ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Following the clerk's entry of default against them, defendants Noel Barlow-Hust, Amanda Gentry, Sandy Jones, Mark Alan Kubinski, Elisa Sue Magnuson, Cindy McDonald, and Judy Mesick ("the Idaho defendants") moved this court to set aside the entry of default. (Docket No. 30.) The court granted that motion on the condition that the Idaho defendants pay attorney's fees and costs associated with plaintiff's preparation of a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against the Idaho defendants. (Docket No. 56.) The court previously reviewed the legal basis for that ruling (id.) as well as the factual and procedural events that precipitated it (id.). Rather than revisit those issues here, the court turns to the accounting work necessary for the implementation of its order. Specifically, having reviewed plaintiff's Application for Attorney Fees and Costs (Docket No. 62), the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, Hans W. Herb (Docket No. 62-1), and the Idaho defendants' response to plaintiff's application (Docket No. 64), the court addresses the amount of plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the Idaho defendants.

In calculating the amount of an award of attorneys' fees, the court will use a lodestar calculation, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Allen v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 456, 458 (9th Cir. 1995). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, the court may adjust the lodestar figure if various factors overcome the presumption of reasonableness.1 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).

I. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff requests that the court award 56.1 hours of attorneys' fees in connection with the preparation of plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. (Pl.'s Appl. for Att'y Fees & Costs at 2.) The Idaho defendants contend that only 12.1 of those hours ought to be recoverable by plaintiff. (Idaho Defs.' Resp. to Req. for Att'y Fees & Costs ("Defs.' Resp,") at 5.)

A. Scope of Recoverable Hours and Costs

The Idaho defendants argue that though the court granted recovery of fees and costs associated with the plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, plaintiff has speciously requested "all fees and costs associated whatsoever with the default process." (Defs.' Response at 3-4.)

The court's March 19, 2019, order conditioned the setting aside of the Idaho defendants' default on "their payment of attorney's fees and costs associated with the preparation of plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment." (Order at 6.) Neither costs associated with the application of clerk's entry of default, nor other costs associated with the litigation process were contemplated by the order. Accordingly, the court disallows the following billing entries because they are not sufficiently associated with the preparation of plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment:

B. Hours Billed After December 7, 2018

In her opposition to the Idaho defendants' Motion to set aside the default, plaintiff claimed that the Idaho defendants "threw a wrench" in the work she had done on the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment by failing to respond to the summons and complaint and then "at the last minute prior to Plaintiff filing her application [for entry of default judgment]" filing a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default. (Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. to Set Aside Default (Docket No. 42) at 20.) This allegation was belied, however, by Exhibit A to Magnuson's Affidavit, a December 10, 2018, email in which Magnuson tells Herb that defendants will move to set aside entry of default if the plaintiff does not stipulate to setting it aside. (Magnuson Aff. in Supp. of Denial of Pl.'s Req. for Att'y Fees & Costs, Ex. A.) Thus, nearly a month before she filed her Motion for Default Judgment, plaintiff knew, or should have known, that the Idaho defendants planned to move to have the entry of default against them set aside.

It is not clear to the court why plaintiff continued work on her Motion for Entry of Default Judgment once she knew that the Idaho defendants intended to move to have the entry of default against them set aside. Regardless, the court will not force the Idaho defendants to underwrite this choice. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Cantine Rallo, S.p.A., 430 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1095 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Wanger, J.) (conditioning setting aside of default on defendant's payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees associated with the default proceedings, but disallowing those fees and costs incurred after defendant informed plaintiff of its intention to defend). Accordingly, the court disallows all billing entries corresponding to the drafting of the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment which are dated December 11, 2018, or later. Specifically, the following billing entries are disallowed:

C. Allowable Hours

After disregarding the disallowed billing entries, there are 18 hours of billing entries in plaintiff's fee request. The court finds that these entries are properly associated with the preparation of plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and were proximately caused by the Idaho defendants' conduct. As such, plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of fees associated with them.

II. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $600 for her counsel, Hans Herb. To determine the reasonableness of this requested rate, the court will look to "the prevailing market rates in the relevant community," Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), "for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986). In general, "the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits." Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). The burden is on the party seeking fees "to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill experience and reputation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11.

