KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.
WHEREAS, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement (the "Joint Motion") and supporting pleadings on August 5, 2014; and
WHEREAS, the Court has reviewed the Joint Motion and supporting pleadings thereto; and
WHEREAS, on August 7, 2014, the Court preliminarily approved of the Settlement Agreement submitted as part of the Joint Motion (the "Settlement"), and ordered that notice of the proposed settlement be disseminated to the Plaintiff Class within thirty days of the August 7, 2014 order; and
WHEREAS, as of September 8, 2014, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) posted the Settlement Notice in all housing units and libraries of each CDCR prison.
WHEREAS the August 7, 2014 Order required that any objections to the Settlement be sent to the Court and postmarked by November 7, 2014, and the Court did not receive any objections to the Settlement.
WHEREAS, on December 8, 2014, this matter came before the Court for hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and the Order of this Court dated August 7, 2014, to consider final approval of the proposed settlement set forth in the parties Joint Motion, with no objectors appearing at the hearing;
WHEREAS, on January 16, 2015, the Court approved a modified notice to the class and ordered it posted not later than January 22, 2015 in all inpatient mental health units operated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Department of State Hospitals in which class members may be housed;
WHEREAS, on January 22, 2015, counsel for Defendants filed certification that the January 16, 2015 Order had been complied with; and
WHEREAS, due and adequate notice having been given to the Plaintiff Class defined below as required by the Court's August 7, 2014 and January 16, 2015 Orders and the Court having considered all papers filed and proceedings in this case, the pleadings and papers filed in support of preliminary approval of the Settlement, and otherwise being fully informed regarding this litigation and good cause appearing therefore; the Court now finds and orders as follows:
1. The Court finds that the proposed settlement is the product of arm's-length, serious, and non-collusive negotiations between experienced and knowledgeable counsel for the Plaintiff Class and Defendants, who have actively and competently prosecuted and defended this litigation.
2. The Court finds that distribution of notice to the class has been completed in conformance with the Court's August 7, 2014 and January 16, 2015 Orders and that no class member objected to the proposed settlement.
3. The Court, having carefully considered the Settlement set forth in the parties' Joint Motion and supporting documents filed August 5, 2014, finds that the Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, and further finds that the benefit to the Plaintiff Class supports final approval of the proposed settlement in light of all of the relevant considerations.
1. This action is determined to be properly maintained as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with an injunctive relief settlement class consisting of all present and future CDCR inmates with psychiatric conditions that are disabilities as defined by the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and who are allegedly excluded and/or screened out from any prison program, service, or activity on the basis of their psychiatric disability status.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation and over all parties to the action, including all members of the Plaintiff Class as defined above.
3. The notices disseminated to the Plaintiff Class as described in Paragraphs 6 through 8 of the Court's August 7, 2014 Order constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances. Said notices provided due and adequate notice of proceedings for approval of the Settlement and of the matters set forth therein, including the proposed Settlement set forth in the Joint Motion, to all persons entitled to such notice, and said notices fully satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Constitution of the United States, due process and any other applicable rule(s) of this Court.
4. A district court's role in reviewing the substance of a class action settlement under Rule 23 is to ensure that it is `fair, adequate, and free from collusion.'" Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 8 (2013) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Court finds that in all respects the settlement in this case is fair, adequate, and free from collusion, and that all of the relevant Hanlon factors weigh in favor of granting final approval in this case. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d 1011 at 1026. The Court thus grants final approval of the settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. The parties' Settlement Agreement, attached as
6. The Court in Coleman will hereafter have jurisdiction to enforce and administer the Settlement Agreement, including resolving disputes arising under Paragraph 23 of the Settlement Agreement regarding allegations of disability discrimination against class members or the exclusion of class members from Defendants' programs and services on the basis of disability. For purposes of resolving disputes regarding discrimination against or the exclusion of class members from Defendants' programs and services on the basis of a disability, the Coleman Court will address whether the specific systemic policies, practices and procedures identified under Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Settlement Agreement violate the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and if so what prospective relief is appropriate. The Coleman Court shall have jurisdiction to resolve any dispute regarding attorneys' fees as set forth in Paragraph 30 of the Settlement Agreement.
