ORDER

DALE A. DROZD, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiff's fully briefed motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA").

Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of a final administrative decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On September 16, 2013, following the filing of a motion for summary judgment by plaintiff and a cross-motion for summary judgment by defendant, the court granted plaintiff's motion, reversed the decision of the Commissioner and remanded the action for further proceedings.

On December 11, 2013, plaintiff filed her motion for attorney's fees. (Dkt. No. 21.) On December 23, 2013, defendant filed a statement opposing plaintiff's motion, (Dkt. No. 22), and on December 30, 2013, plaintiff filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 23.) In the reply, plaintiff's attorneys updates their fee request to reflect that they are seeking a total on award of $8,239.10 based on 44.7 hours of attorney time expended on this action. (Id. at 10.1)

The EAJA provides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). See also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). "It is the government's burden to show that its position was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust." Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)

A "party" under the EAJA is defined as including "an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The term "fees and other expenses" includes "reasonable attorney fees." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). "The statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the prevailing party to the extent that the party `unduly and unreasonably protracted' the final resolution of the case." Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(C) & 2412(d)(2)(D)).

A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) ("No holding of this Court has ever denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) . . ., which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff."). "An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded." Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257.

Here, the court finds that plaintiff is the prevailing party. In addition, the court finds that plaintiff did not unduly delay this litigation, and that her net worth did not exceed two million dollars when this action was filed. (Dkt. No. 3.)

In opposing plaintiff's pending motion defendant argues that the position taken by the government in this action was substantially justified. (Def.'s Opp.'n (Dkt. No. 22) at 3.) However, in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court found that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician. (Dkt. No. 18 at 6.) In doing so the court noted that the ALJ offered two reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion. First, the ALJ found that the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician was not consistent with plaintiff's course of treatment because that treatment had been allegedly "conservative." (Id. at 5.) This reason, as stated by the ALJ, however, was found by the court to be "vague and conclusory." (Id. at 6.)

The other reason offered by the ALJ for rejecting the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician was the ALJ's finding that the opinion was purportedly "without substantial support from the other evidence of record. . . ." (Id. at 5.) However, as noted by the court in the September 16, 2013 order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,

(Id. at 6) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, the ALJ failed to set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the treating physician's, were correct. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The ALJ must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary support for his interpretation of the medical evidence."); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Broad and vague" reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion do not suffice).

Accordingly, having found that the only two reasons offered by the ALJ for rejecting the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician were flawed, the court found that the ALJ rejected the opinion of a treating physician without a legitimate basis for doing so. In arguing that the government's position was, nonetheless, substantially justified, the defendant pours over the administrative record offering potential reasons that could have supported the ALJ's decision. (Def.'s Opp.'n (Dkt. No. 22) at 4-7.) It is well established, however, that the court is required "to review the ALJ's decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ-not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking." Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009). Rather, the Commissioner's decision "must stand or fall with the reasons set forth in the ALJ's decision, as adopted by the Appeals Council." Barbato v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 923 F.Supp. 1273, 1276 n. 2 (C.D. Cal. 1996). See also Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e are wary of speculating about the basis of the ALJ's conclusion. . . .")

Accordingly, the court also finds that the position of the government was not substantially justified. See Campbell v. Astrue, 736 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[T]his circuit has been clear that when an agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence it is a strong indication that the position of the United States is not substantially justified."); Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (position of the government "includes both the government's litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise to the civil action."); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Indeed, it will be only a decidedly unusual case in which there is substantial justification under the EAJA even though the agency's decision was reversed as lacking in reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record."); Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) ("While the government's defense on appeal of an ALJ's procedural error does not automatically require a finding that the government's position was not substantially justified, the defense of basic and fundamental errors such as the ones in the present case is difficult to justify.").

The EAJA expressly provides for an award of "reasonable" attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)A). Under the EAJA, hourly rates for attorney fees have been capped at $125.00 since 1996, but district courts are permitted to adjust the rate to compensate for an increase in the cost of living.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2001); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998). Determining a reasonable fee "`requires more inquiry by a district court than finding the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.'" Atkins, 154 F.3d at 988 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (internal citations omitted)). The district court must consider "`the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.'" Id. at 989 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437).

Here, plaintiff's attorney obtained an order for a new hearing despite defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. Moreover, after carefully reviewing the record and the pending motion, the court finds the claimed 44.7 hours, while admittedly on the high end of the spectrum, to be a reasonable amount of attorney time to have expended on this matter and the court declines to conduct a line-by-line analysis of counsel's billing entries. See, e.g., Stewart v. Sullivan, 810 F.Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw. 1993); Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-03088 KJN, 2011 WL 4383636, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011); Destefano v. Astrue, No. 05-CV-3534, 2008 WL 623197, *4 (E.D. N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008). While the issues presented in this case may have been straightforward, 44.7 hours can be fairly characterized as well within the limit of what would be considered a reasonable amount of time spent on this action when compared to the time devoted to similar tasks by counsel in like social security appeals coming before this court. See Boulanger v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0849 DAD, 2011 WL 4971890, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (finding 58 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); Watkins v. Astrue, No. CIV S-06-1895 DAD, 2011 WL 4889190, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) (finding 62 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-03088 KJN, 2011 WL 4383636, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding 62.1 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); Dean v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0529 DAD, 2009 WL 800174, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009) (finding 41 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); see also Costa v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Many district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in social security cases."); cf. Costa v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) ("District courts may not apply de facto caps limiting the number of hours attorneys can reasonably expend on `routine' social security cases.").

Finally, plaintiff's motion includes a request that any EAJA fees awarded be paid directly to plaintiff's attorney. However, an attorney fee award under the EAJA is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a government offset to satisfy any pre-existing debt owed to the United States by the claimant. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592-93 (2010).

Subsequent to the decision in Ratliff, some courts have ordered payment of the award of EAJA fees directly to plaintiff's counsel pursuant to plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees, provided that the plaintiff has no debt that requires offset. See Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV 08-1454 EFB, 2011 WL 1077765, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011); Dorrell v. Astrue, No. CIV 09-0112 EFB, 2011 WL 976484, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); Calderon v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-01015 GSA, 2010 WL 4295583, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010); Castaneda v. Astrue, No. EDCV 09-1850-OP, 2010 WL 2850778, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). Similarly, in recently submitted stipulations and proposed orders for the award of attorney fees under the EAJA, the parties have stipulated that, if plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, the government will consider the plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees and expenses to plaintiff's attorney and shall honor the assignment by making the fees and expenses payable directly to counsel. The court will incorporate such a provision in this order.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Dkt. No. 21) is granted;

2. Plaintiff is awarded $8,239.10 in attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); and

3. Defendant shall determine whether plaintiff's EAJA attorneys' fees are subject to any offset permitted under the United States Department of the Treasury's Offset Program and, if the fees are not subject to an offset, shall honor plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees and shall cause the payment of fees to be made directly to plaintiff's counsel pursuant to the assignment executed by plaintiff.