STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS & ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, Assistant United States Attorney Samuel Wong and defendant NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS by and through his counsel of record Edward M. Robinson, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous Order, this matter was set for status on Friday, September 9, 2016 at 9:00 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference and change of plea for defendant NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS only to Friday, September 16, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude the time period between the date of this stipulation, September 6, 2016, and the proposed new status conference hearing date, September 16, 2016, from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find and Order the following:

a. Counsel for defendant NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS requires additional time to allow continuity of counsel due to personal conflict.

b. Counsel for NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS has separately filed with this Court the executed plea agreement.

c. Counsel, most importantly requires additional time prior to a status conference, to further meet and confer with NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS with respect to the preparation of a position in an effort to persuade the Court to allow NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENGAS to remain on bail pending sentencing.

d. Counsel for defendant NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. The government does not object to the continuance.

f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from the date of this stipulation, September 6, 2016, to and including the date of the proposed new status hearing and change of plea date to September 16, 2016, shall be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of all parties, it is ordered that the September 9, 2016, status conference and change of plea hearing for NEMESSIS ROSENDO VENEGAS only be continued to September 16, at 9:00 a.m. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defendant VENEGAS continuity of counsel and defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from the parties' stipulation, on September 6, 2016, up to and including the September 16, 2016, status conference and change of plea hearing shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defendant VENEGAS continuity of counsel and defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.