7. The revised Coleman notice agreed to by the Parties filed on January 23, 2015, attached as
8. The Hecker action is hereby dismissed with prejudice except as to claims regarding assignment of (MHSDS) inmates to fire/conservation camps, as described in Paragraph 25 of the Settlement Agreement, which are dismissed without prejudice.
1. This action was filed on December 1, 2005. In the presently operative pleading, the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Robert Hecker, Christopher Lee Jenkins, Peter Taylor, Ying Watt, Askia Ashanti, Ronald Auld, John Mueller, Daniel Hunley, Joseph Cox, Eddie Thomas, Brian K. Stafford, Michael Lovelace, Bobby Daniels, Quinton Gray, John Wesley Williams, Samuel D'Angelo and Jon Schooley, alleged that their rights were being violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Defendants:
(Second Amended Complaint, Docket No. 35, at 12.) Plaintiffs alleged "systemwide, statewide policies, practices, and procedures [that] function to discriminate against inmates with severe psychiatric disabilities; exclude them from programs, services, and activities; retaliate against them; and segregate them unnecessarily." Plaintiffs further sought to represent "a class of all present and future California inmates of the CDCR with psychiatric conditions that are disabilities as defined by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act who are excluded and/or screened out from any prison program, service, or activity on the basis of their assignment to or participation in the MHSDS program, including the EOP and CCCMS." (Id. at 14.)
2. Before the Hecker action was filed, the parties in Coleman v. Brown, E.D. Cal. No. cv 90-0520 LLK, had attempted to negotiate provisions of the Coleman Program Guide (which describes policies and procedures for provision of mental health care for California prison inmates) regarding program access and disability discrimination for prison inmates with psychiatric disabilities. The parties did not reach a resolution.
3. On February 3, 2006, the Coleman Special Master issued his report and recommendation concerning the Program Guide, concluding that the parties' disputes concerning alleged disability discrimination could not be resolved by the Special Master at that time.
4. On November 27, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Hecker action.
5. On March 15, 2007, the Court issued an order staying the Hecker litigation, and referred the matter to the Coleman Special Master to determine whether the claims raised in the present litigation could be resolved within the remedial phase of Coleman. The Coleman Special Master filed a report on June 12, 2007 stating that the parties were not able to resolve the dispute at that time.
6. The Hecker Plaintiffs filed motions to lift the stay on December 14, 2007, and again on September 9, 2012 and March 1, 2013. On October 19, 2012, the Court ordered that the parties meet and confer under the guidance of the Coleman Special Master to determine again whether the issues in the Hecker action could be resolved through the Coleman remedial process.
7. Since that date, the parties have engaged in settlement negotiations with the assistance of the Coleman Special Master. On May 5, 2014, the Court entered an order extending the stay to June 6, 2014.
8. While the case has been stayed, the parties have resolved issues concerning some of the specific policies, practices, and procedures that may have excluded some EOP and CCCMS participants from some of the benefits of the services, programs, and activities operated by CDCR, and may have discriminated against individuals with psychiatric disabilities. These specific issues are listed below at Paragraph 21. To facilitate resolution of these issues, the parties agree that the Coleman Program Guide shall be amended to reflect these changed policies, practices, and procedures. The parties further agree that implementation of the modified replacement polices, practices and procedures may be enforced by the Court as part of the Coleman class action litigation.
9. During the period of the Hecker stay, the parties also identified specific policies, practices, and procedures as to which there is no agreement regarding any past or present effect of exclusion or discrimination. Therefore, as to these issues, which are identified in Paragraph 22 below, the parties have reached no agreement that a remedy is required. The parties, however, have agreed that these issues are appropriate for resolution within the Coleman remedial process.
