MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SARA LIOI, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the combined motion of plaintiff 01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. ("plaintiff" or "01" or "Communique") for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial (Doc. No. 580 ["Mot."]. Defendants Citrix Systems, Inc. and Citrix Online, LLC (collectively "defendants" or "Citrix") opposed the motion (Doc. No. 586 ["Opp'n"]), to which 01 replied (Doc. No. 589 ["Reply"]).

For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background of this case has been extensively detailed in the Court's claims construction and summary judgment opinions. (See Doc. Nos. 343 ["Clm. Const. MOO"] and 471 ["SJ MOO"], respectively.) For purposes of context, a brief background summary is provided now, with greater detail provided later in this memorandum opinion as relevant to the Court's analysis.

In this patent infringement action, plaintiff alleges that Citrix's product, GoToMyPC, infringes independent claim 24, and dependent claim 45, of 01's U.S. Patent No. 6,928,479 (the "`479 patent"). The claimed invention allows individuals to remotely access a personal computer from any device with an internet connection. The primary infringement issue in this case revolves around the manner in which that remote access occurs.

The meaning of certain terms in claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent are disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court was required to construe the disputed terms before plaintiff's infringement allegations could be addressed. After briefing and oral argument, the Court issued an opinion construing the disputed claim terms. (See Clm. Const. MOO.)

Thereafter, multiple summary judgment motions were filed. Among other issues, 01 moved for judgment on its direct infringement claim, and Citrix moved for judgment on plaintiff's claims for willful infringement and induced infringement. (See SJ MOO at 19086-87.1) The parties also filed cross motions for summary judgment as to whether the asserted claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Id.) In ruling on the summary judgment motions, the Court: (1) granted 01's motion for summary judgment that the asserted claims of the `479 patent are eligible under § 101 and denied Citrix's motion that the claims are ineligible under § 101; (2) denied 01's motion for summary judgment as to direct infringement of the asserted claims and for exclusion of all evidence of prior art; (3) granted Citrix's motion for summary judgment on 01's claim for induced infringement; and (4)denied Citrix's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for willful infringement and injunctive relief. (Id. at 19141.)

The jury trial in this case commenced on January 11, 2016. During the trial, both 01 and Citirx moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). (Doc. Nos. 551 and 549, respectively; Doc. No. 552 (Transcript January 15, 2016 ["1/15/16 Tr."]) at 38062-38115). At the close of evidence in the case, but before the case was submitted to the jury, both sides reasserted their Rule 50(a) motions and the Court deferred a ruling. (Id. at 38223.)

On January 19, 2016, the jury rendered a split verdict. (Doc. No. 570 ["Verdict"].) First, the jury found in favor of Citrix that GoToMyPC did not infringe claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent. (Id. at 41191.) Next, the jury found in favor of 01 that neither claim 24 nor 45 of the `479 patent are invalid. (Id. at 41192-93.)

When the jury was excused, neither side orally renewed their Rule 50(a) motions. (See Doc. No. 569 (Transcript January 19, 2016 ["1/19/16 Tr."]) at 41189.) After the Judgment Entry was filed (Doc. No. 576), 01 filed the present combined motion pursuant to Rules 50 and Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Citrix did not file a post-trial motion. The law of the Sixth Circuit, rather than the Federal Circuit, applies to the Court's analysis of 01's Rule 50 and Rule 59 motion. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 485 F.Supp.2d 805, 810 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2007) ("Because Rule 50 and a motion for judgment as a matter of law raises a procedural issue that is not unique to patent law, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applies the law of the `regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually lie.'") (quoting Summit Tech. Inc. v. Nidek Co., 363 F.3d 1219, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

II. 01's RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50

Rule 50(b) provides that:

"The inquiry for resolving a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 is the same as the inquiry for resolving a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56." White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)). The Court must "review all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact for the jury." Id. (citing Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 2001)); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 414 (6th Cir. 2012), aff'd, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014) ("A renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law following an adverse jury verdict `may only be granted if, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences . . . reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion in favor of the moving party.'") (quoting Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1003, 126 S.Ct. 624, 163 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2005)).

