Filed: Nov. 14, 2018
Latest Update: Nov. 14, 2018
Summary: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MICHAEL GOOLD AND SCOTT JONES'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . In July 2014, Bikers of Lesser Tolerance ("B.O.L.T.") and individual motorcyclists (collectively, "Plaintiffs") sued the City of Rancho Cordova ("the City") and police officers (collectively, "Defendants") for violating their Fourth Amendment rights by citing and arresting motorcyclists for violating California's helmet law. Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 31. The Court granted Defen
Summary: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MICHAEL GOOLD AND SCOTT JONES'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . In July 2014, Bikers of Lesser Tolerance ("B.O.L.T.") and individual motorcyclists (collectively, "Plaintiffs") sued the City of Rancho Cordova ("the City") and police officers (collectively, "Defendants") for violating their Fourth Amendment rights by citing and arresting motorcyclists for violating California's helmet law. Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 31. The Court granted Defend..
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MICHAEL GOOLD AND SCOTT JONES'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
In July 2014, Bikers of Lesser Tolerance ("B.O.L.T.") and individual motorcyclists (collectively, "Plaintiffs") sued the City of Rancho Cordova ("the City") and police officers (collectively, "Defendants") for violating their Fourth Amendment rights by citing and arresting motorcyclists for violating California's helmet law. Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 31. The Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Order, ECF No. 89, and Defendants now move for attorney fees, Mot., ECF No. 93, which Plaintiffs oppose, Opp'n, ECF No. 94. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Motion for Attorney Fees.1
I. DISCUSSION
A. Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
In a § 1983 action, a district court has discretion to allow the prevailing party an award of reasonable attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "Authorization for attorneys' fees under § 1988 is different for prevailing defendants in a civil rights action than for prevailing plaintiffs." Legal Servs. of N. Cal., Inc. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 141 (9th Cir. 1997). Prevailing defendants may recover fees only when "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employ't Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). "An action becomes frivolous when the result appears obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit." Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007).
"The strict nature of the Christiansburg standard is premised on the need to avoid undercutting Congress' policy of promoting vigorous prosecution of civil rights violations under . . . § 1983." Miller v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court instructs district courts to avoid post hoc reasoning because "[e]ven when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. "[T]he mere fact that a defendant prevails does not automatically support an award of fees." Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Court does not find that Defendants satisfied the strict standard governing fee awards to prevailing defendants in civil rights cases. Although Plaintiffs' claims were unsuccessful and based on an incorrect interpretation of the law, the Court does not find that they were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 421. Thus, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award attorney's fees to Defendants under § 1988.
II. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.