BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
The parties, through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on Monday, January 11, 2016, at 1:00 p.m. By this stipulation, the parties agreed to continue the matter to February 22, 2016, at 1:00 p.m. By way of further stipulation, the parties then agreed to continue the matter to April 25, 2016, at 1:00 p.m
2. The parties by way of this stipulation now seek to continue the scheduled June 27, 2016, 1:00 p.m. status conference to August 8, 2016 at 1:00 p.m.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendant an opportunity to expeditiously resolve this matter. Plea negotiations and investigation are ongoing.
b. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
c. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 27, 2016 to August 8, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B) (i) because it would allow the parties sufficient time to expeditiously resolve this matter and the failure to grant the continuance would create a miscarriage of justice. Thus, the ends of justice would be served by taking such action and would outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED that the 2
IT IS SO ORDERED.