It is only appropriate to grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law where the Court finds that there is no "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for a reasonable jury to find for the prevailing party on that issue. White, 364 F.3d at 794; Static Control Components, 697 F.3d at 414. In making this determination, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the prevailing party. White, 364 F.3d at 794 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133). The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, and "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id.; Static Control Components, 697 F.3d at 414 ("We will not substitute our interpretation of the evidence for the jury's, even if we would have reached a different conclusion.") (citing Barnes, 401 F.3d at 738).

B. Discussion

In its post-trial motion, 01 seeks judgment as a matter of law with respect to its claim that GoToMyPC infringes claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent. A party must move for judgment as a matter of law on an issue at the close of all the evidence in order to preserve the right to renew its motion on that issue after the jury returns its verdict. Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Bolt, 106 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); Carter v. Ricumstrict, 637 F. App'x 917, 919 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 340, 196 L. Ed. 2d 267 (2016) (citing, among authority, Am. & Foreign Ins. Co., 106 F.3d at 160).

As a threshold matter, Citrix argues that 01's post-trial motion must be denied because 01 did not seek judgment as a matter of law for infringement under Rule 50(a) and, therefore, 01 waived and forfeited its right to now seek judgment as to infringement after the jury returned its verdict. (Opp'n at 41433-34.) 01 contends that it preserved its right to seek post-trial judgment on the issue of infringement by incorporating its motion for summary judgment and motions in limine into its Rule 50 arguments. (Reply at 41481-84.)

01 incorporated its summary judgment motion into the oral argument on its Rule 50 motion regarding invalidity as follows:

(1/15/16 Tr. at 38087 (footnote added).) 01 also incorporated former motions by reference at the close of oral argument on its Rule 50 motion as to invalidity: "Once again, Your Honor, we incorporate our motions for summary judgment and motions in limine into this argument." (Id. at 38096.)

01's generic incorporation by reference "once again" of its summary judgment and in limine motions "into this argument," considered in context, appears to refer to its written and oral Rule 50 arguments regarding invalidity, not infringement. Plaintiff's opposition to Citrix's Rule 50(a) motion for judgment on infringement supports and confirms this conclusion. In opposing Citrix's motion for judgment as a matter of law on infringement at the close of evidence, 01 argued that it offered evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for 01 on that issue. (See Doc. No. 567 at 41148-49; id. at 41153 ("[J]udgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if there is no conflicting evidence, which is not the case here."); 1/15/16 Tr. at 38072-83.) 01's opposition to Citrix's Rule 50(a) motion is inconsistent with its current postverdict argument that it sought judgment as a matter of law on infringement, as well as invalidity, at the close of evidence. See Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed, LLC, 758 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("The statement that BestMed now relies on as evidence of a motion for JMOL actually indicates the opposite—BestMed's counsel stated that anticipation was `definitely something for the jury.' . . . Further, BestMed's counsel made this statement in opposition to Medisim's motion for JMOL under Rule 50(a)[.]") (internal record citation omitted).

Moreover, 01's generic incorporation by reference fails to satisfy the specificity requirement of Rule 50(a)(2) as to infringement. Rule 50(a)(2) requires that a motion for judgment as a matter of law "specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment." 01's written Rule 50 motion (Doc. No. 551) and Rule 50 argument during trial (1/15/16 Tr. at 38086-38115) addressed invalidity with great detail and specificity. However, 01 did not even mention that it sought judgment as a matter of law on infringement in its written or oral Rule 50(a) motions, or provide any specificity regarding the law and facts supporting such a judgment. "Even where a party has made some reference to an issue in a Rule 50(a) motion that it later invokes as the basis for its renewed motion under Rule 50(b), the issue is not preserved if it was not raised in a sufficiently substantial way in the earlier motion." CFE Racing Prod., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 793 F.3d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 9 F.3d 422, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1993)).

