ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART DEENDANT PFIZER'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND DENYING PLAINTIFF PLUMLEE'S MOTION FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW

(Re: Docket Nos. 153, 174)

PAUL S. GREWAL, Magistrate Judge.

Before the court in this putative consumer class action is Defendant Pfizer, Inc.'s motion to compel further production of documents and responses to interrogatories.1 Plaintiff Laura A. Plumlee opposes,2 and requests in camera review for the documents at issue.3 Pfizer opposes Plumlee's request for in camera review.4 The parties appeared for a hearing.5 After careful consideration, the court GRANTS Pfizer's motion, but only IN-PART as set out below. The court DENIES Plumlee's motion for in camera review.

I. BACKGROUND

In an order dated December 20, 2013, the court ordered Plumlee to produce medical records and interrogatory responses for the period of "the time she was taking Zoloft and the two years prior to her first Zoloft purchase."6 The court based its ruling on Plumlee's multiple challenges in her complaint to Zoloft's efficacy during that period, and explained that it would entertain another motion for an earlier period "if Pfizer can establish that additional discovery is warranted based on particular facts."7 As ordered, Plumlee provided Pfizer with medical records from 2003 to 2005, two years before she began taking Zoloft, and from 2005 to June 2008, the period during which Plumlee took Zoloft.8 Citing evidence in the production to date raising questions about Plumlee's adequacy to represent a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and its impact on Pfizer's right to due process, Pfizer now wants Plumlee to update her discovery responses to include the period since 2008—an additional six years.9 The specific interrogatories at issue are:

Pfizer also wants an update as to the following eight document requests:

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION

"Unless otherwise limited by court order," a party "may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense."10 All discovery, however, "is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)."11 These limitations include no unreasonably cumulative discovery, no discovery that can be obtained in a less burdensome manner, and no discovery where the burden outweighs its benefit.12 The "information sought" also must constitute "sufficient potential significance" justifying the burden of the discovery process.13

The class representative adequacy requirement is not demanding,14 although the court needs to conduct a "rigorous analysis" to determine adequacy.15 The standard applied for adequacy in the Ninth Circuit is: "(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?"16 The class representative is considered the fiduciary to the entire class.17 The class representative's duties include supervising counsel, controlling and directing prosecution of the action, and evaluating settlement opportunities.18 Ultimately a class representative's adequacy is a question under the court's discretion.19

Ordinarily, mental health history is not relevant to a putative class representative's adequacy.20 But certain cases present circumstances warranting some limited and narrowly tailored discovery on the subject.21 This appears to be just such a case. The discovery produced thus far suggests Plumlee suffers from chronic mental health conditions that may persist to the present day and that could impair her in adequately representing the class' interests.22 Because Judge Koh needs to know whether Plumlee's condition has stayed the same, further deteriorated, or improved, so that a fair assessment can be made of Plumlee's ability to represent a class, the burden of this production does not outweigh its benefit.23 While Plumlee's medical history is privileged information, at the time she filed her complaint, she publicized various aspects of her medical history.24 Any doubts that Plumlee thus waived her claims of privilege were resolved by Judge Koh.25

All that said, the court still must answer the question of how much discovery is appropriate on the issue in dispute. Six more years worth of answers is plainly too much. If the issue is Plumlee's current capacity to serve, what counts are her current—or near current—records, not those from over a half a decade ago. Only the past six months of Plumlee's records and interrogatory response related to Plumlee's mental health are necessary to evaluate Plumlee's present adequacy as a putative class representative. Pfizer also may depose Plumlee to determine her ability to participate in and understand the fundamentals of the litigation,26 and may further conduct a medical examination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35.27

Finally, Plumlee's requested leave to submit additional records for in camera review to show their "dubious" relevance is DENIED.28 The exhibits sumitted by Pfizer under seal were sufficient for such purposes.

III. CONCLUSION

Pfizer's motion to compel discovery of Plumlee's recent medical history is granted in-part, only as to the post six months. This discovery shall be produced within 30 days. Plumlee's motion for in camera review is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.