MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI, Chief Magistrate Judge.

I. Procedural History:

Plaintiff, Tyanne Yevette Thurman, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. ECF No. 1. On May 30, 2013, judgment was entered reversing and remanding Plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 14. Plaintiff now moves for a total of $2,799.60 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), requesting compensation for 14.15 attorney hours at an hourly rate of $174.00 and 4.50 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $75.00. ECF Nos. 15-16. The Commissioner filed a timely response, stating no objections. ECF No. 17.

II. Applicable Law:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After reviewing the case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further proceedings is a prevailing party.

An award of attorney's fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion of the case, Plaintiff's attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney's fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985).

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purpose of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing party's litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. Id. See also Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized statement . . . stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel's services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand counsel's representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1989)). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an accurately calculated attorney's fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996, amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour, the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A), unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index ("CPI").

In this instance, counsel requests attorney's fees at an hourly rate of $174.00 for work performed in 2012 and 2013. ECF No. 16, Exs. A-B. Counsel attached a copy of the CPI as evidence that this rate is a proper reflection of the cost of living. ECF No. 16, Ex. 6. Counsel's requested rate is consistent with Amended General Order 39, which sets forth the maximum hourly rate for EAJA fees in the Western District of Arkansas. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that counsel is entitled to an hourly rate of $174.00 for work performed in 2012 and 2013.

III. Discussion:

The undersigned next addresses the number of hours Plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this case. Counsel requests a total of 14.15 attorney hours for work performed in 2012 and 2013. ECF No. 16, Ex. A. The undersigned finds that counsel's requested time is reasonable and recommends awarding the full 14.15 hours. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is entitled to 14.15 attorney hours at an hourly rate of $174.00.

Counsel also requests compensation for 4.50 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $75.00. ECF No. 16, Exs. A-B. A prevailing party that satisfies EAJA's other requirements may recover paralegal fees at prevailing market rates. Richlin Sec. Service Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S.Ct. 2007, 2019 (U.S. 2008). Plaintiff's counsel cited to Richlin as evidence that this hourly rate is appropriate for paralegal work. ECF No. 16, at 3. The undersigned finds that $75.00 per hour for paralegal work is reasonable, and the Commissioner does not object to this rate. The undersigned also finds that the requested time is reasonable and recommends awarding the full 4.50 paralegal hours. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is entitled to 4.50 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $75.00.

IV. Conclusion:

Based on the above, the undersigned recommends awarding Plaintiff fees under the EAJA for 14.15 attorney hours at an hourly rate of $174.00 and 4.50 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $75.00, for a total attorney's fee award of $2,799.60. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which Plaintiff may be awarded in the future. Further, this award should be made payable directly to Plaintiff, but may be properly mailed to Plaintiff's attorney.2 The parties are reminded that the award under the EAJA will be taken into account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent double recovery by counsel for the Plaintiff.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.