Rule 50(a)(2) does not define how specific the grounds for judgment as a matter of law must be. Kusens v. Pascal Co., 448 F.3d 349, 361 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). But the Sixth Circuit has cautioned against reviewing a post-verdict motion too narrowly, finding instead that the motion should be reviewed in light of Rule 50(a)'s purpose—"providing notice to the court an opposing counsel of any deficiencies in the opposing party's case prior to sending it to the jury[.]" Id. (citation omitted); Chain v. Tropodyne Corp., 238 F.3d 421, at *3 (6th Cir. 2000) (Table decision) ("Th[e] purposes [of Rule 50(a)] are to provide the opposing party an opportunity to cure any defects in proof and to enable the trial court to re-examine the question of evidentiary insufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the movant.") (citing Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1330 (6th Cir. 1988) (further citation omitted)). Where Rule 50(a)'s purpose is met, "courts usually take a liberal view of what constitutes a pre-verdict motion sufficient to support a post-verdict motion." Kusens, 448 F.3d at 361 (citation omitted).

Even taking a liberal view of 01's Rule 50(a) motion, the rule's purpose as to infringement is not met. First, 01's generic incorporation by reference of motions in limine and summary judgment did nothing to put Citrix—not to mention the Court—on notice of any deficiencies in Citrix's case with respect to its defense of 01's infringement claims so that those deficiencies could be corrected prior to submission to the jury. Neither Citrix nor the Court are required to speculate as to which specific facts and legal arguments in 01's summary judgment and in limine motions were to be considered with respect to 01's Rule 50(a) motion at the close of evidence. See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. CV 00-1693-PA, 2003 WL 24901381, at *1 (D. Or. July 5, 2003) (court declined to speculate as to issues and arguments not specifically set forth in renewed Rule 50 motion where party incorporated by reference into renewed motion all arguments previously made in motions for summary judgment, in limine, etc.).

Second, 01's detailed Rule 50(a) arguments on the issue of validity were insufficient to accomplish the purpose of Rule 50(a) as to infringement because the elements of proof for validity and infringement are entirely different. Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (pre-verdict motion for anticipation will not support post-verdict motion for obviousness because anticipation and obviousness are legally distinct challenges to a patent's validity that require different elements of proof) (citation omitted); Laymon v. Lobby House, Inc., 613 F.Supp.2d 504, 512 (D. Del. 2009) (a general pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law is insufficient to provide notice when the issues involve different elements of proof) (citation omitted).

For all of the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that 01's failure to assert a Rule 50(a) motion on infringement precludes it from now asserting such a post-verdict motion. Accordingly, 01's Rule 50(b) motion must be denied. The denial of 01's Rule 50(b) motion is somewhat academic, however, because 01 has alternatively moved for a new trial under Rule 59, as permitted by Rule 50(b). Moreover, even if 01 had not waived its Rule 50 motion as to infringement, the motion would be denied. The same evidence that supports the Court's conclusion that 01's Rule 59 motion for a new trial should be denied also supports the conclusion that, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Citrix, there is a "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for a reasonable jury to find for Citrix on the issue of infringement.

III. 01's MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)

Rule 59(a) provides that:

"[A] new trial is appropriate when the jury reaches a `seriously erroneous result as evidenced by (1) the verdict being against the [clear] weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias.'" Static Control Components, 697 F.3d at 414 (quoting Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)). 01 contends that it is entitled to a new trial because the non-infringement verdict was against the weight of the evidence and certain aspects of the trial were prejudicial.

B. Jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence

1. Standard of Review

The Court should not overturn the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence "unless the verdict was unreasonable." Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 453, 455 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (quoting Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047-48 (6th Cir. 1996)). "Thus, if a reasonable juror could reach the challenged verdict, a new trial is improper." Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1048). "[C]ourts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable." Id. 201 F.3d at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1967)); Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 395 (6th Cir. 2014) (same) (citing Owens-Corning and Holmes).

