Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MANNHEIMER, Judge.

Lori Jean Phillips appeals the composite sentence of 698 days to serve that she received in the three cases listed above. For the reasons explained in this opinion, Phillips has failed to show that the district court's sentencing decision was clearly mistaken — and we therefore affirm Phillips's sentence.

Underlying facts

In 2005, Phillips was convicted of three offenses under the Anchorage Municipal Code: driving under the influence, refusing to take a breath test, and eluding a police officer.1 She received a composite sentence of 12 days to serve with an additional 198 days suspended, and she was placed on probation for 4 years.

In March 2009, while Phillips was still on probation from this 2005 case, she again drove while under the influence, and she again refused the breath test. Phillips was charged with these two new crimes, and the Municipality petitioned the district court to revoke Phillips's probation from the 2005 case.

Pending her trial, Phillips was released on bail. Among other things, Phillips's conditions of release prohibited her from drinking alcoholic beverages and from driving without a valid driver's license and the necessary vehicle insurance.

A few months later, in November 2009, while Phillips was still on bail release, she again drove while intoxicated. This time, she caused a fatal car crash, and the State of Alaska charged her with second-degree murder and first-degree assault (as well as driving under the influence, driving with a revoked license, and reckless driving).

Based on these new offenses, the Municipality initiated a new criminal case against Phillips, charging her with three counts of violating the conditions of her release.2 The Municipality also filed a new petition to revoke Phillips's probation from the 2005 case.

Phillips went to trial in the State case, and she was convicted of all counts. While awaiting her sentencing in the State case, Phillips pleaded no contest to the charges in her two pending Municipal cases, and she also admitted violating her probation in the 2005 case.

In the DUI/breath-test refusal case from March 2009, the district court sentenced Phillips to consecutive terms of 270 days with 200 days suspended on each count — for a total of 140 days to serve.

In the November 2009 case, where Phillips was charged with three counts of violating the conditions of her release, the district court sentenced Phillips to 180 days to serve for each count, with two of the sentences concurrent and one consecutive, for a total of 360 days to serve.

And with regard to Phillips's violations of her probation from the 2005 case, the district court imposed all 198 days of Phillips's suspended jail time.

Thus, the district court imposed a composite sentence of 1098 days' imprisonment with 400 days suspended — 698 days to serve.

(In her brief to this Court, Phillips contends that she received a lesser composite sentence of 615 days to serve. This is mistaken.)

Phillips's arguments on appeal

Phillips argues that she is being unlawfully subjected to multiple punishments for the same conduct. Specifically, Phillips argues that the district court should not have relied on her new offenses as a basis for revoking her probation from the 2005 case, or as a basis for finding that she violated the conditions of her release in the March 2009 case, because the State of Alaska was separately prosecuting Phillips for these new offenses.

We conclude that these arguments have no merit. Under Alaska law, when a defendant's probation is revoked because the defendant has committed a new crime, any increased sentence imposed in the earlier case is viewed as an amendment of the original sentence for the earlier offense(s) — not as an additional punishment for the defendant's more recent offense. As we explained in Merry v. State, 752 P.2d 472, 475 (Alaska App. 1988), "the fact that one act form[s] the basis for both [a] criminal conviction and [a] probation revocation does not violate [the prohibition against] double jeopardy."3 The same principle applies when a defendant violates their conditions of bail release by committing a new crime.

Phillips also argues that the district court should not have imposed such a lengthy sentence because Phillips had not previously had the benefit of formal (i.e., actively supervised) probation. Phillips points out that misdemeanor probation is normally informal. She asserts that, because she has never been under active probation supervision, it is still possible that her danger to the community might be addressed by measures short of lengthy incarceration — for example, by having her wear an electronic monitor that would check her alcohol consumption.

This is an argument that Phillips's attorney might properly have made to the district court at Phillips's sentencing. But on appeal, our task is to determine whether the sentence imposed by the district court is within the range of reasonable sentences — i.e., whether the district court's sentencing decision is clearly mistaken.4

We note that the conditions of Phillips's pre-trial release in the March 2009 case prohibited her from drinking alcoholic beverages in any amount, and from driving any motor vehicle without the proper license and vehicle insurance. Despite these restrictions, Phillips again drove under the influence in November 2009 (committing the felony offenses that were prosecuted by the State).

Given this record, the district court found that Phillips was a worst offender, and that her new crimes were "the most serious violations of the conditions of release that can occur." The district court could reasonably conclude that electronic monitoring would be insufficient to adequately protect the public from Phillips, and that a lengthy term of incarceration was needed.

Finally, Phillips argues that her composite misdemeanor sentence is excessive. She contends that the district court should not have imposed such a lengthy sentence because it was obvious that Phillips was going to receive a much lengthier sentence when the superior court sentenced her for her felony convictions.

While it may have been obvious that Phillips was going to receive a long term of imprisonment for her felony convictions, Phillips's district court sentencing hearing occurred first, and it would have been completely speculative for the district court to make assumptions about the length and contours of the felony sentence that the superior court might impose. Rather, the length of Phillips's misdemeanor sentences would be a proper subject for Phillips's attorney to address at the later sentencing hearing in the superior court — because Phillips's final composite term of imprisonment could not be known until that time.

To the extent that Phillips means to attack the composite sentence she received for all of her offenses (both her misdemeanor convictions in the district court and her felony convictions in the superior court), we can not resolve that claim here.

When this Court reviews a composite sentence imposed for two or more criminal convictions, we assess whether the combined sentence is clearly mistaken, given the whole of the defendant's conduct and history.5 We do not require that a specific sentence imposed for a particular count or offense be individually justifiable as if that one crime were considered in isolation.6 For this reason, we will not hear a defendant's challenge to the consecutive imposition of sentences unless the defendant has appealed each of the sentences that contributes to the composite total, so that this Court can meaningfully evaluate the whole.7

Accordingly, we will take Phillips's misdemeanor sentences into account when we decide Phillips's sentence appeal in her felony case, but we will not evaluate Phillips's misdemeanor sentences in a vacuum.

The sentencing decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.