LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on January 14, 2019. The parties now stipulate to continue the sentencing hearing until February 25, 2019.
Defendant Javier Alonso Beltran pled guilty on October 9, 2018, to two counts of use, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which carried a mandatory minimum of 32 years of imprisonment: a seven year sentence for the first count and a mandatory twenty-five year sentence for the second count. (Dkt. 24, Plea Agreement.) As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that at sentencing they would jointly recommend that Beltran be sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 32 years in prison. (Id. at ¶ VI.B.)
On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act was signed into law. The First Step Act eliminates "stacking" of Section 924(c) charges, so that the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence applies only if a defendant has previously been convicted of and sentenced for a Section 924(c) offense:
First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403 (2018), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/756/text#toc-idd0e1582d312d4fb88da458f8ff5b3f39.
This change applies to anyone sentenced after the enactment of the First Step Act, even if the defendant committed the conduct prior to the First Step Act. Id. at § 403(b). Therefore, under the provisions of the First Step Act, Beltran's mandatory minimum sentence is no longer 32 years, as the parties contemplated in the plea agreement.
The parties request additional time to discuss a further resolution in this matter and for counsel for Beltran to discuss this change in law with his client and any additional issues that will now arise given the new state of the law. The parties therefore request that the Court continue sentencing until February 19, 2019, at 8:30 a.m.
For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 14, 2019 to February 19, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
So found.
IT IS SO ORDERED.