10. During the period of the Hecker stay, the parties also identified specific policies, practices and procedures that Defendants maintain are legally justified, do not unlawfully have the effect of excluding or discriminating against EOP and CCCMS prisoners, and therefore cannot be addressed in the Coleman remedial process. These specific issues are listed at Paragraph 23 below. The parties agree that as to these specific issues, there is no remedy in Coleman, and any claims as to them will be dismissed in Hecker without prejudice.
11. The parties agree that solely for purposes of settlement and judicial approval of this Agreement, they stipulate that the putative class in Hecker—specifically, all present and future CDCR inmates with psychiatric conditions that are disabilities as defined by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and who are allegedly excluded and/or screened out from any prison program, service, or activity on the basis of their assignment to or participation in the MHSDS program, including the CCCMS and EOP—may be certified as a class for settlement purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), and that an order may be entered, after notice to the class and an opportunity to object, finding the settlement to be fair and reasonable as to this settlement class.
12. All parties and their counsel recognize that, in the absence of an approved settlement, they face lengthy and substantial litigation, including motions to dismiss, motions for class certification, formal discovery, motions for summary judgment, and trial and potential appellate proceedings, all of which will consume time and resources and present the parties with ongoing litigation risks and uncertainties. The parties wish to avoid these risks, uncertainties, and consumption of time and resources through a settlement under the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
ACCORDINGLY, without any admission or concession by Defendants of any liability or wrongdoing with respect to the allegations in the complaint, and without any admission or concession by Defendants of any systemic violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the complaint, and all claims made in it, shall be finally and fully compromised, settled, and released, and the action dismissed with prejudice upon and subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, which the parties enter into freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and with the advice of counsel.
13. Plaintiffs Robert Hecker, Christopher Lee Jenkins, Peter Taylor, Ying Watt, Askia Ashanti, Ronald Auld, John Mueller, Daniel Hunley, Joseph Cox, Eddie Thomas, Brian K. Stafford, Michael Lovelace, Bobby Daniels, Quinton Gray, John Wesley Williams, Samuel D'Angelo, and Jon Schooley have been at relevant periods inmates of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and participates in the Mental Health Services Delivery System (MHSDS) at both the Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) and Clinical Correctional Case Management System (CCCMS) levels of care as defined by the Coleman Program Guide. Plaintiffs allege that they are persons with disabilities within the meaning of all applicable statues, and are qualified persons with disabilities within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs allegedly represent a class of all present and future CDCR inmates with psychiatric conditions that are disabilities as defined by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act who are excluded and/or screened out from any prison program, service, or activity on the basis of their assignment to or participation in the MHSDS program, including the EOP and CCCMS.
14. Defendants are CDCR, the Governor of the State of California, CDCR's secretary, CDCR's undersecretary, CDCR's Director of Adult Institutions, and the Warden of the California Medical Facility. Each Defendant is a state official sued in his or her official capacity.
15. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202.
16. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because a substantial part of the events alleged by Plaintiff occurred within the Eastern District of California.
17. The parties shall jointly request certification of a settlement class to be defined as all present and future CDCR inmates with psychiatric conditions that are disabilities as defined by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and who are allegedly excluded and/or screened out from any prison program, service, or activity on the basis of their assignment to or participation in the MHSDS program, including the CCCMS and EOP (the Hecker class.)
18. The parties shall lodge their joint request for certification of the Hecker class along with a Notice of Settlement of the Hecker Action to be submitted for approval by the Court, and subject to such approval, to be posted in all CDCR institutions.
19. The parties shall jointly request a fairness hearing on the Hecker settlement to be set at a reasonable time after the posting of notice to allow for the receipt and consideration of class member objections.
20. If this Agreement is not approved by the Court, the parties shall be restored to their respective positions in the action as of the date on which the Agreement was entered, the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall have no force and effect, and shall not be used in this action or in any proceeding for any purpose, and the litigation of this action would resume as if there had been no settlement, with no stipulated class.
