ORDER
CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, born on June 3, 1966, applied on June 18, 2010 for SSI, alleging disability beginning October 1, 1999. Administrative Transcript ("AT") 104-110, 125. Plaintiff alleged he was unable to work due to paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, degenerative disc disease, and hepatitis C. AT 129. In a decision dated June 1, 2012, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 9-18. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 18, 2010, the application date.
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: hepatitis C, degenerative disc disease, polysubstance abuse, antisocial personality disorder, and mood disorder.
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined [in the regulations] except he can remember, follow and carry out simple tasks with adequate concentration, persistence and pace. He can relate appropriately to coworkers, supervisors and the public. He can adapt to changes in a routine work setting.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work.
6. The claimant was born on June 3, 1966 and was 44 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed.
7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English.
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work.
9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since June 18, 2010, the date the application was filed.
AT 11-18.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of consultative psychologist Dr. Weesner.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). "The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
ANALYSIS
Consultative psychologist Dr. Weesner examined plaintiff twice. The first time she examined plaintiff was on November 4, 2010. AT 302-307. At that time, she assessed plaintiff's ability to perform simple and repetitive tasks as fair and plaintiff's ability to perform all other work-related activities as poor. AT 307. Dr. Weesner thereafter filed an addendum to her report in which she stated that she was unaware at the time of performing the examination that plaintiff was under the influence of marijuana. AT 311. The second time Dr. Weesner examined plaintiff, on May 5, 2011, she upgraded to "fair" his ability to complete detailed and complex tasks, the ability to accept instructions from a supervisor, and the ability to maintain regular attendance in the work. AT 364-371. She concluded the remaining areas of work related abilities were still poor at the time of the second examination. AT 370. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected these opinions.
The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996).
To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for "clear and convincing" reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected for "specific and legitimate" reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating professional's opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining professional's opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician's conclusory, minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.
The ALJ accorded little weight to the opinion of Dr. Weesner rendered after the first examination because plaintiff engaged in substance abuse at the time of the evaluation and because Dr. Weesner noted that plaintiff "did not appear to respond to questions in an honest and open manner." AT 17, 306, 311. The ALJ concluded these factors seriously undermined the validity of the examination findings. AT 17. The ALJ also noted that both opinions rendered by Dr. Weesner were inconsistent with her own findings in which she found plaintiff had intact social functioning and was cooperative and pleasant. AT 306, 367, 369. The ALJ also discounted Dr. Weesner's assessments that plaintiff had poor work related abilities due to mental impairment because Dr. Weesner assessed relatively high Global Assessment of Functioning scores (GAF) of 55 and 68,2 respectively, indicating plaintiff's condition was mild to moderate. AT 17, 306, 369. The ALJ also concluded the extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Weesner were inconsistent with her conclusion after plaintiff's second examination (performed when plaintiff was not engaged in marijuana use) that plaintiff was not suffering from a major mental disorder. AT 17, 369.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ, in discounting Dr. Weesner's opinions, impermissibly relied on the opinion of another examining psychologist, Dr. Donohue. Although Dr. Donohue's opinion was rendered two years prior to Dr. Weesner's first examination, the ALJ appropriately assigned great weight to Dr. Donohue's opinion. Plaintiff alleged disability beginning October 1, 1999. The ALJ recognized that because plaintiff had applied for SSI, disability payments could not be made prior to the month following the month in which the application was filed (June 2010). AT 9. However, consistent with the regulations, the ALJ appropriately considered plaintiff's complete medical history, which included the consultative examination of Dr. Donohue. AT 9, 16, 253-256. Dr. Donohue opined that plaintiff could do simple tasks but would have difficulty with detailed or complex tasks and might have stress in work or work-like situations.3 AT 256. The ALJ accorded significant weight to Dr. Donohue's opinion because it was consistent with the overall medical record and plaintiff's own reported daily activities. AT 16, 35-39 (plaintiff testified to a wide variety of daily activities and engaging in social activities with friends and family), 236 (plaintiff denied having mental health problems in report to treating nurse in June, 2008), 261 (plaintiff reported no history of mental illness in February, 2009), 267 (screening at California Department of Corrections in February, 2009 indicated no mental illness), 269 (plaintiff seen by D. Hardcastle, Ph.D. who reported "inmate and myself have no idea why he is here . . . [plaintiff] adamantly states `I don't need any mental health treatment!'"), 268 (no mental health symptoms while plaintiff was not taking methamphetamines while incarcerated in April 2009), 379-381 (mental status exam in February 2011 indicated mild impairments with some moderate impairments in flow of thought and severe impairments in concentration and memory), 389 (evaluator in March 2011 concluded plaintiff had moderate impairment), 455 (plaintiff reported mental health symptoms stopped once he stopped using drugs; plaintiff diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and psychosis secondary to substance abuse).4 Viewing the record as a whole, the reasons set forth by the ALJ for according little weight to the opinions of Dr. Weesner are specific and legitimate and supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12) is denied;
2. The Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is granted; and
3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.