2. Literal infringement

The issue before the Court is whether a reasonable jury, based on the evidence at trial, could have reached the verdict that GoToMyPC did not infringe claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent. Direct infringement of a patent occurs when one, "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention" within the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). "Direct infringement requires a party to perform each and every step or element of a claimed method or product." BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted.) To establish literal infringement at trial,3 01 must prove that each limitation of claims 24 and 45 "reads on" or is found in GoToMyPC. See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Ind., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

01's argument that the jury's verdict of non-infringement is against the weight of the evidence4 is two-pronged: (1) Citrix's non-infringement argument at trial was premised upon a construction of the claim term "create" that was rejected by the Court;5and (2) under the Court's construction of "create," reasonable minds could not disagree that GoToMyPC infringed claims 24 and 45 of `479 patent. (Mot. at 41249 and 41251-54.) Citrix opposes 01's arguments on both the merits and on the grounds that 01 waived this basis for a new trial by failing to lodge appropriate objections during trial. (Opp'n at 41444.) For the purpose of this analysis, the Court assumes, without finding, that 01 did not waive this argument for a new trial.

3. Court's claim construction of "creating"

01's argument for a new trial focuses on the claim term "creating" in claim 24(b)(ii)6 of the `479 patent, which describes one function of the "location facility"—"creating a communication channel between the remote compute and personal computer." During claim construction, the meaning of "creating" was not disputed by the parties. They agreed that "creating" means "making or bringing into existence," and the Court adopted the parties agreed construction. (Clm. Const. MOO at 11485.) Contrary to 01's contention, Citrix did not offer a construction of "creating" during claim construction that was rejected by the Court.

With respect to the balance of the phrase—"a communication channel between the remote computer and personal computer"—Citrix advanced a construction requiring that the connection between the remote and personal computer be created by the locator server, not by the remote and personal computer, and not by the locator server assisting other components to create the communication channel. (Clm. Const. MOO at 11484.) Citrix supported this construction by arguing that during reexamination7 of the `479 patent, 01's expert, Dr. Gregory Ganger ("Ganger"), distinguished prior art on the grounds that the `479 patent requires that the location facility itself must create the communication channel, and that it was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the `479 patent if the location facility was used by, assisted, facilitated, or enabled other components to create the communication channel.8 (Clm. Const. MOO at 11484-85.)

The Court rejected this language, however, because "the plain language of claim 24, the reexamination record, and the Federal Circuit's definition of location facility,9 all provide that it is the location facility, not the locator server as stated in . . . defendants' proposed construction, that creates the communication channel. There is no support in the claim itself, the reexamination record, or the precedent of the Federal Circuit to support a construction that the locator server creates the communication channel." (Id. at 11485 (emphasis in original).) Upon rejecting Citrix's proposed construction, the Court agreed with 01 that no construction was required. This means that the words are given their ordinary and customary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Thus, the Court construed the phrase "`creating a communication channel between the remote computer and personal computer' to mean: `making or bringing into existence a communication channel between the remote computer and the personal computer.'" (Clm. Const. MOO at 11485-86.) Contrary to 01's contention, the Court's construction did not reject Citrix's proposed construction because of the proposed manner by which the location facility achieved its "create" function, and drew no distinction between the location facility being "used by" other components, and "using" other components, to create the communication channel. (Mot. at 41254; Clm. Const. MOO at 11484-85.)

4. Citrix did not utilize a rejected definition of "create" at trial

In support of its contention that Citrix utilized an improper definition of "creating" when arguing at trial that GoToMyPC does not infringe the `479 patent, 01 cites the cross examination of Ganger and the direct examination of Foster. 01's argument, however, is not supported by the record. The record reflects that the testimony cited by 01 does not address the definition of "creating," but what the `479 patent requires of the location facility regarding creation of a communication channel, and how the communication channel is created in the accused product, GoToMyPC.

Dr. Ganger's cross examination

As an example of Citrix's purportedly improper use of "create" in its non-infringement case, 01 points to Citrix's cross examination of Ganger regarding paragraph 810 of his second declaration to the patent office during reexamination. During this exchange, 01 argues that Citrix suggested the term "create" had "special meaning" rather than the Court's construction of the term. (Mot. at 41256-57.) The relevant portion of the transcript follows.