21. The parties agree that the Coleman Program Guide shall be amended, where necessary, so that the following polices, practices, and procedures have been or will be modified:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
22. The parties have not agreed that the following specific policies, practices, and procedures have had the effect of discriminating against or excluding EOP and CCCMS participants from the benefits of the services, programs, and activities operated by CDCR, and therefore that any remedy is required regarding them. The parties nevertheless agree that allegations of discrimination related to the following specific policies, practices, and procedures are appropriate for resolution within the Coleman remedial process.
a. Privileges for inmates with psychiatric disabilities with extended stays in reception centers (i.e. beyond ninety days) due solely to a psychiatric disability;
b. Access to substance abuse programs by inmates with psychiatric disabilities;
c. Access to minimum security facilities and community-based programs by inmates with psychiatric disabilities;
d. Access to reentry hub programs by inmates with psychiatric disabilities;
e. Effective communication and discrimination in the Rules Violation Report (RVR) process for inmates with psychiatric disabilities; and
f. Discrimination in use of restraints, including treatment modules, for prisoners with psychiatric disabilities.
23. Resolution of issues identified in Paragraphs 21 and 22 through the Coleman remedial process shall include a reasonable continued period of negotiations facilitated by the Special Master. Any issues resolved in such negotiations may result in further amendments to policies, practices, and procedures to be implemented as part of the Coleman remedy. Issues that are not resolved after a reasonable period of negotiations may be presented by Plaintiffs to the Coleman court for resolution. The parties agree that for purposes of resolving issues of discrimination or exclusion against prison inmates with psychiatric disabilities, the Coleman Court should address whether the specific systemic policies, practices and procedures identified in this paragraph violate the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and if so what prospective relief is appropriate. Plaintiffs shall have the burden of proving that the specific systemic policies, practices and procedures identified in Paragraphs 21 and 22 violate the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Defendants shall have an opportunity to respond to any such evidence presented to the Court and to present their own evidence. Brief or isolated instances of alleged disability discrimination shall not constitute an ongoing, system-wide policy or practice in violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.
24. The parties agree that the following issues are not appropriate for resolution in the Coleman remedial process, and that upon dismissal of the Hecker action, these issues will not become part of the Coleman remedy, and that as to these issues the dismissal of Hecker will be without prejudice to resolution of these issues in subsequent litigation:
a. Exclusion of CCCMS inmates from participation in the program, service, or activity of assignment to conservation/fire camp.
Defendants agree that any of the individual Hecker plaintiffs may pursue ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims concerning fire camp/conservation camp against Defendants in a separate lawsuit.
25. The parties shall jointly request that the Hecker Court, after the fairness hearing described in Paragraph 19 above, shall dismiss the Hecker action in a form of order jointly proposed by the parties that specifies that the Hecker certified class action is dismissed in return for the relief that the Hecker class will have received under the terms of this Agreement by virtue of the implementation of specific policy, practice and procedure changes as part of the Coleman remedial process. The form of order shall specify that the dismissal is with prejudice except as to claims regarding assignment of MHSDS inmates to fire/conservation camps.
26. It is the intention of the parties in signing this Agreement that upon approval by the Court it shall be effective as a full and final accord and satisfaction and release from all claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint except for claims concerning conservation/fire camp, which will be dismissed without prejudice as described above. By signing this Agreement, Plaintiffs release CDCR, Defendants, and any other past or current State officials and employees from all claims, past, present and future, known or unknown, that arise or could arise from the facts alleged in the complaint. Nothing in this Agreement will affect the rights of any named Hecker Plaintiffs regarding any legal claim that arises after the date that the settlement is executed or regarding claims of Hecker Plaintiffs other than those asserted in the Second Amended Complaint under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for injunctive and declaratory relief.
