STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 7, 2016.

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 7, 2016, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between January 7, 2016, and April 7, 2016, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 98 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. The government has also conveyed written plea agreements to each of the defendants. Defense counsel for each defendant needs additional time to review the plea agreements with their clients.

b. Counsel for the defendants desires additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. The parties have conferred and the government has extended offers to the defendants that each will need to consider. Defense counsel for Mr. Voskanyan has also been preparing for USA v. Lee Loomis which is a large real estate fraud and Ponzi scheme trial scheduled to commence on February 8, 2016. This is one reason for why defense counsel for Mr. Voskanyan needs more time to prepare for this case.

c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 7, through April 7, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.