STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

[18 U.S.C. § 3161]

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Aleksandr Kovalev, Arthur Menefee, Adil Qayyum, Jannice Riddick, and Florence Francisco, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order this matter was set for a status hearing on December 5, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 5, 2013 and to exclude time between December 5, 2013 and February 6, 2014, under Local Codes T4 and T2. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) On May 1, 2013, the parties except Florence Francisco appeared before the Court for a status hearing at which time the Court, the Honorable Kimberly J. Mueller, presiding, deemed the case complex under Local Code T2 and the corresponding section of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq.

b) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, loan records, and related documents in electronic form that constitute approximately 40,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel.

c) Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to conduct their investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, and to otherwise prepare a defense.

d) Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The United States does not object to the continuance.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 5, 2013 to February 6, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

h) This time period is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2] on the basis that the case is complex due to the number of defendants and nature of the prosecution.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.