MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

FREDERICK F. MUMM, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action seeking to overturn the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pursuant to the June 12, 2013 Case Management Order, on March 4, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation detailing each party's arguments and authorities. The Court has reviewed the administrative record ("AR"), filed by defendant on December 9, 2013, and the Joint Stipulation. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 13, 2009, plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). ALJ Michael D. Radensky held a hearing on December 29, 2011. On January 27, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. Plaintiff sought review of the decision before the Social Security Administration Appeals Council and submitted additional evidence. The Council denied review on March 26, 2010. Plaintiff commenced the instant action on May 30, 2013.

CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff raises two issues in this action:

1. Whether the finding that plaintiff can perform the requirements of exertionally medium work is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.

2. Whether the finding that plaintiff's subjective complaints are not credible is supported by clear and convincing rationales.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d841, 846 (9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla" but less than a preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984). However, even if substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be reversed if the proper legal standard was not applied. Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

The Court will address the issues raised by plaintiff in reverse order.

A. Issue 2.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony. An ALJ may reject a claimant's allegations upon: (1) finding evidence of malingering; or (2) providing clear and convincing reasons for so doing. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). The following factors may be considered in weighing the claimant's credibility in the absence of evidence of malingering: (1) his reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the claimant's testimony or between the claimant's testimony and his conduct; (3) his daily activities; (4) his work record; and (5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which he complains. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (S.S.A.). The ALJ may also use "ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 960. "General findings are insufficient." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ must state which testimony is not credible and identify the evidence that undermines the plaintiff's complaints. Id.; Benton, 331 F.3d at 1041. The ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to deference if his reasoning is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is "sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant's testimony. . . ." Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ must "point to specific facts in the record which demonstrate that [the claimant] is in less pain than she claims").

The ALJ provided the following rationale for discounting plaintiff's testimony:

AR 23.

Essentially, the ALJ appears to rely on two factors: (1) plaintiff's hearing testimony shows a more active lifestyle than he described in his Function Report and (2) the test results (and presumably plaintiff's testimony regarding same) showing severe neuropathy are not supported by clinical findings. Neither of these factors is clear and convincing.

With respect to the first factor, the activity described by plaintiff in his hearing testimony cannot accurately be described as showing an active lifestyle. Plaintiff testified that he previously did not go to church, but that he now goes to church on Sundays accompanied by his family. (AR 55-56.) He also testified that his 14 grandchildren come to visit him. He did not describe participating in any activity with his grandchildren. (AR 62.) In addition, plaintiff testified that one of his grandsons plays football every other Saturday. Although the record is unintelligible at this point, it may be that plaintiff testified that he attended those games. (AR 59.) Finally, plaintiff testified that another of his grandchildren plays baseball, but that he has not been to one of those games in awhile. (AR 63.)

Presumably, the ALJ considered this testimony to be inconsistent with the following statements in the Function Report: under "Social Activities," when asked about the kinds of things he does with others, plaintiff wrote, "[F]amily members visit w/me as I lay in my bed." When asked to list places he goes on a regular basis, plaintiff wrote, "Nowhere, I just sit on my porch in the evenings." (AR 202.) Depending on one's interpretation of "regular basis," the only apparent inconsistency between the hearing testimony and the Function Report is the failure to mention attending church every Sunday. However, the Function Report is dated August 1, 2010; whereas, the hearing was held on December 29, 2011. Plaintiff testified that he previously did not attend church. Because the ALJ never asked plaintiff when he started to attend church regularly, there is no contradiction in the record.

With respect to the second factor, the ALJ acknowledges that the medical test showed severe neuropathy and that the treating notes document a symptom of neuropathy (i.e., lack of sensation in the feet). It is unclear what "objective clinical findings" the ALJ was looking for. It is even less clear why a medical test and treatment notes that corroborate plaintiff's symptom testimony provide support for rejecting that testimony. In any event, lack of objective medical support is insufficient, in itself, to serve as a basis for rejecting a claimant's subjective symptoms. Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).

Therefore, remand is required with respect to this issue.

B. Issue 1.

Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's findings regarding plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Given that a reassessment of plaintiff's credibility may affect the residual functional capacity analysis, the Court need not decide Issue 2 at this time. However, the Court notes that it is concerning that the ALJ relied on the report of a consultative examiner who had no access to the medical files and was unaware of the diagnostic test (which took place after the consultative examiner prepared his report) that indicated severe neuropathy. Presumably on remand the ALJ will address this concern.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgement of the Commissioner is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.