(1/13/16 Tr. at 36485-88 (emphasis added).)

At this point, 01 requested a side bar and counsel for 01 argued that the Court had construed the term "create" and objected to Citrix's suggestion that the term had some other "special meaning." Counsel for Citrix acknowledged that he should have not used the term "special meaning," but only intended to clarify the role of the location facility. (Id. at 36489.) The Court agreed that use of the phrase "special meaning" was not appropriate, and directed counsel for Citrix to rephrase the question. (Id. at 36490.11) With that, Citrix's cross-examination of Ganger continued with a discussion of whether one of ordinary skill in the art would consider the location facility to satisfy the `479 patent's requirement of creating the communication channel if the location facility is enabling or facilitating other components to create the channel. (Id. at 36491-92.12)

The transcript reflects that Citrix's cross examination of Ganger does not address the definition of "create," but how "location facility" fulfills this function as claimed in the `479 patent—to "make or bring into existence" a communication channel between the remote and personal computers. Indeed, upon direct examination by 01 about the location facility's "create" function in the `479 patent, Ganger specifically used the Court's definition of "create" when testifying that one of ordinary skill in the art would not say that the location facility was "creating" if it only enabled or facilitated the communication channel:13

(Id. at 36537-39 (emphasis added).)

With respect to his infringement analysis, Ganger specifically used the Court's construction of "creating" when opining that the location facility14 in GoToMyPC "creates" the communication channel on both direct examination (Doc. No. 532 (Transcript January 12, 2016 ["1/12/16 Tr."]) at 35757-78) and on cross examination by Citrix (1/13/16 Tr. at 36481-82). Ganger also used the Court's definition of "create" in forming his opinion that GoToMyPC infringed claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent, in addition to considering GoToMyPC's source code and technical documents, the requirements of the asserted claims of the `479 patent, and how both the claimed invention and accused product create a communication channel between the remote and personal computers. (1/12/16 Tr. at 35676-82.)

The Court concludes that no "special meaning" of the claim term "creating" was argued or used by Citrix in connection with Citrix's cross examination of Ganger, and that Ganger used the Court's construction of that term in arriving at his opinion that GoToMyPC infringed the asserted claims of the `479 patent.

Dr. Foster's direct examination

Further in support of its argument that Citrix used an improper construction of "creating" in its non-infringement argument, 01 points to Foster's testimony regarding Ganger's declaration submitted during reexamination. (Mot. at 41251-52 (citing Doc. No. 548 (Transcript January 14, 2016 ["1/14/16 Tr."]) at 37819).) 01 argues that although the Court defined "create" as "making or bringing into existence," Foster "expressly rel[ied] on a definition of `create' that was limited by statements made during the reexamination by Dr. Ganger[.]" (Mot. at 41251 (underline in original).)

Like Ganger's testimony, however, Foster's testimony does not address the definition of "create," but the required function of the location facility in the `479 patent to "create" a communication channel between the remote and personal computers. Indeed, in testifying about how the communication channel in GoToMyPC is created, and whether that satisfies the asserted claim limitations in the `479 patent, Foster specifically applied the Court's definition of "create."

(1/14/16 Tr. at 37817-19 (emphasis added).)

Utilizing the Court's construction of "creating," Foster agreed with Ganger that the `479 patent requires the location facility to create—i.e. make or bring into existence—"a communication channel between the remote computer and the personal computer," and that this requirement is not met if the location facility only enables or assists the remote and personal computers in creating the communication channel. Like Ganger's testimony regarding the "create" function of the location facility in the `479 patent, Foster's testimony does not redefine "create," but addresses how the location facility does, or does not, create the communication channel.

Using the Court's definition of "create," Foster testified, among other things, about the requirements of the `479 patent, GoToMyPC's source code, and how both the claimed invention and accused product create a communication channel between the remote and personal computers in reaching his opinion that GoToMyPC does not contain all of the limitations of claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent. Thus, Foster opined that GoToMyPC did not infringe the asserted claims. (Id. at 37791-819.)

