This Decision Does Not Create Legal Precedent and May Not Be Cited Except As Authorized By Applicable Rules. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 Memorandum Decision.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BRAMMER, Judge.

¶1 Petitioner Edward de la Cruz seeks review of the trial court's summary denial of his successive petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. After a jury trial, de la Cruz was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a class two felony and dangerous-nature offense. The court found he previously had been convicted of two historical prior felony convictions and sentenced him to a presumptive 15.75-year prison term. We affirmed his conviction and sentences on appeal. State v. de la Cruz, No. 2 CA-CR 2004-0229 (memorandum decision filed Nov. 23, 2005).

¶2 In his first post-conviction relief proceeding, initiated in 2006, de la Cruz alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, and this court denied relief on review. State v. de la Cruz, No. 2 CA-CR 2007-0100-PR (memorandum decision filed Sept. 10, 2007). De la Cruz filed a second Rule 32 notice in October 2007, but the court dismissed the proceeding when he failed to file his petition for post-conviction relief as required by Rule 32.4(c). De la Cruz did not petition this court for review of that dismissal.

¶3 In his third post-conviction relief proceeding, filed in 2010, de la Cruz argued that the state had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing, that the sentence imposed by the trial court was illegal, and that his sentencing and appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise these issues. To avoid a determination that his claims were precluded by his failure to raise them previously, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), he maintained these claims were grounded in newly discovered evidence, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), or a significant change in the law, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) (claims based on Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) not subject to preclusion when notice sets forth specific exception and "the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or in a timely manner"). Apparently referring to Rule 32.1(h), de la Cruz also asserted, in a conclusory fashion, that "this is an `actual innocence' case with newly-discovered evidence" that also "proves trial counsel . . . was ineffective/incompetent," but he failed to identify any of the "exculpatory evidence" he claimed to have discovered that would support this claim. The trial court dismissed de la Cruz's petition, finding each of his claims precluded by his failure to raise them in earlier proceedings. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). This petition for review followed.

¶4 On review, de la Cruz argues the court abused its discretion in dismissing his claims as precluded and asserts seventeen "issues presented for review." Many of these issues are conclusory assertions that either were not decided by the trial court or were unnecessary to its ruling; others pertain to claims not fairly presented in de la Cruz's petition below.1 We will not consider these issues on review.2 See State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (App. 1980) (reviewing court will not consider for first time on review issues not presented to trial court); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii) (petition for review shall contain "[t]he issues which were decided by the trial court . . . which the defendant wishes to present" for review).

¶5 To the extent de la Cruz seeks review of the trial court's determination that his claims are precluded, we find no abuse of discretion. See State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (court's summary denial of post-conviction relief reviewed for abuse of discretion).3 The court clearly identified, thoroughly addressed, and correctly resolved de la Cruz's argument that he had raised non-precluded claims based on "[n]ewly discovered material facts . . . [that] probably would have changed the verdict or sentence," Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), as well as his argument that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), was a "significant change in the law that if determined to apply to [his] case would probably overturn [his] conviction or sentence," Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). Moreover, the court resolved these claims in a manner sufficient to permit this or any other court to conduct a meaningful review, and no purpose would be served by repeating the court's analysis here. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993). Instead, we adopt it.

¶6 Although the trial court did not address de la Cruz's implicit assertion that his claims are not precluded because he is "actual[ly] innocen[t]," see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h), we find no fault with the court's ruling. De la Cruz's veiled reliance on Rule 32.1(h) was far from clear, and he provided no basis for this narrow exception to preclusion, which requires a defendant to "demonstrate[] by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. De la Cruz did not even attempt to identify any such evidence in his petition below and, indeed, appeared only to be challenging his sentence, not his conviction.4

¶7 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.

JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Chief Judge, PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge, Concurring.