27. In furtherance of this intention, the parties acknowledge that they are familiar with, and expressly waive, the provisions of California Civil Code section 1542, which states:
28. This Agreement is the compromise of various disputed claims and shall not be treated as an admission of liability by any of the parties for any purpose. The signature of or on behalf of the respective parties does not indicate or acknowledge the validity or merits of any claim or demand of the other party. The parties further agree that the Coleman class does not include persons on parole and that nothing in this agreement limits the ability of Plaintiffs to pursue any claims on behalf of persons on parole.
29. The parties agree that this Agreement regarding specific policies, practices, and procedures that have allegedly had the effect of excluding some EOP and CCCMS participants from some of the benefits of the services, programs and activities operated by CDCR shall not affect or otherwise impact Defendants' ability to seek termination of prospective relief entered in Coleman. Termination of the Coleman litigation will terminate the issues that have been or are being resolved under this Agreement. By this agreement, Defendants do not waive any defenses already asserted in this litigation.
30. The parties agree that all claims for reasonable fees and costs for work previously done in this litigation, and any future work done by Plaintiffs' counsel in Coleman regarding Plaintiffs' alleged violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by Defendants, may be resolved through the periodic fees process in Coleman. The parties agree that Plaintiffs' counsel's billing rates for such work will be subject to the maximum billing rate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Defendants waive any objection that such work is not compensable in Coleman because it involves allegations of violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Work performed by Plaintiff's counsel before execution of this Settlement Agreement may be addressed in the Coleman quarterly fees negotiation immediately following the execution of the Settlement Agreement.
31. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties and their respective officers, agents, administrators, successors, assignees, heirs, executors, trustees, attorneys, consultants, and any committee or arrangement of creditors organized with respect to the affairs of any such party.
32. Plaintiffs represent that they own the interests, rights, and claims that are the subject matter of this Agreement. Plaintiffs and their principals, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, heirs, descendants, executors, representatives, partners, and associates fully release and discharge the other parties and their principals, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, heirs, descendants, executors, representatives, partners, and associates from all rights, claims, and actions that Plaintiffs and their successors now may have or at any time in the future may have against the other parties and their successors except for claims concerning conservation/fire camp dismissed without prejudice.
33. The consideration recited in this Agreement is the only consideration for this Agreement, and no representations, promises, or inducements have been made to the parties, or any of their representatives, other than those set forth in this Agreement.
34. This Agreement may be executed simultaneously in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.
35. Each party to this Agreement shall execute or cause to be executed such further and other documents as are needed to carry out the expressed intent and purpose of this Agreement.
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement,
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement,
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law,
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties, No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
36. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.
37. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by all the parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.
38. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are governed by and interpreted under California state law.
39. Should any provision of this Agreement be held invalid or illegal, such illegality shall not invalidate the whole of this Agreement, but the Agreement shall be construed as if it did not contain the illegal part, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced accordingly.
The undersigned agree to the above:
On September 13, 1995, a federal court in Sacramento ruled that the CDCR violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Constitution by failing to provide adequate mental health care. The ruling was in a case called Coleman v. Wilson (now Coleman v. Brown). The case covers all prisoners with serious mental disorders housed in California state prisons. The case continues today. The Court's 1995 Order is available for review in your prison law library.
There have been numerous additional Orders from the Court requiring specific changes. Some of the areas addressed include: screening, treatment programs, staffing, accurate and complete records, medication distribution, inpatient psychiatric care, segregation, use of force, the disciplinary process and suicide prevention.
The Court has approved CDCR's plan for providing mental health care. That plan is now set forth in the "Mental Health Services Delivery System Program Guide." CDCR also is modifying policies that may have discriminated against prisoners with psychiatric disabilities and will allow class members to request reasonable accommodations. The Court has appointed a Special Master who, among other things, monitors and reports on CDCR's compliance with the mental health Program Guide and CDCR policies.
The lawyers representing the prisoners are:
Prison officials are represented by lawyers in the California Attorney General's office:
(Revised January 2015)