JAMES V. SELNA, District Judge.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Defendant Elvin Tabah ("Tabah") moves for sanctions against Plaintiffs Jose Garay, APLC and Jose Garay (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), as well as their counsel of record William Caldwell and Tamar Arminak (collectively, "Plaintiffs' counsel"). (Mot. Sanctions, Docket ("Dkt.") No. 43.) Plaintiffs oppose (Opp'n Mot. Sanctions, Dkt. No. 50), and Tabah has replied. (Reply Supp. Mot. Sanctions, Dkt. No. 58.)
For the following reasons, the Court
The facts, circumstances, and allegations in this matter are familiar to the parties and the Court. The claims in this action arose from Tabah's employment by Plaintiffs and Tabah's alleged theft of confidential information during and after his employment. (See generally FAC ¶¶ 19-21, 32-33, 48, Dkt. No. 16.)
In February 2014, Tabah sued Plaintiffs in Orange County Superior Court for various discrimination and harassment claims,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) ("Rule 11"), the "safe harbor rule," requires a party requesting sanctions under Rule 11 to wait 21 days between serving the opposing party and filing the motion with the Court. This allows the offending party an opportunity to correct any error.
"Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify by their signature that (1) they have read the pleadings or motions they file and (2) the pleading or motion is `well-grounded in fact,' has a colorable basis in law, and is not filed for an improper purpose."
Under Rule 11, sanctions may be imposed "when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose."
Tabah moves for sanctions based on Plaintiffs' FAC (Mot. Sanctions 3:28-4:5), which was the operative complaint in this action until the Court dismissed the remaining CFAA claim. (Order re OSC 2-3.)
Because the FAC is the "primary focus" of Tabah's Motion, the Court "must conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine (1) whether the complaint is legally or factually `baseless' from an objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney has conducted `a reasonable and competent inquiry' before signing and filing it."
Because "the mere existence of one non-frivolous claim in a complaint does not immunize it from Rule 11 sanctions,"
Plaintiffs alleged that Tabah violated their copyrighted website. (FAC ¶¶ 36-41.) Although a copyright infringement claim cannot be alleged until the copyright has been preregistered or registered, 17 U.S.C. § 4119(a), Plaintiffs did not allege registration of a copyright for their website in their FAC. Moreover, they admitted in their opposition brief to Tabah's motion to dismiss that they had not registered the copyright until a month after filing the FAC. (Opp'n Mot. Dismiss 12:24-13:15, Dkt. No. 26.)
However, at oral argument, Plaintiffs demonstrated that they withdrew this legally and factually baseless claim within the 21-day safe harbor period.
There are three sets of CFAA claims alleged by Plaintiffs that could warrant Rule 11 sanctions, including: (1) a CFAA violation premised on 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A); (2) a CFAA violation during Tabah's employment, premised on 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(a)(4); and (3) a CFAA violation after Tabah's employment, premised on 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(a)(4). Plaintiffs did not clearly specify in the FAC that they were alleging CFAA claims under these subsections, but did so for the first time in their opposition to Tabah's motion to dismiss. (Opp'n Mot. Dismiss 15:21-24.)
The Court dismissed the first set of CFAA claims because the FAC failed to allege a clear prerequisite for a § 1030(a)(5)(A) claim; namely, that Tabah's alleged actions caused "damage," or "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information," to a protected computer. (See Order re Mot. Dismiss 6); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), 1030(e)(8). Moreover, a published Northern District of California case dismissed a CFAA claim for the same reason.
The Court also dismissed the second set of CFAA claims, which alleged that Tabah violated the CFAA because he accessed Plaintiffs' database for an improper purpose during his employment. (Order re Mot. Dismiss 7-8; FAC ¶¶ 43, 46.) However, the Court held that Ninth Circuit precedent precluded this claim because two cases made clear that a person cannot violate the CFAA by using his authorized access to a computer for an improper purpose. (Order re Mot. Dismiss 7-8;
Plaintiffs' third set of CFAA claims were the only claims the Court did not dismiss pursuant to Tabah's motion to dismiss. (Order re Mot. Dismiss 8-9.) However, subsequent to issuing that order, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the remaining CFAA claim should be dismissed because it was a compulsory cross-complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 426.30. (OSC.) After providing both parties an opportunity to submit briefs on the issue, the Court dismissed the CFAA claim because it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the related state action. (Order re OSC 2-3.) Although the Court eventually dismissed this remaining CFAA claim, there is a difference between the claim having no legal or factual basis and the claim being procedurally defective. This claim clearly falls into the latter category. While the assertion of the third set of claims was erroneous, the Court finds this conduct less culpable, and insufficient to award sanctions.
Therefore, the Court proceeds to the reasonable inquiry analysis only with regards to the first and second sets of CFAA claims.
"The reasonable inquiry test is meant to assist courts in discovering whether an attorney, after conducting an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, would have found the complaint to be well-founded."
As to the second set of CFAA claims, a cursory legal inquiry as to how the Ninth Circuit has interpreted two key terms in the CFAA—specifically "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access"—would have revealed that these allegations lacked any legal basis. (
Without a legal basis or reasonable inquiry as to the first and second sets of CFAA claims, the Court concludes that sanctions are warranted. However, sanctions are not warranted with regards to the third set of CFAA claims.
The Court held that it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the fifteen state law claims in the FAC. (
Additionally, Tabah argues that the fifteen state claims constitute harassment because eleven of the fifteen claims were also alleged in the Plaintiffs' withdrawn cross-complaint in the state action. (Reply Supp. Mot. Sanctions 9;
Because the Court will not analyze the adequacy of the state claims and Plaintiffs' filing of the state claims did not constitute harassment, sanctions are not warranted for the state claims. Thus, no reasonable inquiry analysis is required.
Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(4), the Court may award monetary or nonmonetary sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). If the Court is to award Tabah sanctions, then Plaintiffs request that the Court award only nonmonetary sanctions. (Opp'n Mot. Sanctions 16-18.) Given that the Court has dismissed all the claims in this case and only retains jurisdiction to decide on the instant Motion (Order re Mot. Dismiss 11; Order re OSC 3), it is unclear what nonmonetary sanctions would be sufficient to "deter repetition of the [Plaintiffs'] conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Thus, the Court concludes that monetary sanctions are necessary to carry out the purpose of Rule 11.
The Court is willing to award monetary sanctions in the form of attorney's fees for the time Tabah spent to obtain dismissal of the first and second sets of CFAA claims, including the time spent beyond the instant Motion. Tabah's counsel requests $33,000 in addition to a "to be determined" amount for approximately forty-seven hours he spent on this Motion at a rate of $600 per hour. (Diggs Decl. ¶ 14, Dkt. No. 43.) The Court requires additional documentation of Tabah's fees. More specifically, Tabah must provide further documentation supporting the reasonableness of his counsel's $600 hourly rate. Tabah also must provide a reasonable allocation of the time spent between sanctionable and non-sanctionable claims. In support of his claims, Tabah shall file redacted timesheets within ten (10) days of this Order. Tabah may file the timesheets under seal. Within ten (10) days of Tabah's submission, Plaintiffs may file a response.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that monetary Rule 11 sanctions are warranted for the Plaintiffs' first and second sets of CFAA claims alleged in the FAC, but they are not warranted for the third set of CFAA claims, the copyright infringement claim, or the fifteen state law claims. The Court thus