Filed: Dec. 07, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-11605 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECEMBER 7, 2009 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00107-CR-FTM-99-DNF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DEAN LAWTHER, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (December 7, 2009) Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges. PER CU
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-11605 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECEMBER 7, 2009 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00107-CR-FTM-99-DNF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DEAN LAWTHER, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (December 7, 2009) Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges. PER CUR..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-11605 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 7, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00107-CR-FTM-99-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEAN LAWTHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 7, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Dean Lawther appeals his conviction for transporting a visual
depiction involving the sexual exploitation of minors in interstate commerce in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and (b)(1). On appeal, Lawther argues that his
conviction should be vacated and his case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings because his due process rights were violated. Lawther claims that the
district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing at sentencing
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) because the information he presented was
sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt of Lawther’s competency. To substantiate his
position, Lawther notes that Dr. Frederick Schaerf, a psychiatrist who testified at
sentencing, specifically detailed Lawther’s history of sexual abuse, learning
difficulties, drug and alcohol abuse, anxiety, depression, and low intelligence. In
addition, Lawther emphasizes that he told the district court that his medications
were out of control, that he was suffering from depression, and that he was having
mood swings and other psychological issues. Accordingly, Lawther contends that
the district court’s failure to conduct at least some inquiry into his competency,
including questions regarding the amount and types of medications that he was
using, and to order a competency hearing amounted to reversible error.
We review a district court’s failure to order a competency hearing sua
sponte under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Williams, 468
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F.2d 819, 820 (5th Cir. 1972)1 (interpreting a prior version of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)
and stating that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order sua
sponte a hearing on the appellant’s competency to stand trial.”). See also United
States v. Lindsey,
2009 WL 2345209 (11th Cir. Jul. 31, 2009) (No. 08-14916)
(relying on Williams).
Section 4241(a) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides that:
[a]t any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense
and prior to the sentencing of the defendant . . . . The court shall . . .
order [a hearing to determine mental competency] on its own motion,
if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently
be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly
in his defense.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4244(a) (requiring the court to sua
sponte order a hearing to determine whether a defendant is in need of treatment for
a mental disease or defect prior to sentencing, but after the defendant’s conviction,
if there is substantial information indicating that the defendant is suffering from a
mental disease or defect). “Whether [a] defendant is competent is an ongoing
inquiry; the defendant must be competent at all stages of [the] trial [including
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to October 1, 1981.
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sentencing].” United States v. Rahim,
431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
Accordingly, “[a] district court must conduct a competency hearing when
there is a ‘bona fide’ doubt regarding the defendant’s competence.”
Id. The test
for determining competence to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 402,
80 S. Ct.
788, 789,
4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). Lastly, when a defendant’s counsel
fails to raise the issue of a defendant’s competency at the trial level, this is
“persuasive evidence that [the defendant’s] mental competence was not in doubt.”
United States v. Rodriguez,
799 F.2d 649, 655 (11th Cir. 1986).
Because the record demonstrates that Lawther was both able to aid in his
defense and understand the proceedings against him, we conclude that there was no
bona fide doubt as to his competency at sentencing. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in failing to conduct a competency hearing, and we affirm Lawther’s
conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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