STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 15, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 24, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between May 15, 2014 and July 24, 2014, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form including approximately 63 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant has just concluded a lengthy four co-defendant homicide jury trial in Department 29 of the Sacramento County Superior Court in the case of People v. Alvarez, et al., Case Number 11F02295. As of today, the jury is still deliberating. This case was initially assigned out for motions in limine on January 15, 2014. Evidentiary hearings on the motions were held and jury selection then commenced on February 25, 2014. While defense counsel has begun his defense preparation on behalf of Defendant Porras, additional time is needed to further review the reports, conduct further investigation and legal research inasmuch as this prosecution stems from the now dismissed state court prosecution, People v. Jose Robert Porras, Sacramento County Superior Court Case Number 13F06023.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 15, 2014 to July 24, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.