Plaintiff's counsel, Hans Herb, graduated from law school in 1988 and is an experienced attorney.2 Herb concedes that he is not a specialist in civil rights law and states that his requested $600 per-hour rate reflects his lack of expertise in this area.3 (Herb Aff. ¶ 15.) The requested rate does not, however, reflect the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, i.e., the Sacramento region.

A review of recent cases indicates that an hourly rate of $280 per hour is appropriate for a lawyer of Mr. Herb's skill and experience.4 Cf. Deocampo v. Potts, No. 2:06-1283 WBS, 2014 WL 788429 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014)(awarding $280 hourly rate to lawyer with approximately 30 years of experience); Levine v. Sleep Train, Inc., No. 2:15-00002 WBS AC, 2016 WL 4368107 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016)(awarding $260 hourly rate to attorney with 25 years of experience).

Given Mr. Herb's reasonable hourly rate of $280, the lodestar amount is $5,040 ($280/hour x 18 hours). This amount is "presumptively reasonable." See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. Adjustments of the Loadstar Amount

The Idaho defendants advance several arguments as to why the court should adjust the lodestar amount downward. The court will address each in turn.

A. Level of Culpability

In explaining its authority to impose a sanction on the Idaho defendants as a condition of granting their Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default, the court cited Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538 (9th Cir. 1988). In Nilsson, the court conditioned the setting aside default against a defendant who "followed a deliberate, willful, studied course of frustrating plaintiff's attempts at discovery, complicating proceedings, and ignoring court orders" on the payment of a sanction. Id. at 1547.

The Idaho defendants now argue that because the conduct that earned them this sanction is not so bad as that at issue in Nilsson, the loadstar figure used to calculate plaintiff's award should be adjusted downward. The fact that the conduct at issue here may be less egregious than that at issue in other cases is not significant. The court has already determined that because the Idaho defendants created needless work for both plaintiff and the court by failing to respond to the summons and complaint, a sanction is appropriate in this case. (Docket No. 56). The inconvenience imposed upon the court and opposing counsel is not dependent upon the degree of culpability of the defendants. The court thus declines to excuse the defendants from paying the fee award in its entirety simply because defendants' conduct may not have been as egregious as the conduct at issue in other cases.

B. Relationship Between Plaintiff and Her Counsel

Plaintiff and her counsel have known each other for 30 years and have previously worked together. (Herb Aff. (Docket 62-1) ¶¶ 3-4.) The Idaho defendants argue that in light of this extended professional relationship, and the possibility that plaintiff's counsel is handling plaintiff's case pro bono or at a highly reduced rate, the court should reduce the loadstar amount. Defendants are correct that courts may consider "the nature and length of the [attorney's] professional relationship with the client" in determining reasonable attorney's fees. Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. In the instant case, however, a reduction in the loadstar is not warranted. Any discounts or savings plaintiff may receive because of her long-term professional relationship with Mr. Herb should not work to the benefit of defendants' attorneys. (Herb Aff. ¶¶ 16-18.)

III. Costs

Plaintiff requests an award of $278.24 in costs: a $152.50 fee for the transcription of the February 19, 2019, hearing on the Idaho defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default; $117.74 for her counsel's travel to the February 19, 2019, hearing; and $8 in parking costs associated with her counsel's appearance at the February 19, 2019, hearing.

Like the attorney's fees associated with her counsel's appearance at the hearing on the Idaho defendants' Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default, these costs are not directly associated with the preparation of the Entry for Default Judgment. As such, they are outside the scope of the award made to plaintiff. (See Docket No. 56.) Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff's request for costs.

IV. Service of Process Argument

In their response, the Idaho defendants argue that the sanction is inappropriate because they were not properly served until February, 2019. Without making any finding as to the adequacy of the service made on the Idaho defendants in their official capacity, the court finds that the Idaho defendants were properly before the court in their individual capacities. (See Docket Nos. 13-19.) This argument against the fee award is accordingly unavailing.5

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Idaho defendants, as sued in their individual capacities, shall, within 30 days, pay plaintiff $5,040 in attorney's fees associated with the preparation of her Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. Upon their timely and complete compliance with this Order, the entry of default against them (Docket No. 22) shall be set aside.