ANTHONY ISHII, District Judge.
This case deals with various orders issued by Fresno County Superior Court judges in an on-going state court matter. The only causes of action are for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
From the Complaint, Plaintiffs Schulte and CMLS were in litigation with Dwight Long ("Long") regarding claims of embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty, and defamation. Margarett Wilkins is the sole owner of CMLS, but was not initially named as a party to the case (she was added, however, as a Defendant by Long in October 2008). Defendant Judge Franson was the judge presiding over the case. In July 2008, Long apparently obtained injunctive orders from Judge Franson that purported to maintain the status quo with respect to the operations of CMLS and a related entity, Bay Development Group ("Bay"). In August 2008, Long obtained a modification of the July 2008 Order. The August 2008 Order gave Long full authority to pay Bay's venders, and also stated that "CMLS and Bay will continue to operate as historically." Schulte contends that the July 2008 Order and the August 2008 Order (collectively "Injunctive Orders") are fatally ambiguous.
On September 3, 2008, Long filed a motion for contempt based on violations of the Injunctive Orders. On September 4, 2008, Judge Franson issued an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") based on the contempt motion. There was no arraignment and Schulte was not advised of his rights. Further, the OSC for contempt was never personally served on Schulte in violation of California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") § 1016 until after the contempt trial started.
After the OSC had been issued, Schulte discovered that Judge Franson had personally sued Schulte 10 years prior, and had alleged that Schulte was "malicious." Upon discovering this information, Schulte filed a verified statement of disqualification that alleged that Judge Franson was biased against Schulte based on the prior lawsuit.
Judge Franson did not properly object to the statement of disqualification and instead recused himself.
Prior to Judge Franson's recusal, Long had filed another contempt motion for violation of the Injunctive Orders. On July 2, 2009, Judge Corona issued a second OSC, but Schulte was never personally served or arraigned.
Around June 2009, Judge Corona began the contempt hearing on the first and second OSC's. As the contempt hearing proceeded, Long filed other motions for contempt against Schulte. In an ex parte hearing without Schulte's attendance, Judge Corona issued a third OSC for contempt. Schulte was never personally served with, or arraigned on, the third OSC.
The next day, Long requested a fourth contempt OSC. CMLS then filed a motion for disqualification of Judge Corona. Later, Judge Carona recused himself, but did not issue a fourth contempt OSC. The case was transferred to Defendant Judge Snauffer.
In June 2010, Judge Snauffer began to proceed on the first, second, and third contempt OSC's, and also on Long's fourth request for contempt, even though no OSC had issued for that request. Judge Snauffer combined all of the contempt allegations into one trial. In the trial, Schulte argued inter alia that his rights were repeatedly violated. Judge Snauffer refused to consider arguments on the orders issued by Judge Franson, including that the orders were void as being issued by a disqualified judge, ambiguity, and Long committed fraud on Judge Franson. Judge Snauffer also refused to consider Schulte's arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction and refused to allow Schulte to call and/or question witnesses against him, even though those witnesses had presented testimony against Schulte and had been subpoenaed.
On October 22, 2010, Judge Snauffer issued his ruling. Judge Snauffer did not find Schulte to be in contempt of the first, second, or fourth OSC orders. Judge Snauffer did find Schulte in contempt of all allegations in the third OSC, and also found Schulte violated a twelfth contempt charge, even though there had never been any allegations made regarding a twelfth charge. The twelfth charge was simply "made up." Judge Snauffer ordered Schulte to pay $500 to the Fresno County Superior Court and awarded Long $68,000 in attorney's fees.
Currently, the Injunctive Orders' ambiguity has led the Superior Court in a related matter to attempt to infringe on Wilkins's right to her company and CMLS's right to counsel.
On October 20, 2011, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. On March 26, 2012, per stipulation and order, Plaintiffs' only claim for damages, specifically ¶ 72 of the complaint, was dropped. Instead of damages, Plaintiffs pray that this Court grant them declaratory relief on nine separate issues.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)allows for a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.
Plaintiffs have named the Fresno County Superior Court as a Defendant. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State or its agencies for all types of relief, regardless of the nature of the relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state to be sued.
The Complaint seeks only declaratory relief. Although Judge Franson did issue the Injunctive Orders, he recused himself from Plaintiffs' case, appears to have had nothing to do with Plaintiffs' case after the recusal, and most importantly, is no longer a judge on the Fresno County Superior Court. If Judge Franson is no longer a Superior Court judge, then he has no interest in, or influence on, this litigation.
Plaintiffs' opposition explains that they fear Judge Franson will somehow interfere with Plaintiffs' case in an appellate capacity. However, that is nothing more than unfounded speculation. If Judge Franson as a Superior Court judge already recused himself once, without even answering Plaintiffs' recusal motion, then there is no reason whatsoever to think that he would not again recuse himself as an appellate judge. Further, there is nothing to suggest that the justices of the Fifth District Court of Appeal would tolerate or condone an attempt of any kind by Judge Franson to influence the review of a lower court case over which he once presided and had previously recused himself. There is no basis to conclude or believe that Judge Franson will ever have anything more to do with Plaintiffs' case.
