Filed: Apr. 25, 2017
Latest Update: Apr. 25, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 11, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 18, 2017, and to exclude time between
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 11, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 18, 2017, and to exclude time between M..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 11, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 18, 2017, and to exclude time between May 11, 2017, and May 18, 2017, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 3,000 pages of discovery consisting of reports, affidavits, bank and business records, and other investigative documents, as well as at least 14 disks comprising audio/visual materials. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time consult with his client, review the current charges and discovery, conduct investigation and research regarding a potential affirmative defense to one of the charges, and to otherwise prepare a defense at trial. The defendant anticipates possible entry of a change of plea at the next hearing date, and requests a one-week continuance to ensure continuity of counsel.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 11, 2017 to May 18, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
