STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS IN INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS' CONSOLIDATED AMENDED COMPLAINT

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.

WHEREAS, as directed by the Court, the parties in the Indirect Purchaser actions have met and conferred in in an effort to narrow and simplify the issues to be presented on the forthcoming Phase II of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs' ("IPPs'") Consolidated Amended Complaint ("IPP-CAC"); and

WHEREAS, as part of those meet and confer efforts, Defendants have agreed not to move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1) the IPPs' claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act on the grounds that it is not pled with sufficient particularity; and (2) the IPPs' claim under Nebraska's Junkin Act on the grounds that the IPPs may not obtain damages allegedly incurred before Nebraska repealed the bar on indirect purchaser standing set forth by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), although Defendants reserve their right to assert these arguments in other actions in this multi-district litigation or any other related case; and

WHEREAS, the IPPs have similarly agreed to voluntarily dismiss certain claims asserted in the IPP-CAC, as set forth below;

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between counsel for the undersigned Plaintiffs and Defendants, as follows:

1. Defendants shall not move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1) the IPPs' claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act on the grounds that it is not pled with sufficient particularity; and (2) the IPPs' claim under Nebraska's Junkin Act on the grounds that the IPPs may not obtain damages allegedly incurred before Nebraska repealed the bar on indirect purchaser standing set forth by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), without prejudice to Defendants' right to assert these arguments in other actions in this multi-district litigation or any other related case; and

2. The following claims in the IPP-CAC are voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

a. The IPPs' damages claims under Puerto Rico law, see IPP-CAC, ¶¶ 293, 354, 401, 411(v), 466;

b. The IPPs' damages claims under New Hampshire law to the extent the alleged damages accrued before January 1, 2008, the effective date of New Hampshire's Illinois Brick repealer statute, see IPP-CAC, ¶¶ 402, 411(p); and

c. The IPPs' damages claims under Utah law to the extent the alleged damages accrued before May 1, 2006, the effective date of Utah's Illinois Brick repealer statute, see IPP-CAC, ¶¶ 402, 411(z).

3. The above dismissals shall be properly reflected in the IPPs' Second Consolidated Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.