5. Analysis

The first prong of 01's argument that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence because Citrix did not use the Court's definition of "create" fails for the reasons discussed above. Experts from both sides, using the Court's definition of "create," presented extensive testimony, including whether GoToMyPC reads on claim 24's limitations in the `479 patent, whether GoToMyPC contains a location facility, whether a location facility in GoToMyPC creates the communication channel between the remote and personal computers, and whether the remote and personal computers in GoToMyPC create the communication channel between them.

Infringement is a question of fact for the jury. To establish literal infringement at trial, 01 was required to prove that each limitation of claims 24 and 45 in the `479 patent "reads on" or is found in GoToMyPC. Among other evidence, the parties' experts expressed different opinions regarding how GoToMyPC creates a communication channel between the remote and personal computers, and whether the manner the communication channel is created "reads on" claims 24 and 45. If the evidence presented at trial by Citrix was believed by the jury, there was more than sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude, among other things, that GoToMyPC does not contain a location facility, and/or that the remote and personal computers, not the location facility, creates the communication channel in GoToMyPC. If the jury concluded that GoToMyPC does not read on even one limitation in claim 24, then 01 failed to establish that GoToMyPC infringes the `479 patent. Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1330 ("To prove infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device contains each limitation of the asserted claim[.]") (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).

The Court should not overturn the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence "unless the verdict was unreasonable." Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund, 186 F.R.D. at 455 (citations omitted). A verdict is not unreasonable simply because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions from the evidence presented. Owens-Corning, 201 F.3d at 821. The jury was persuaded by Citrix's evidence and not persuaded by 01's evidence. Because there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that GoToMyPC does not infringe claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent, the Court will not grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

C. Trial was not Unfairly Prejudicial to 01

A new trial is warranted if the proceedings were unfair to the moving party in some way, such as if the proceedings were influenced by prejudice or bias. Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1046-47; Kusens, 448 F.3d at 367 n.13 (citing Holmes). That is, there must be a "reasonable probability" that the verdict of the jury was influenced by the alleged prejudice or bias. See Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 624 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1980)); Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1045-46 ("[A] new trial is warranted when a jury has reached a seriously erroneous result as evidenced by . . . the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias.") (citations omitted). A substantial error in the admission or rejection of evidence, or the giving of, or refusing to give, a proper jury instruction, establishes prejudice. The Scotts Co. v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 734, 752 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1045-46.)

01 advances three reasons in support of its contention that the trial was fundamentally unfair and prejudicial: (1) Citrix's claim construction argument to the jury was improper and prejudicially misleading; (2) Citrix's "practicing the prior art" defense and presentation of prior art was improper and prejudicially misleading; and (3) the Court's ruling that 01 could not identify Citrix as the requester of the reexamination was prejudicial. (See Mot. at 41246.) The Court has already concluded that Citrix did not utilize a claim construction of "create" at trial that was previously rejected by the Court. Therefore, the Court need not address 01's first argument that it was prejudiced by improper claim construction. It was not. (See Mot. at 41258-60.)

1. "Practicing the prior art" defense to literal infringement

01's second prejudice argument is that Citrix used a "well-known defendant's trick" known as the "practicing the prior art" defense to 01's infringement claim. (Mot. at 41261.)

Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

The Federal Circuit has rejected "practicing the prior art" as a defense to literal infringement.15 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no `practicing the prior art defense' to literal infringement.") (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). "[L]iteral infringement is determined by construing the claims and comparing them to the accused device, not by comparing the accused device to the prior art." Id. at 1366 (citing Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583.

01's argument

01 contends that Citrix improperly argued throughout the trial that "if the jury found that [GoToMyPC] infringed the 479 patent, then the patent must be invalid, because Citrix was doing no more than what was known in the prior art BuddyHelp and ExpertLive systems." (See Mot. at 41261-64.) By intertwining invalidity and infringement, 01 maintains that Citrix prejudicially encouraged the jury "to circumvent an element-by-element analysis of infringement[,]" thus warranting a new trial. (Reply at 41484.)

