STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR., Senior District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 16, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 11, 2019, and to exclude time between November 16, 2018, and January 11, 2019, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes is over 2,000 pages, which includes reports of interview, bank records, and other evidence obtained in the investigation. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) The United States has provided a plea offer to Mr. Bluford, which has been extended to January 11, 2019.

c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery, discuss the evidence with Mr. Bluford, including as it relates to the plea offer provided and other matters, and to conduct fact investigation, and legal research that affects both preparation for trial as well as potential resolution. Further, counsel is in the process of obtaining information for consideration by the United States which may affect resolution and/or trial.

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The United States does not object to the continuance.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 16, 2018 to January 11, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.