WILLIAM ALSUP, District Judge.
In these consolidated PSLRA class actions, the lead plaintiff moves for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement agreement. The motion is
The background of these consolidated actions has been set forth in prior orders (see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 181, 252). In short, defendant LendingClub Corporation, which operated an online peer-to-peer marketplace to match borrowers with lenders for various loans, completed an initial public offering of its common stock in December 2014. The registration statement that LendingClub issued and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of that IPO contained certain representations regarding, among other things, LendingClub's internal controls, procedures, and data-security protocols. In May 2016, however, numerous discrepancies, weaknesses, and improprieties in LendingClub's business operations came to light, causing its share price to drop and various securities rating agencies to downgrade LendingClub.
These securities actions followed. All three were related to the undersigned judge and subsequently consolidated with Water and Power Employees' Retirement, Disability and Death Plan of the City of Los Angeles ("WPERP") as the lead plaintiff. A prior order certified the following class (Dkt. Nos. 252 at 22-23, 255):
Significantly, that order specifically excluded from the class definition "short sellers who incurred losses from short sales during the class period" to account for "the practical difficulties of tracing the short seller's loss to any alleged fraud" (id. at 22).
The lead plaintiff has now filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement (Dkt. No. 333). For purposes of the instant motion only, the parties also filed a stipulated request to modify the foregoing class definition in three ways. First, they wish to change the start of the class period from December 11, 2014, to December 10, 2014, for claims under the 1933 Securities Act. Second, they wish to erase the exclusion of "short sellers who incurred losses during the class period as a result of their short sales." Third, they wish to change "defendants and their families" to "defendants and their immediate families" (emphasis added) in the list of excluded categories. The purpose of these changes would be to fully subsume the class in a parallel state litigation so that both that litigation and this one could be settled in one fell swoop (Dkt. No. 332).
Again, the parties request these changes to our class definition for purposes of settlement only. Should the settlement fall through, the class definition would revert to that set forth in the class certification order. Having considered the parties' stipulation, the Court
"A settlement should be approved if `it is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.'" Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Preliminary approval is appropriate if "the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible approval." In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Chief Judge Vaughn Walker). Here, the proposed settlement agreement satisfies these requirements.
The proposed settlement agreement establishes a gross settlement fund of $125 million (Dkt. No. 333-1 ¶ 1.31). Lead counsel in both the federal and state actions intend to seek up to approximately $16 million in attorney's fees and $650,000 in litigation expenses, to be paid out of the gross settlement fund (Dkt. Nos. 333 at 19, 333-1 at 51). Additionally, the claims administrator estimates that notice and administration expenses may cost up to $1.25 million, which would also be paid out of the gross settlement fund (Dkt. No. 333-6 ¶ 21). The net settlement fund that remains after these deductions will then be distributed on a pro rata basis to class members who complete and timely submit a valid proof-of-claim and release form, based on recognized losses calculated from information provided on said form (including, for example, when each claimant bought and sold LendingClub stock) (see Dkt. No. 333-1 at 71-82).
Any balance remaining after the initial distribution will be reallocated among authorized claimants until the net settlement fund dips below five thousand dollars. At that point, according to the proposed settlement agreement, the remainder would be donated to "Second Harvest Food Bank or to another 501(c)(3) non-profit organization unaffiliated with Federal and State Lead Counsel and approved by the Court" (Dkt. No. 333-1 ¶ 6.8). The Court would prefer that the donation go to an organization with a purpose that bears a closer nexus to the claims asserted herein. At this stage, however, this detail does not preclude preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement.
The gross settlement fund of $125 million represents approximately seventeen percent of the total estimated damages that would be recoverable if the lead plaintiff prevailed at trial, i.e., $711 million. If LendingClub proved incapable of paying a judgment of that size, however, then the remaining defendants would face only approximately $140 million in damages, in which case the $125 million gross settlement would represent approximately 89 percent of the total estimated damages recoverable at trial (Dkt. No. 333 at 14). The difference between the maximum possible recovery and the gross settlement fund accounts for not only the risk of LendingClub's insolvency but also avoided risks and costs of litigation, including the accrued fees and expenses of counsel, the risk of an adverse jury verdict, and the risks and costs of "lengthy appeals that would inevitably follow" (see id. at 2) even if the lead plaintiff prevails at trial. Given that this proposed settlement agreement comes after nearly two years of litigation, discovery, and motion practice, including prior orders on a motion to dismiss and on class certification (see id. at 11), both sides have had ample opportunity to carefully assess and weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses of their legal positions. The discounted settlement amount seems to reflect those considerations.
The proposed settlement agreement contains a release of claims that exceeds the scope of the certified class claims. Specifically, the proposed settlement agreement provides (Dkt. No. 333-1 ¶¶ 1.25, 1.42 (emphasis in original)):
Although the undersigned judge typically requires that a release of class claims "be limited only to the claims certified for class treatment" and avoid "releasing claims that `could have been brought'" (see Dkt. No. 13 at 3), this particular release is anchored to "the purchase, acquisition, holding, sale, or disposition of LendingClub common stock by Class Members during the [class] period" (see Dkt. No. 333 at 7). In another securities case, the undersigned judge recently granted preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement agreement with substantially identical language in its release of claims. See Luna v. Marvell, Case No. 15-5447 (Dkt. Nos. 220 ¶¶ 1.25, 1.33; 224 at 4:9-7:9). The same language suffices for purposes of preliminary approval here.
As stated, lead counsel in both the federal and state actions intend to seek up to approximately $16 million in attorney's fees and $650,000 in litigation expenses, to be paid out of the settlement fund. In addition, the state class representatives may seek incentive awards — up to five thousand dollars apiece — from the state court, but any such service award would be paid out of any fees and expenses awarded to lead counsel in the state action (Dkt. No. 333-1 ¶ 3.5). While the prospect of these forthcoming requests does not prevent preliminary approval at this stage, the parties are advised that the requested amount of attorney's fees and costs will be subject to close scrutiny and potential reduction at the final approval stage.
In addition, as cautioned in the "Notice Regarding Factors to be Evaluated for Any Proposed Class Settlement," the requests for incentive awards to the state class representatives is a "red flag" (Dkt. No. 13 at 5). Although those requests will be directed to the state court, they nevertheless raise the concern that incentive awards have been thrown in to the bargain to make a flawed or inadequate settlement more "palatable" to some of the players involved because any proposed settlement agreement that purports to cover both the federal and state litigations would ostensibly need the consent of the state class representatives as well. At this stage, however, the proposed settlement agreement does not provide for any automatic incentive award, no request for any such award has been made yet, and the proposed settlement agreement will not be contingent on the outcome of any such request. Preliminary approval thus remains appropriate.
Another factor weighing in favor of preliminary approval is that the proposed settlement agreement came about as a result of extensive mediation efforts supervised by Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero, including two in-person settlement conferences and subsequent deliberations. Indeed, the proposed amount of $125 million for a global settlement came from Judge Spero's mediator's proposal (see Dkt. No. 333 at 5-6, 10). This background is not dispositive of but nevertheless relevant to the question of whether this proposed settlement agreement appears to be "the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations." See In re Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
Subject to the foregoing, the lead plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement is
The proof-of-claim and release form is
By
If counsel submits revised versions of the proposed notices with the foregoing revisions by March 17 at 5:00 p.m., then the undersigned judge will try to respond by the following Monday. In all events, counsel shall submit, along with the proposed notices, a revised proposed timeline for administering the settlement that takes into account the delay in obtaining Court approval for said notices.
The final pretrial conference and trial dates, as well as other pending deadlines in this action, are hereby