ROBIN F. WYNNE, Judge.

This is a property case in which appellants sued the City of Bald Knob, Arkansas, and the lessors of mineral rights to property on which Bald Knob Lake is located. The circuit court granted appellees' motions for summary judgment. Appellants later filed a motion to dismiss their remaining claims with prejudice, which the court denied as moot based on its finding that its previous order and judgment was a final, appealable order disposing of all appellants' claims. We affirm the circuit court's order.

Appellants, Braidy and Leann Varnell and Barth and Amy Grayson, are landowners in White County.1 The property at issue is part of the land that the City of Bald Knob acquired in the late 1950s and early 1960s to create Bald Knob Lake to serve as a source of water for its residents. In 2007, the City of Bald Knob entered into an agreement to lease the oil and gas rights to approximately 419 acres to David H. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc. (Arrington). In April 2009, appellants filed a complaint in White County Circuit Court against the City and Arrington, seeking declaratory judgment. Appellants alleged that the City did not own the mineral rights to the land on which the City created Bald Knob Lake, and they asked the circuit court to quiet title to the oil and gas rights in the respective properties in their favor based on the doctrine of absolute necessity2 and, pursuant to an alleged contract, issue an injunction requiring the City to survey the lake and determine the proper boundary line between the lake and the property surrounding the lake. In June 2009, appellants filed an amended complaint adding Chesapeake Exploration, LLC (Chesapeake), to which Arrington had assigned the oil and gas rights at issue, as a defendant. Appellants also added an alternative claim to ownership under the doctrine of reversion.

Appellants filed a motion for partial summary judgment in December 2009. They asserted that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of ownership of the oil and gas rights in their properties. Appellants attached the following as exhibits to their motion: warranty deeds conveying the property at issue to the City of Bald Knob in 1960; warranty deeds from other landowners conveying property to the City; an application for condemnation of private lands to construct the reservoir and a judgment granting it; a letter from the City's attorney threatening to institute condemnation proceedings against Mrs. Davis if an agreement could not be reached; and quitclaim deeds conveying property to the appellants. The City and Chesapeake both responded and filed motions for summary judgment of their own.3 In their motions for summary judgment, appellees argued that the City owned the property at issue in fee simple absolute by virtue of the warranty deeds, which contained no reservation of the mineral rights.

A hearing was held, and on September 27, 2010, the court entered an order and judgment granting appellees' motions for summary judgment and denying appellants' motion for partial summary judgment. The court found that "[t]he disputed land in this case was not taken by the City of Bald Knob pursuant to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but was, instead, acquired by negotiation and conveyance by Warranty Deed by each of the Plaintiffs' ancestors." Accordingly, the order provided that "the Complaint of Plaintiffs is dismissed with prejudice."

On October 6, 2011, appellants filed a motion to dismiss remaining claims with prejudice. They stated that they wished to dismiss their "two remaining claims with prejudice, i.e., the survey claim and the reversion claim." After a hearing, the court entered an order holding that its September 27, 2010 order and judgment was a final order and denying as moot appellants' motion to dismiss remaining claims. It is from this order that appellants filed their notice of appeal, in which they abandoned any pending but unresolved claims.

First, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in ruling that its September 27, 2010 order and judgment was a final, appealable order. To be final and appealable, a trial court's order, decree, or judgment must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Mueller v. Killam, 295 Ark. 270, 272, 748 S.W.2d 141, 142 (1988). In this case, the trial court found that its September 2010 order and judgment was a final order disposing of all claims. The order states: "The City of Bald Knob is the owner of title to the oil, gas and mineral estate in and to the disputed lands, free and clear of all claims of the Plaintiffs[.]" The order goes on to grant the motions for summary judgment filed by the City and Chesapeake and to dismiss appellants' complaint.

Appellants contend that the September order granting summary judgment was not a final order because it did not discuss their contract and reversion claims. While the order does not expressly name these separate claims, we believe that it nonetheless clearly concluded appellants' rights to the subject matter in controversy. As the City was the owner in fee simple absolute to the disputed land, appellants' claims necessarily failed. Appellants also argue that the court failed to address or dismiss its amended complaint, which added the claim for reversion. This argument fails because the circuit court clearly intended to grant summary judgment on all claims and the reference to the complaint rather than the amended complaint is a mere scrivener's error.

Because we affirm the circuit court's order denying as moot appellants' motion to dismiss their remaining claims, we do not reach their arguments regarding the grant of summary judgment on their claim under the doctrine of absolute necessity. Appellants failed to timely appeal from the order granting summary judgment. See Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 4(a) (2012).

Affirmed.

VAUGHT, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.