U.S. v. Navarrette, 8:17CR335. (2018)
Court: District Court, D. Nebraska
Number: infdco20180608e31
Visitors: 2
Filed: Jun. 07, 2018
Latest Update: Jun. 07, 2018
Summary: ORDER SUSAN M. BAZIS , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [97]. Counsel needs additional time to receive and review disclosure and evidence previously provided by the government to defendant's court-appointed attorney as well as investigating facts and witnesses in the State of Arizona. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [97] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for June 12, 2018, is
Summary: ORDER SUSAN M. BAZIS , Magistrate Judge . This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [97]. Counsel needs additional time to receive and review disclosure and evidence previously provided by the government to defendant's court-appointed attorney as well as investigating facts and witnesses in the State of Arizona. For good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [97] is granted, as follows: 1. The jury trial now set for June 12, 2018, is ..
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ORDER
SUSAN M. BAZIS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on the Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial [97]. Counsel needs additional time to receive and review disclosure and evidence previously provided by the government to defendant's court-appointed attorney as well as investigating facts and witnesses in the State of Arizona. For good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Continue Trial [97] is granted, as follows:
1. The jury trial now set for June 12, 2018, is continued to August 28, 2018.
2. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court finds that the ends of justice will be served by granting this continuance and outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Any additional time arising as a result of the granting of this motion, that is, the time between today's date and August 28, 2018, shall be deemed excludable time in any computation of time under the requirement of the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
Source: Leagle
