ERICA P. GROSJEAN, Magistrate Judge.
On March 18, 2019, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 19). Plaintiffs were represented by Diana Kruze and David Wiener. Defendants were represented by James Weakley. For the reasons stated on the record during the hearing, and as stated herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Compel.
Plaintiffs move to compel Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests related to a consent decree entered in the case of Hall v. County of Fresno, Case No. 1:11-cv-02047-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal.). Those discovery requests are the following:
(ECF No. 19 at 7.)
Defendants argue that they are precluded from responding to these discovery requests by the terms of the consent decree, and specifically ¶ 22 of the consent decree, which provides: "Neither the fact of this Consent Decree nor any statements of claims contained herein shall be used in any other case, claim, or administrative proceedings, except that Defendant and its employees and agents may use this Consent Decree and any statement contained herein to assert issue preclusion or res judicata." (ECF No. 21-1 at 17.)
The Court took this issue under advisement in order to review the cases cited by Plaintiffs during the hearing and in their briefing in support of their motion to compel. The Court has now reviewed and considered those cases and finds the cases distinguishable.
In Washington v. United States, 2007 WL 3025843 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2007), the court conditioned its approval of a consent decree on the removal of language stating the "Consent Decree shall not be used against any Party in any action or proceeding other [than] to enforce the terms of this Consent Decree." Id. at *10. The court noted that the consent decree "already contains a provision precluding the use of the Consent Decree as evidence of an admission of liability" on the part of the defendant and found that the court "cannot and should not prohibit the use of the Consent Decree in future actions." Id.
In contrast to Washington, here this Court is not in the position of determining whether a consent decree should be approved. To the contrary, the consent decree was approved and is in full force and effect, and Washington does not convince the Court that ¶ 22 of the consent decree is unlawful or otherwise unenforceable.
In the remaining two cases cited by Plaintiff, there is no indication that the settlement agreements included a prohibition similar to the one contained in ¶ 22 of the consent decree. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1400 (4th Cir. 1987); Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 640-42 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
For the reasons stated on the record during the March 18, 2019, hearing, as supplemented herein, the Court finds that ¶ 22 of the consent decree precludes the Court from compelling Defendants to respond to RFP 12, Interrog. 9, and RFAs 1 and 2. The Court will accordingly deny the Motion to Compel to the extent it seeks to compel Defendants to respond to RFP 12, Interrog. 9, and RFAs 1 and 2.
Plaintiffs move to compel Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery request related to the guards that were on duty surrounding the time of Herrera's death. The specific discovery request at issue is the following:
Interrogatory 5 requests Defendants to "IDENTIFY all PERSONS acting as guards or correctional officers, or who were otherwise responsible for securing and monitoring the pod in which Lorenzo Herrera was detained on March 23, 2018 and March 24, 2018." Defendants answered Interrogatory 5 by providing the names of twenty-one correctional officers. Defendants, however, refused to respond to RFP 17, arguing that the request is overbroad because it does not limit either the time or the type of complaint, and seeks information that is not relevant to Plaintiffs' case.
For the reasons stated on the record during the March 18, 2019, hearing, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Compel to the extent it is seeking to compel Defendants' response to RFP 17:
Plaintiffs move to compel Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests related to "dangerous" housing conditions. The specific discovery requests at issue are the following:
For the reasons stated on the record during the March 18, 2019, hearing, the Court grants the Motion to Compel to the extent it is seeking to compel Defendants to respond to RFAs 9-12. Defendants are to provide their responses to RFAs 9-12 no later than April 17, 2019.
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: