MAXINE M. CHESNEY, District Judge.
The instant case arises from petitioner's conviction and death sentence for the first degree murders of Ellen Hansen ("Hansen") and Heather Scaggs ("Scaggs"), the attempted murder of Steven Haertle, the attempted rape of Hansen, and the rape of Scaggs. See People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal.4th 312 (1997). The crimes were committed in Santa Cruz County and, following a change of venue, the case was tried in Los Angeles County.
Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on December 24, 1996; the petition was denied by the California Supreme Court on May 27, 1998. Prior to the denial of his state habeas petition, petitioner filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California a request for appointment of federal habeas counsel and a motion for change of venue. On June 12, 1998, petitioner's venue motion was granted, and the instant habeas case was transferred to the Northern District.
Pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), petitioner's federal habeas petition was due by May 27, 1999. The Court, however, granted petitioner's motion to equitably toll the running of the limitations period for five months, to and including October 27, 1999. See Order Denying Motion to Vacate and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Equitable Tolling at 38.
Respondent subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition, which primarily asserted procedural grounds that, respondent argued, supported dismissal of at least certain portions of petitioner's First Amended Petition. The Court thereafter addressed, in a series of orders, each of those procedural issues. See, e.g. Carpenter v. Ayers, 548 F.Supp.2d 736 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
In 2008, based on allegations in the First Amended Petition and the applicable law, the Court issued an order requiring petitioner's competency be determined in a timely manner, pursuant to Rohan ex. rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 817 (9
The parties subsequently met and conferred, and agreed to a briefing schedule to address the remainder of petitioner's claims. The schedule also separated the claims into nine separate groups. This briefing schedule was later amended by this Court. An earlier Order denied Group I Claims 42, 43, 46, 59, 62 and 63. This Order addresses Group II Claims 49, 50, 51, 52, 54 and 55.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this Court should not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).
The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of section 2254(d) have separate and distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established United States Supreme Court law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 413-414. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of United States Supreme Court law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 414. In Harrington v. Richter, the Court further stresses that "`an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'" 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)).
"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "While the `objectively unreasonable' standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a great[] degree of deference to the state courts." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9
Holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Clark, 331 F.3d at 1070. A state court's decision need not cite to, and a state court need not be aware of federal law to pass muster under AEDPA; rather, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [federal law]", the decision may be upheld. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
When a federal court is presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, the court has no basis other than the record "for knowing whether the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle or was extending the principle into a new context." Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9
Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of section 2254(d), habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Under this standard, petitioners "may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in `actual prejudice.'" Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 439 (1986)).
In Claim 49, petitioner claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for an order requiring prospective jurors to complete a questionnaire asking for socioeconomic data; by such motion petitioner also sought an order requiring payment of additional jury fees, to limit the number of jurors excused for financial hardship. According to petitioner, the denial of his motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.
The California Supreme Court denied the claim in a reasoned decision on direct appeal, holding the claim lacked merit for the following reasons:
Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
Petitioner fails to show the state court's denial of said claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Petitioner also fails to demonstrate the state court's denial relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Petitioner cites no case or statutory law supporting his assertion that the Sixth Amendment requires the gathering of economic data from a jury pool in order to insure a fair cross-section. Rather, the cases on which petitioner relies are inapposite.
In that regard, petitioner cites to Thiel v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). In Thiel, which concerned a civil suit for damages and not a criminal trial, the court and the jury commissioner testified that they intentionally excluded from the jury lists "all persons who work for a daily wage," a practice the Supreme Court stated could not "be justified by state or federal law." Id. at 221-222. The Supreme Court confirmed, however, "that a federal judge would be justified in excusing a daily wage earner for whom jury service would entail an undue financial hardship." Id. at 224. Here, petitioner does not allege and cannot show that persons of a certain economic status were intentionally and completely excluded; consequently, his reliance on Thiel is unavailing. Petitioner also cites to Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1395-1396 (2010). The purpose of petitioner's citation to Berghuis is unclear, as the Supreme Court held the habeas petitioner therein had not demonstrated there was clearly established precedent supporting his claim that certain factors in jury selection had resulted in the unconstitutional representation of African-Americans in the jury pool. Id. Indeed, Berghuis supports respondent's position that petitioner's claim must be denied. Id. at 1395.
Moreover, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any such alleged error of the trial court was prejudicial to him. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. There is no evidence that, had petitioner's motion requesting a questionnaire on socioeconomic data and/or additional jury fees been granted, the result of petitioner's trial would have been different. Id.
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
In Claim 50, petitioner claims there were numerous errors in the selection of the guilt phase jury that violated his constitutional rights. First, he alleges it was constitutional error to excuse a particular prospective juror for cause. Second, he alleges the denial of two defense challenges for cause violated his constitutional rights. Third, he alleges the refusal to give a cautionary instruction violated his constitutional rights. In particular, petitioner argues, the above-referenced errors were violations of state law, that the state laws in question amounted to a state-created liberty interest protected under the federal Due Process Clause, and that such errors violated his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable process of adjudication. Each said claim will be considered in turn.
Petitioner claims a potential juror, Ignacio Castor ("Castor"), was excused for cause over defense objection, in violation of state law. Castor was excused because of his opposition to the death penalty, and the trial judge did not permit petitioner's counsel to extensively question him before he was excused; according to petitioner, said rulings violated former California Penal Code section 1078. Petitioner also contends the state law at issue amounted to a state-created liberty interest protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The California Supreme Court denied this claim, reasoning as follows:
People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
Petitioner has not shown the state court's reasoned opinion holding there was no error in the removal of Castor is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Petitioner also fails to demonstrate the state court's opinion relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Petitioner argues that, because the state court addressed his claim under state law, this Court is free to address his federal constitutional claims pertaining to Castor's dismissal de novo. In support of his argument, petitioner cites Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 636-641 (9
Petitioner's reliance on Williams, which currently is under review by the Supreme Court, is misplaced. Petitioner's federal constitutional claims of error are based solely on what he alleges is his "state-created liberty interest" under California statutes governing juror dismissal. As the Supreme Court has made clear, not every state law error is, ipso facto, a federal due process violation. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 159 (2009). Rather, errors of state law implicate the federal constitution only if the error "so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law." Estelle v. McQuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 (1991). More importantly, as the California Supreme Court's reasoned opinion confirmed, there was no violation of state law in the dismissal of Castor. A state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). Consequently, petitioner cannot persuasively argue that his federal due process rights were implicated.
Petitioner also states, without explanation, that he is bringing his claim in light of Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 635 (9
Further, petitioner has not shown he suffered any prejudice by reason of any such alleged error on the part of the trial court. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. There is no evidence that if petitioner's counsel had been allowed to further question Castor, the result of petitioner's trial would have been different. See Id.
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
Petitioner claims the trial judge should have dismissed two prospective jurors for cause; instead, they were dismissed after being peremptorily challenged by petitioner's counsel. Petitioner makes no real argument in support of this claim in either his opening or reply brief, opting instead to submit the claim in light of Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 158-159 (2009).
Petitioner cannot demonstrate the state court's rejection of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Rivera offers no support for petitioner's claim, and instead supports respondent's position that the claim must be denied. In Rivera, the Supreme Court cited approvingly to Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86-88 (1988), in which it held the peremptory challenge of a juror that should have been removed for cause did not result in a constitutional violation, because, ultimately, the jury did not include the juror in question and there was no showing that any "member of the jury as finally composed was removable for cause." See Rivera, 556 U.S. at 158. Petitioner's case is no different in that regard.
Further, for similar reasons, petitioner has not demonstrated that any such alleged error was prejudicial to him, as there is no evidence that the result of the trial would have been different had petitioner's challenges for cause been granted. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
Petitioner claims it was constitutional error for the trial judge to refuse to give a cautionary instruction after a prospective juror stated she was terrified and would like to be excused. According to petitioner, lack of a cautionary instruction after the prospective juror's statement violated his right to an impartial jury.
This claim was rejected by the California Supreme Court in its reasoned opinion on direct appeal. In particular, the state court held, the trial court's refusal to give a cautionary instruction to the remaining members of the venire was reasonable because "the juror expressed a generalized fear of sitting in a case such as this, not a specific fear of defendant," Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
Petitioner has not shown the state court's reasoned opinion was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Petitioner also fails to demonstrate that the state court's opinion relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner does not, and indeed cannot, cite to any case establishing he was entitled to a cautionary instruction, nor can petitioner show the alleged error was prejudicial to him. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Petitioner cites to no evidence suggesting the impartiality of the other prospective jurors was compromised by the remark, nor has he shown the result of the trial would have been different had the judge cautioned the remaining prospective jurors.
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
In Claim 51, petitioner claims various errors in the selection of the penalty phase jury violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, petitioner alleges, the trial court both improperly granted eleven prosecution challenges for cause and improperly denied numerous defense challenges for cause.
Petitioner argues it was constitutional error for the trial court to dismiss eleven prospective jurors who were challenged for cause by the prosecution on the basis of their views about the death penalty. The Supreme Court has held that potential jurors may be dismissed for cause if the juror's views on the death penalty "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). This claim was denied by the California Supreme Court in a reasoned opinion on direct appeal. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
To begin with, petitioner contends the views of the prospective jurors were tainted by an instruction from the trial court that he calls a "mandatory sentencing formula." Petitioner previously made a claim regarding the constitutionality of the same instruction, which this Court denied. See Order Denying Group I Claims at 10-12, filed September 28, 2011.
Petitioner argues the trial court further erred when it refused to allow defense counsel to ask the jurors additional questions regarding the above-referenced instruction. As the California Supreme Court concluded, however, the instruction was permissible, and there was no further error because the trial court "merely sustained objections it found misleading or ambiguous" and "did not prevent the defense from effectively pursuing the subject." Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
Petitioner also argues it was error for the California Supreme Court to rely on Wainwright w. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), to review the qualification process used in petitioner's case, when the trial court relied on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Specifically, petitioner challenges the following determination:
Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
In support of such challenge, petitioner points out that Witt liberalized the standard from that articulated in Witherspoon; specifically, a juror who might have been qualified under Witherspoon could properly be excused under Witt. Petitioner, however, can point to no case authority or statutory law calling the state court's analysis into question, and, equally important, petitioner fails to show the trial court erred under either standard. Nor has petitioner shown he suffered any prejudice.
Lastly, petitioner argues that, even if there was no error as discussed above, certain of the jurors challenged by the prosecution should not have been dismissed for cause. The California Supreme Court addressed this claim in its reasoned opinion on direct appeal as follows:
Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th at 358.
Petitioner has not shown the state court's denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor has petitioner shown the state court's opinion relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. All of the subject potential jurors gave answers that were facially disqualifying under the applicable state law. Tellingly, petitioner cites to no federal law in his discussion of this claim.
Accordingly, to the extent this claim is based on prosecution challenges, the claim will be denied.
Petitioner next turns to the defense challenges for cause, arguing there was a lack of "symmetry" as to the parties' respective challenges. According to petitioner, the fact that the trial court upheld a greater number of prosecution challenges for cause than defense challenges for cause violated his due process rights. This claim was addressed and denied by the California Supreme Court, which explained:
Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th at 358-359.
Petitioner has not shown the state court's reasoned denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. None of the jurors that petitioner maintains should have been dismissed for cause served on petitioner's jury. As the Supreme Court has held, the peremptory challenge of a juror that should have been removed for cause does not result in a constitutional violation, where the jury as ultimately constituted does not include the juror in question. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 86-88. Moreover, petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice under Brecht.
Accordingly, to the extent this claim is based on defense challenges, the claim will be denied.
In Claim 52, petitioner claims the trial court's limitation of voir dire and remarks by the trial judge during voir dire deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial and an impartial jury. Each of petitioner's contentions will be considered in turn.
Petitioner first asserts certain limitations on the voir dire of prospective penalty phase jurors violated his constitutional rights. This claim was addressed by the California Supreme Court in its opinion on direct appeal and was denied for the following reasons:
Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
Petitioner has not shown the state court's denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court's opinion relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner cites to no controlling federal authority that compels the result he seeks. Moreover, as the California Supreme Court made clear, petitioner cannot establish he suffered any prejudice as a result of said alleged errors. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. As the state court noted, petitioner had several peremptory challenges remaining when the jury was sworn, and could have used those challenges to excuse any of the prospective jurors. A trial court's failure to strike even a biased juror for cause will not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation so long as the jury that hears the case is impartial. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. The fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated, see id.; Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 1999); rather, a petitioner must establish prejudice, e.g., that the jury as finally constituted was not impartial or that the loss of peremptory challenges forced him to accept a biased juror, see id.
Accordingly, this portion of the claim will be denied.
Petitioner also claims his due process rights were violated because the trial judge was hostile to defense counsel during jury selection. According to petitioner, such alleged hostility evidenced partiality on the judge's part, and prevented the jurors from being impartial. In its reasoned opinion on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court resolved this claim as follows:
Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4
Petitioner has not shown the state court's denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court's opinion relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
A trial judge "`must be ever mindful of the sensitive role [the court] plays in a jury trial and avoid even the appearance of advocacy or partiality.'" Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1974)). At the same time, however, courts have recognized that a trial judge is "more than an umpire." United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989). Generally, it is appropriate for a trial judge to take part where necessary to clarify testimony and assist the jury in understanding the evidence. See id.
Further, given the fact that the judge may question the witness directly, there is nothing improper in a judge, under appropriate circumstances, suggesting a line of questioning to an attorney. United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 513-515 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no judicial bias where record showed trial judge engaged in colloquy with prosecutor about holes in evidence and testimony necessary to fill in gaps, in effort to ensure any motion by defendant for acquittal based on insufficient evidence could be granted based on evidence, not speculation). A trial judge's participation oversteps the bounds of propriety and deprives the parties of a fair trial only when the record discloses actual bias or leaves the reviewing court with an abiding impression that the judge's remarks and questioning projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality. See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Morgan, 376 F.3d at 1008-09 (finding federal district judge's extensive and suggestive examination of witness did not require reversal where other testimony, as well as court's curative instructions, made it highly unlikely that "a substantial right of a defendant was affected").
Under the above-described standard, and given the deference this Court must show the state court's reasoned opinion under AEDPA, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. In that regard, petitioner's reliance in part on Hurles v. Ryan, 650 F.3d 1301, 1309-1311 (9
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
Petitioner claims the presence of the penalty phase jury in the courtroom during the guilt phase of the trial deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. At petitioner's request, the trial court had empanelled separate guilt phase and penalty phase jurors. The trial court, however, overruled petitioner's objection to the presence of the penalty phase jurors in the courtroom during the guilt phase.
Petitioner cannot point to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state court's denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown the state court's denial of the claim relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Significantly, petitioner can point to no case holding, or even suggesting, that the presence of a penalty phase jury at the guilt phase of a capital trial is prejudicial.
Petitioner's reliance on Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75-76 (2006), which did not address the issue at hand, is misplaced. Indeed, Musladin supports respondent's position that petitioner has not demonstrated he is entitled to relief. In Musladin, the habeas petitioner, who was tried for murder, argued the presence of spectators in the courtroom wearing buttons with a photo of the alleged murder victim prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Id. at 72-73. In overturning the appellate court's decision granting Musladin's claim, the Supreme Court stated: "Given the lack of holdings from this Court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators' courtroom conduct of the kind involved here, it cannot be said that the state court `unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.' §2254(d)(1)." Id. at 77. Similarly here, in the absence of Supreme Court authority regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of a separate penalty phase jury's presence during the guilt phase of a capital trial, petitioner cannot demonstrate he is entitled to relief on this claim.
Moreover, even if petitioner had demonstrated error by the trial court, he would not be entitled to relief because he has not shown he was in any manner prejudiced thereby. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
Petitioner contends the presence of the penalty phase jury during closing argument in the guilt phase violated his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty adjudication. As with the preceding claim, petitioner points to no supporting case authority. Further, petitioner again fails to demonstrate prejudice. As noted, petitioner was convicted of multiple murders, attempted murder, rape and attempted rape. Petitioner has made no showing to support a claim that, had the penalty phase jury not been present during the guilt phase closing arguments, it would have returned a more lenient verdict as to his sentence.
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
For the foregoing reasons, Claims 49, 50, 51, 52, 54 and 55 in petitioner's First Amended Petition are hereby DENIED.