Accordingly, declaratory relief against Judge Franson is no longer available, and Plaintiffs' claims against him are moot.
Defendants argue, inter alia, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in this case. Plaintiffs were parties to the underlying state court action, and have sued the individual judges who presided over those proceedings. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the underlying judicial determinations, or to declare the state court orders unenforceable.
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The superior court judges are state officials and treated as arms of the state who are entitled to immunity. The only claims in this case involve conduct that can only be performed by a judge acting in an official judicial capacity. Thus, all claims should be dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Defendants also argue that Courts have consistently held that States and their agencies or officers are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, because the Superior Court and the judges are agents of California, they are not persons under § 1983.
Defendants also argue that the judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Judicial immunity applies when the conduct at issue is judicial in nature and is performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Here, the orders at issue are judicial acts. Further, the acts as alleged amount to an abuse of the power to issue orders. They do not reflect the absence of all jurisdiction. Thus, the judges are entitled to judicial immunity.
Defendants also argue that, assuming on-going state proceedings, Younger abstention is appropriate. The state has a vital interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial system so that its orders and judgment are not rendered void. Further, Plaintiffs are not barred from raising their claims in state court. If they believe that Jude Snauffer or Franson erred, they can file an appeal or a writ petition in the state system. Finally, granting Plaintiffs the requested declaratory relief would void a court order and dictate the future course of the state proceeding.
Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because only one of the nine requests for declaratory relief seeks relief from the contempt order. Defendants do not discuss the remaining eight requests. As to the one request that is challenged by Defendants, the parties in the state court action and the federal action are not the same. Further, the remaining eight requests do not involve final orders, but instead are part of an on-going case. Rooker-Feldman does not apply if the state court proceedings have not ended.
Plaintiffs argue that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply because the Complaint no longer contains any claims for money damages. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply if the federal case seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief and is aimed at state officers acting in their official capacities.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Defendants are "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As long as no money damages are sought, a state official is a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs also argue that Younger abstention is inappropriate. While this case is still pending in state court, the state interest involved here is not similar to Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 2004) because the constitutionality of a state law is not implicated. Further, there are a number of bars to litigating the federal claims in state court — there is no appeal right on a contempt ruling, judicial bias acts as a bar, the superior court continues to unconstitutionally apply the Injunctive Orders, Judge Franson now sits in charge of appeals and/or writs on this case, and there are other procedural issues that prevent the issues from being presented in the superior court.
Plaintiffs pray for the Court to issue the following declarations: (1) Judge Franson's Injunctive Orders are void because he was disqualified for cause; (2) the Injunctive Orders are unenforceable against Margarett Wilkins since she was not a party when the Injunctive Orders were issued; (3) the Injunctive Orders are unenforceable against Wilkins and/or CMLS because the orders are ambiguous; (4) Wilkins, as the sole owner of CMLS, has the right to choose counsel for CMLS; (5) CMLS has been shut down by the actions of Wilkins because Wilkins's actions were done prior to the Injunctive Orders; (6) the Injunctive Orders are unenforceable against Schulte because they are ambiguous; (7) the Snauffer award of attorney's fees on the contempt ruling is a violation of Schulte's liberty and property interests; (8) the Snauffer contempt ruling is invalid due to multiple violations of Schulte's constitutional rights; and (9) the Snauffer contempt ruling on the twelfth charge is invalid because that charge was not the basis of an allegation, a hearing, or an OSC. Plaintiffs contend that these declarations are necessary to protect their constitutional rights to due process, and that to allow continued enforcement of the various orders and rulings would result in constitutional violations.
"Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny, a federal court should abstain from hearing a case that would interfere with ongoing state proceedings."
"Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, may not serve as appellate tribunals to review errors allegedly committed by state courts."
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars suits "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."
Judge Snauffer's arguments that he is entitled to various immunities are not persuasive. Since Plaintiffs are seeking prospective declaratory relief, neither judicial immunity nor Eleventh Amendment immunity apply.
It appears to the Court that the requirements for Younger abstention have been met.
First, there is an on-going state proceeding. Plaintiffs essentially concede that this element is met.
Second, important state interests are implicated. States have significant interests in enforcing court orders and judgments, as well as in preserving their judicial schemes.
Third, the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise the Plaintiffs' federal constitutional concerns. This Younger element requires "the absence of `procedural bars' to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings."
With respect to the Injunctive Orders, it appears that each of the arguments made against those orders in this Court were also raised before Judge Snauffer. Although the arguments were rejected or not considered by Judge Snauffer, Plaintiffs have not shown that they were procedurally barred from making their arguments. More importantly, as indicated above, California law permits direct appeals of orders that grant injunctions and orders that decline to dissolve injunctions, and also permits review of injunctions through a writ of mandate.
