STIPULATION TO VACATE TRIAL DATE, SET CHANGE OF PLEA HEARINGS; FINDINGS AND ORDER

LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on January 22, 2020 at 8:30 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to vacate the trial date and set the matter for change of plea before the Court as to all defendants for January 6, 2020 at 8:30 a.m. and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and January 6, 2020 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(D), 3161(h)(1)(G), 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Defendants Alcala, Cisneros, and Corona have executed plea agreements with the government, which have been filed with the Court.

b. The next available date before the Court for a change of plea is January 6, 2020.

c. As the defendants do not intend on going to trial, the parties request that the trial date, and all other corresponding Court dates be vacated. Vacating the trial date and pretrial order deadlines will conserve judicial resources as it will avoid the scheduling of a jury panel, the consideration of pretrial filings, and the transportation of witnesses, among other trial preparations, for a case that has been resolved by plea agreements.

e. By previous Court order, time was excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., through and including January 22, 2020 for inter alia trial preparation. In an abundance of caution, the parties also request that time be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., from the date of this stipulation through and including January 6, 2020, to allow defendants to continue to consult with counsel, and to prepare for and attend change of plea hearings.

f. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance/time exclusion would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

g. The government does not object to, and agrees to, the continuance/time exclusion.

h. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

i. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to January 6, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(D), 3161(h)(1)(G), 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to January 6, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(D), 3161(h)(1)(G), 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. At the request of the parties, the January 22, 2020 trial date and all other corresponding Court dates in the above case are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.