REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge.

This case involves judicial review of administrative action by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Reversal and/or Remand. Docket No. 11. The Commissioner filed a response in opposition and a Cross-Motion to Affirm. Docket No. 16. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 19. This action was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a report of findings and recommendation.

I. STANDARDS

A. Judicial Standard of Review

The Court's review of administrative decisions in social security disability benefits cases is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 405(g) provides that, "[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides." The Court may enter, "upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id.

The Commissioner's findings of fact are deemed conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To that end, the Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision denying benefits if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standard and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the decision. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court reviews the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

Under the substantial evidence test, the Commissioner's findings must be upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Batson v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). When the evidence will support more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the Commissioner's interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the issue before this Court is not whether the Commissioner could reasonably have reached a different conclusion, but whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence.

It is incumbent on the ALJ to make specific findings so that the Court does not speculate as to the basis of the findings when determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ's findings should be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which the ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Disability Evaluation Process

The individual seeking disability benefits bears the initial burden of proving disability. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir 1995). To meet this burden, the individual must demonstrate the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). More specifically, the individual must provide "specific medical evidence" in support of his claim for disability. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1514. If the individual establishes an inability to perform his prior work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the individual can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721.

The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining whether an individual is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). If at any step the ALJ determines that he can make a finding of disability or nondisability, a determination will be made and no further evaluation is required. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful; it involves doing significant physical or mental activities usually for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a)-(b), 416.972(a)-(b). If the individual is currently engaging in SGA, then a finding of not disabled is made. If the individual is not engaging in SGA, then the analysis proceeds to the second step.

The second step addresses whether the individual has a medically determinable impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that significantly limits him from performing basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe when medical and other evidence establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on the individual's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921; Social Security Rulings ("SSRs") 85-28 and 96-3p.1 If the individual does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, then a finding of not disabled is made. If the individual has a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, then the analysis proceeds to the third step.

The third step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual's impairments or combination of impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. If the individual's impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal the criteria of a listing and meet the duration requirement (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), then a finding of disabled is made. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the individual's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal the criteria of a listing or meet the duration requirement, then the analysis proceeds to the next step.

Before considering step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must first determine the individual's residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The residual functional capacity is a function-by-function assessment of the individual's ability to do physical and mental work-related activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from impairments. SSR 96-8p. In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929; SSRs 96-4p, 16-3p. An ALJ will consider the claimant's statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms, and will further evaluate whether the statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and the other evidence. SSR 16-3p. The ALJ must also consider opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p, and 06-3p.

The fourth step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual has the residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work ("PRW"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). PRW means work performed either as the individual actually performed it or as it is generally performed in the national economy within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the date that disability must be established. In addition, the work must have lasted long enough for the individual to learn the job and performed at SGA. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565, 416.960(b), 416.965. If the individual has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work, then a finding of not disabled is made. If the individual is unable to perform any PRW or does not have any PRW, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth and last step.

The fifth and final step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual is able to do any other work considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If he is able to do other work, then a finding of not disabled is made. Although the individual generally continues to have the burden of proving disability at this step, a limited burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Commissioner. The Commissioner is responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the individual can do. Lockwood v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On November 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income alleging that she became disabled on April 27, 2012. See, e.g., Administrative Record ("A.R.") 219-35. Plaintiff's claims were denied initially on March 28, 2013, and upon reconsideration on August 8, 2013. A.R. 139-43, 155-66. On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). A.R. 167-72. On June 3, 2014, Plaintiff, Plaintiff's attorney, and a vocational expert appeared for a hearing before ALJ Christopher R. Daniels. See A.R. 45-61. On July 23, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, through the date of the decision. A.R. 24-44. On December 8, 2015, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. A.R. 1-8.

On February 5, 2016, Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Docket No. 1.

