Filed: May 01, 2013
Latest Update: May 01, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, Luis Figueroa Alcazar, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 2, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 30, 2013, and t
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, Luis Figueroa Alcazar, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 2, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 30, 2013, and to..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, Luis Figueroa Alcazar, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 2, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 30, 2013, and to exclude time between May 2, 2013 and May 30, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties represent that defendant would like the continuance in order to enter a plea.
b. Counsel for the defendant desire additional time to consult with his client to discuss the entry of plea.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 2, 2013 to May 30, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Respectfully submitted,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
