Filed: Apr. 24, 2013
Latest Update: Apr. 24, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (PROPOSED) FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, DERICK NOBLE, and JONATHAN GONZALEZ, by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 29, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 2
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (PROPOSED) FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge. Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, DERICK NOBLE, and JONATHAN GONZALEZ, by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 29, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 20..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (PROPOSED) FINDINGS AND ORDER
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, DERICK NOBLE, and JONATHAN GONZALEZ, by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 29, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 20, 2013, and to exclude time between April 29, 2013 and May 20, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients regarding a resolution to this case.
b. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 29, 2013, to May 20, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Date: 4-24-13 By:/s/ Jill Thomas
Authorized to sign for Ms. Thomas
On April 24, 2013
Jill Thomas
Assistant U.S. Attorney
IT IS SO ORDERED.