Plaintiffs' briefing indicates that there are barriers to litigating their constitutional claims against the Injunctive Orders. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that "the judicial bias is such that it acts as a bar, that the Superior Court continues to unconstitutionally apply a ruling issued by a disqualified judge, the disqualified judge now sits in charge of appeals and/or writs on this case, and other procedural issues which cannot be addressed . . . in the superior court." Doc. No. 22 at 5:6-11. These arguments are not convincing.
First, as discussed above, Judge Franson no longer sits on the Superior Court and thus, cannot act on the case while it is pending in that court. Also as explained above, nothing indicates that Judge Franson would refuse to recuse himself at the appellate level since he already recused himself at the trial level. Nor is there anything that remotely suggests that the Fifth District Court of Appeal would permit Judge Franson to have any influence over the appellate proceedings. Second, that the Superior Court continues to apply the Injunctive Orders does not speak to Plaintiffs' ability file an appeal under CCP § 904.1(a)(6) or file a writ of mandamus under CCP § 1086, both of which would be heard by the Fifth District Court of Appeal and not the Superior Court. Further, as previously stated, the Complaint indicates that Plaintiffs' contentions against the Injunctive Orders were already raised in the Superior Court, but without success. There is nothing to indicate that Plaintiffs cannot file motions to reconsider or to dissolve or modify the Injunctive Orders. Third, Plaintiffs do not identify the "other procedural issues" that prevent presentation of the constitutional claims in the Superior Court. Without identification of controlling statutory or judicial authority, Plaintiffs cannot overcome the assumption of adequate state procedures. Also, that Plaintiffs believe that they cannot raise their constitutional arguments in the Superior Court does not speak to their ability to raise those arguments in the Fifth District Court of Appeal through either an interlocutory appeal under CCP § 904.1(a)(6) or a writ of mandate under CCP § 1086. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that they are procedurally barred from raising their constitutional arguments against the Injunctive Orders.
As for the contempt order, Plaintiffs make the identical arguments as those regarding the Injunctive Orders, except that Plaintiffs state that there is no appeal available for contempt orders. For the reasons discussed above, arguments relating to the bias of Judge Franson and the unspecified procedural bars are not persuasive. As for the inability to file an appeal of the contempt orders, it appears that Schulte is relying on CCP § 1222 and CCP § 904.1(a)(1). Section 1222 reads: "The judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive." Cal. Code. Civ. Pro. § 1222. Section 904.1(a)(1) reads: "An appeal . .. is to the court of appeal. An appeal . . . may be taken from any of the following: (1) From a judgment, except . . . a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222." Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 904.1(a)(1). Thus, pursuant to statute, a "contemner possesses no right of appeal."
Under California law, review of a "contempt judgment is by extraordinary writ."
Here, Plaintiffs have not addressed their ability to challenge the contempt orders through an extraordinary writ. In the context of an administrative proceeding, the Ninth Circuit has found that use of California's writ of mandate directed to a state court provides an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.
Finally, the declarations requested in this case would have the practical effect of enjoining the state court proceedings. The requested declarations would void the Injunctive Orders and the contempt order, and the Superior Court would be required to reconsider its orders, reevaluate issues that had been previously decided, and conform its conduct to the declarations.
In sum, the elements of Younger abstention are met in this case. Plaintiffs are only seeking declaratory relief. Because monetary relief is not sought, the Court is required to dismiss this case.
As an alternative holding, it appears that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to at least the contempt order. Plaintiff Schulte lost in the Superior Court when he was found in contempt, fined, and ordered to pay attorney's fees. Through this lawsuit, Schulte is directly challenging the propriety and correctness of the contempt order and award of fees. Finally, as quoted above, CCP § 1222 reads: "The judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive." Pursuant to this statute, it would appear that the contempt orders are final.
With respect to the Injunctive Orders, they appear to be non-final, interlocutory orders. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory orders.
The Court is not convinced that the parties have adequately addressed Rooker-Feldman. The parties have not discussed or even cited Mothershed or Doe & Assocs. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to resolve Rooker-Feldman's application or non-application to Plaintiffs' declaratory requests concerning the Injunctive Orders. Because the Court has found that Younger abstention applies, the Court will simply note that application of Rooker-Feldman to the Injunctive Orders claims is not necessarily as straightforward as the parties have implied.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against two state court judges and the Fresno County Superior Court. Dismissal of all claims against the Fresno County Superior Court is appropriate because, as an arm of the state, that court is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Dismissal of all claims against Judge Franson is appropriate because Judge Franson already recused himself once and is no longer a judge on the Superior Court. Finally, dismissal of all claims against Judge Snauffer is appropriate because Younger abstention applies. Alternatively, with respect to the contempt order, Rooker-Feldman deprives this Court of jurisdiction to review Plaintiffs' claims. Due to the application of the Eleventh Amendment, mootness, Younger abstention, and Rooker-Feldman, amendment cannot save the complaint. Dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint will be without leave to amend.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend; and
2. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
