Filed: Jan. 07, 2020
Latest Update: Jan. 07, 2020
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2020. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 30, 2020, and to exclude time between January 9, 2020, and April 30, 2020, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2020. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 30, 2020, and to exclude time between January 9, 2020, and April 30, 2020, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2020.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 30, 2020, and to exclude time between January 9, 2020, and April 30, 2020, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 900 pages of discovery — including reports and photographs — and more than 80 video or audio recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, review the discovery, research the legal ramifications of the factual basis related to the charges, discuss potential options, to prepare motions, and otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 9, 2020 to April 30, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
g) On December 18, 2019, the Court entered a minute order of its own volition vacating the January 9, 2020 status date and resetting the matter for status on April 16, 2020. This order supersedes the December 18, 2019 order. The reasons for exclusion under the Speedy Trial Act stated in this stipulation are independent of that order.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: January 6, 2020 McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
MICHAEL W. REDDING
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: January 6, 2020 ERIN J. RADEKIN
Counsel for Defendant
MANUEL S. CARDENAS
Dated: January 6, 2020 JEROME PRICE
Counsel for Defendant
GENARO L. MERINO
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