01 cites three examples in support of this aspect of its motion. First, 01 contends that Citrix improperly used the "practicing prior art defense" in its opening statement16 as follows:

(Doc. No 521 (Transcript January 11, 2016 ["1/11/16 Tr."]) at 33932-33.)

01 next points to an exchange between the Court and counsel for Citrix that 01 contends shows Citrix's improper and prejudicial intentions to advance a "practicing the prior art" defense to infringement at trial:

(1/12/16 Tr. 35820-21 (emphasis added).)

For its third example, 01 points to the testimony of Foster regarding the validity of the `479 patent with respect to certain prior art, which 01 maintains shows that Citrix's invalidity defense was a ruse to improperly assert a "practicing the prior art" defense to infringement. (Mot. at 41263-64.) The relevant portions of Foster's testimony are as follows:

(1/14/16 Tr. at 37820-23 (emphasis added).)

Analysis

In order to run afoul of the "practicing the prior art" defense to literal infringement, Citrix would have to compare the prior art, instead of the accused product, to the limitations in the asserted claims of the `479 patent. Tate, 279 F.3d at 1366. But Citrix did not make this impermissible comparison. Foster's non-infringement analysis properly compared GoToMyPC—not the prior art—to claims 24 and 45 of the `479 patent to arrive at his opinion that GoToMyPC does not infringe the `479 patent. (See 1/14/16 Tr. at 37781-819.) Similarly in Citrix's invalidity defense, Foster's testimony properly compares the prior art (e.g. BuddyHelp and PCAnywhere) to the asserted claims of the `479 patent; he does not improperly compare the prior art to the accused product, GoToMyPC. (See id. at 37826-30.)

Citrix's argument that if GoToMyPC infringed the `479 patent then the patent was invalid, or, if GoToMyPC did not infringe the `479 patent then the patent was valid, did not turn on improperly comparing prior art to the asserted claims (to prove non-infringement) or improperly comparing prior art to the accused product (to prove invalidity). Rather, the argument turned on a difference of opinion between the parties' experts regarding how the communication channel was created in the `479 patent, GoToMyPC, and the prior art.17 (See id. at 37832-33.)

In addition to properly comparing the prior art to the asserted claims of the `479 patent during the invalidity phase of his testimony, Foster also gave limited testimony directly comparing GoToMyPC with BuddyHelp,18 ExpertLive,19 and PCAnywhere.20 But regardless of whether the totality of Foster's invalidity testimony could be construed as an improper use of prior art with respect to Citrix's invalidity defense, that defense failed—the jury determined that the `479 patent was valid.

More importantly, an examination of the trial transcript shows that during its defense to literal infringement, Citrix did not improperly compare the prior art to the asserted claims of the `479 patent as a defense to literal infringement, but properly compared the accused product— GoToMyPC—to the asserted claims. Citrix's limited comparison of prior art to the accused product during the invalidity phase of the trial is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the jurors linked those comparisons to their infringement analysis. See CNH Am. LLC v. Kinze Mfg., Inc., 809 F.Supp.2d 280, 288-89 (D. Del. 2011). Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed by the Court that: "The determination of literal infringement depends on the presence of the claim elements in the accused product, not on similarities between the accused product and the prior art." (1/15/16 Tr. at 38242.)

Given that Citrix did not improperly compare the prior art to the asserted claims as part of its infringement defense, any limited prejudice that may have resulted from the comparisons of prior art to GoToMyPC during the invalidity phase was cured by the Court's specific instruction to the jury regarding their determination of infringement. See Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1046-47 ("Although prejudice that affects the fairness of a proceeding can certainly be grounds for a new trial, when `such prejudice is cured by instructions of the court, the motion for a new trial should be denied.'") (quoting Clarksville-Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Sys. v. United States Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 1002 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also, e.g., Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 438 F.2d 373, 375 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that in light of the curative instructions given by the district court and the context of the entire record, the improper comments of the plaintiff's attorney were not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial).Thus, to the extent that any prejudice resulted from comparisons between GoToMyPC and prior art by Citrix in connection with invalidity, there is no reasonable probability that the jury's infringement verdict was influenced by prejudice, or that the infringement verdict was seriously erroneous. Strickland, 142 F.3d at 358; Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1045-46.

