ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.

Defendant Lino Hernandez ("Defendant") was convicted after a jury trial of: (1) Conspiracy to Manufacture Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1); (2) Conspiracy to Possess a Listed Chemical with Knowledge, or Having Reasonable Cause to Believe, That it Would be Used to Manufacture Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(c)(2); (3) Possession of a Listed Chemical with Knowledge, or Having Reasonable Cause to Believe, That it Would be Used to Manufacture Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2); and (4) Distribution of Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On August 12, 2003, Defendant was sentenced to 292 months on Count 1 to be served concurrently with 240-month terms on Counts 1-3, which were in turn to run concurrently to each other, for a total of 292 months of imprisonment. Defendant previously moved for a reduction in his sentence, which Motion was denied. ECF Nos. 418, 453.

Presently before the Court is Defendant's subsequent Motion to Appoint Counsel and for Preservation of Johnson claim. ECF No. 462. This matter was referred to the Office of the Federal Defender, which filed a notice indicating that it did not intend to assume representation of Defendant. ECF Nos. 463, 467. The Government opposes Defendant's request, ECF No. 471, and, for the reasons that follow, it is DENIED.

In Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), the Supreme Court struck the "residual clause" in the Armed Career Criminal Act after concluding that the clause was unconstitutionally vague. By way of his instant Motion, Defendant appears to challenge under similar logic a 2-level enhancement he received at sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon. Defendant's argument is foreclosed both procedurally and substantively.

As a procedural matter, Defendant's instant request is most properly construed as a Section 2255 habeas petition, but Defendant has previously sought relief under § 2255 and has failed to obtain leave to file a second or successive petition. This Court thus lacks jurisdiction to consider his claims. See United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive petition absent certification from the appropriate court); Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3(a) ("An applicant seeking authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court must file an application in the Court of Appeals demonstrating entitlement to such leave under sections 2254 or 2255.").

Even absent this procedural bar, however, Defendant's argument would nonetheless be foreclosed on the merits. See Barajas v. United States, No. 1:13-cr-00026-AWI, 2016 WL 4721481, at *2 (E.D. Cal.) (Johnson does not apply to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)); see also Beckles v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890 (2016) (advisory guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge). Accordingly there is no justification for the appointment of counsel nor has Defendant identified any Johnson claim to preserve. Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 462) is thus DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.