B. The Decision Below

The ALJ's decision followed the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. A.R. 24-44. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2017 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 27, 2012. A.R. 32. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: schizoaffective disorder and major depressive disorder. A.R. 32-33. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. A.R. 33-35.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), but that she is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks for 2-hour periods over the course of the workday and workweek; she is limited to only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; she is unable to interact with the general public, but she is able to adapt to routine work changes. A.R. 36-39. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a housekeeper. A.R. 39. Based on all of these findings, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled and denied the applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. See A.R. 39-40.

III. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Plaintiff seeks reversal and/or remand of the ALJ's decision on two grounds, (1) that the ALJ improperly ignored evidence that was submitted after the hearing and (2) that the ALJ improperly afforded too much weight to the opinion of consultative psychologist Kenneth McKay and too little weight to treating physician Dr. Steven Shon.2 The Court addresses these two arguments below.3

A. Consideration of Evidence Submitted After the Hearing

Plaintiff argues repeatedly that the ALJ did not consider evidence that she submitted after the hearing. E.g., Docket No. 11 at 13, 23-24.4 As the Commissioner correctly points out, this contention lacks merit. See Docket No. 16 at 7. Plaintiff submitted 15 pages of documents from Dr. Kuraishi after the hearing. A.R. 409-424.5 These documents were incorporated into the record considered by the ALJ. A.R. 44 (list of exhibits). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide any meaningful discussion how those particular documents undermine the ALJ's decision. The Court finds unpersuasive Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred with respect to records submitted after the hearing.

B. Consideration of the Opinions of Dr. Shon and Dr. McKay

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ's reliance on the opinion of consultative psychologist Dr. McKay rather than on the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Shon. Docket No. 11 at 23-25. A treating physician's medical opinion as to the nature and severity of an individual's impairment is entitled to controlling weight when that opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See, e.g., Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001). The opinion of a treating physician is not necessarily conclusive as to the existence of an impairment or the ultimate issue of a claimant's disability. See, e.g., Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). When the opinion of a treating physician is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may reject the opinion of the treating physician by articulating specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 957. The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ provided insufficient reason for relying on Dr. McKay's opinion over Dr. Shon's opinion. Docket No. 11 at 23-25. The Commissioner disagrees. In particular, the Commissioner contends that the record supports the ALJ's findings that Dr. Shon relied on Plaintiff's subject complaints, that his findings were inconsistent with his notes, and that his findings were inconsistent with the medical record as a whole. See Docket No. 16 at 4-5, 6-11. As such, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ did not err in relying instead on the opinion of Dr. McKay. See id.

The Commissioner has the better argument. The ALJ discounted the opinion of Dr. Shon because (1) it relied heavily on the subjective complaints report by Plaintiff, while there was also reason to doubt those complaints, and (2) it was inconsistent with the medical record, including Dr. Shon's own notes. A.R. 37. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that these are proper factors for an ALJ to consider. E.g., Morgan v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that an ALJ may properly discount a doctor's opinion premised to a large extent on the claimant's subject complaints, when those allegations have been properly discounted); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the ALJ had "clear and convincing" reason to discredit treating doctor's opinion when it contradicted the doctor's clinical notes). Moreover, substantial evidence exists in the record supporting those findings. As to Plaintiff's subjective complaints of disability, the ALJ found her testimony to be not entirely credible, A.R. 37, a finding that is not challenged on appeal. Moreover, Dr. McKay stated that Plaintiff's complaints seemed exaggerated. A.R. 340. There is also substantial evidence with respect to the inconsistency between Dr. Shon's opinion and the medical record. For example, Dr. Shon's notes show relatively normal mental status exam findings. E.g., A.R. 366.

In short, the ALJ articulated specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in discounting the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician. It was not error to do so.

IV. CONCLUSION

Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny disability benefits is limited to determining whether the decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence. It is the ALJ's responsibility to make findings of fact, draw reasonable inferences from the record, and resolve conflicts in the evidence including differences of opinion. Having reviewed the Administrative Record as a whole and weighed the evidence that supports and detracts from the conclusion, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and the ALJ did not commit legal error.

Based on the forgoing, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Reversal and/or Remand (Docket No. 11) be DENIED and that Defendant's Cross-Motion to Affirm (Docket No. 16) be GRANTED.