2. Inter partes reexamination record

01's second argument regarding prejudice is grounded in the Court's ruling on Citrix's motion in limine as to the manner in which the reexamination record could be used as evidence at trial. (Doc. No. 405.) After considering the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 403, the Court ruled that the reexamination record could be used in a limited manner at trial, with one of the limitations being that Citrix could not be identified as the party that requested the reexamination. (Doc. No. 512 at 32877.) In so ruling, the Court concluded that while the parties are entitled to include all of the prior art considered by the patent office in advancing their claims,

(Id. at 32876-77.)

01 contends that excluding evidence of the party requesting the inter partes reexamination is "without precedent in the case law," and prejudiced plaintiff because 01 could not put the reexamination evidence in context with Citrix's illegal "practicing the prior art" defense theory to infringement at trial. (Mot. at 41265.) In support, 01 cites the same portion of Citrix's opening statement that it cited in support of its "practicing the prior art" argument. (Id. (citing 1/11/16 Tr. at 33932).) 01 argues that the opening statement falsely claimed that 01, not Citrix, placed BuddyHelp before the Patent Office for review,21 and falsely suggested that the patent office agreed with Citrix's view that BuddyHelp is different from the `479 patent22 when, in fact, Citrix argued on reexamination that the `479 patent was invalid because BuddyHelp met the limitations of the `479 patent. In doing so, 01 contends that "counsel [for Citrix] suggested to the jury that the Patent Office supported Citrix's "practicing the prior art defense," knowing that Citrix had opposed that position in the Reexamination." (Id. at 41265-66.) According to 01, "[b]y allowing Citrix to obscure its own role in the reexamination — and particularly the fact that it had made arguments diametrically opposed to those argued by its trial counsel — the Court prejudicially prevented Communique from a full-on attack of the illegitimate `practicing the prior art' defense to infringement." (Id. at 41267.)

Neither party cites any case law that addresses the issue of excluding the identity of the party requesting reexamination from evidence in a patent infringement trial. Some courts have limited the use of reexamination evidence by not permitting use of the word "reexamination" or evidence of the number of times prior art references were considered by the patent office, and requiring appropriate redactions. See Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc., No. CV 12-540-LPS, 2015 WL 10457176, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 23, 2015) ("While there shall be no reference to `reexamination,' evidence (including prior art) used during a reexamination is not inadmissible solely due to its use or even creation during a reexamination, provided that general terminology (e.g., `prosecution history') is used and necessary redactions are made.") Such evidence of reexamination history may be excluded under the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403:

Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., No. CV 09-80-LPS, 2014 WL 4246579, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2014) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).

Plaintiff cites to cases where the court issued special jury instructions regarding reexamination, but did not order redaction regarding post-issuance proceedings in the patent office. (Mot. at 41266.) But those cases are not on point, and only establish that courts may arrive at different conclusions regarding the proper Rule 403 balance between prejudice and the probative value of evidence depending upon the particular facts of a case.

Moreover, plaintiff's only claim of prejudice resulting from the manner in which the Court limited evidence of the reexamination record is that the ruling "prejudicially prevented Communique from a full-on attack of the illegitimate `practicing the prior art' defense to infringement." (Mot. at 41267.) The Court has concluded, however, the Citrix did not assert such an illegal defense theory to plaintiff's infringement claim that was prejudicial to plaintiff. Therefore, there is nothing that occurred at trial that changes the Court's conclusion that the probative value of identifying the party requesting reexamination is outweighed by the danger of jury confusion and prejudice to Citrix.

Accordingly, 01's motion for a new trial on this basis must be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that 01's motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial (Doc. No. 580) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.