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) governs motions that the parties may make regarding "any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits."
Section 924(c)(1)(A) imposes increased terms of imprisonment for the use of a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). For purposes of this statute, "crime of violence" is defined as an offense that is a felony and —
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). "Courts generally refer to the `(a)' clause of section 924(c)(3) as the `force clause' and to the `(b)' clause of section 924(c)(3) as the `residual clause.'" United States v. Bell, 153 F.Supp.3d 906, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
In this case, the Court granted Defendants' § 2255 petitions because following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), Defendants' § 1201(a)(1) convictions can no longer serve as predicate offenses for sentencing enhancements pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Court found that under Johnson and Dimaya, the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) is unconstitutionally vague, and cannot be the basis for a § 924(c)(1)(A) sentence enhancement. ECF No. 73 at 8; ECF No. 74 at 8. The Court additionally determined that each Defendant's § 1201(a)(1) conviction is categorically not a crime of violence under the § 924(c)(3) force clause. ECF No. 73 at 17; ECF No. 74 at 17.
Defendants now argue that the Court should dismiss the § 924(c)(1)(A) counts in their respective indictments. ECF No. 78 at 3. Upon review of the record, which indicates that Defendants have no other criminal convictions, the Court agrees. For all of the reasons the Court granted Defendants' § 2255 petitions, the Court must likewise dismiss the § 924(c)(1)(A) counts in their indictments because Count 3 of each Defendant's indictment no longer states a cognizable violation of law. See Boren, 278 F.3d at 914. Accordingly, Defendant' joint motion to dismiss Count 3 on their indictments, ECF No. 78, is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.