D.P. MARSHALL, Jr., District Judge.
1. On de novo review, the Court adopts the recommendation, No. 19, as supplemented and overrules Robinson's objections, No. 22 & 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
2. The procedural issues muddy the water; but the merits are clear. Robinson has no protectable state or federal liberty interest in early release on parole. No. 19 at 6; see also Pittman v. Gaines, 905 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1990); Hamilton v. Brownlee, 237 F. App'x 114 (8th Cir 2007) (unpublished per curiam). And a parole denial doesn't amount to double punishment. Roach v. Arkansas Board of Pardons and Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). Robinson's due-process and double-jeopardy claims therefore fail.
As for equal protection, the only comparator Robinson specifically identifies is his former co-defendant. No. 1 at 11. But the co-defendant was initially sentenced to probation, while Robinson was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Thus, the two aren't similarly situated under the law. This claim fails too. E.g., Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 2003).
Finally, Robinson's deliberate indifference claim is premised on his being unlawfully imprisoned. No. 1 at 12-13. He's not. This claim therefore fails too; but its dismissal will be without prejudice to Robinson raising it in a § 1983 action.
3. None of Robinson's claims show he's being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). His petition, No. 1, will therefore be dismissed. Because Robinson hasn't made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, no certificate of appealability will issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)-(2).
4. The Court directs the Clerk to correct the docket: No. 22 is a motion for new appointed counsel. No sufficient reason exists for that step. Robinson's motion, No. 22, is denied. Patrick Spivey's motion to withdraw, No. 20, is granted. Spivey is relieved as counsel with the Court's thanks.
So Ordered.